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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of risk management as 
practised by tax administrations of developed countries and to ascertain what 
prevents the developing countries from managing risks efficiently and effectively. 
Tax administrations are faced with challenges to ensure voluntary compliance 
with the tax law. Compliance risk that is generally faced by tax administrations in 
relation to the implementation of the Self-Assessment System (SAS) is further 
explored. A well-designed risk management strategy enables tax administrations 
to manage risks efficiently whilst reducing administrative costs in the process. 
The empirical evidence indicates that, in developing countries, the level of 
compliance is generally low and the administrative capability of tax agencies is 
relatively poor. In an effort to increase tax compliance, tax administrations in 
developing countries tend to adopt a traditional approach to their duties by 
implementing a command-and-control mechanism.  
 
The majority of tax compliance research has been written from the perspective of 
taxpayers. This study, in contrast, investigates the perspective of a tax 
administration in a developing country; hence the Malaysian Tax Administration, 
also known as the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) has been selected 
as a case study. Compliance risk management by the IRBM is addressed in order 
to understand the agency’s activities that are designed to encourage voluntary 
compliance and manage compliance risk. This qualitative research uses 
responsive regulation theory as a concept to underpin this investigation. This 
study also develops a conceptual framework which combines three major themes: 
tax compliance, risk management and responsive regulation. Responsive 
regulation in the tax administrations of developing countries is considered a new 
concept, thus warranting further study. Responsive regulation encourages a soft 
approach to handling non-compliant taxpayers, resorting to a hard approach only 
if taxpayers refuse to comply. Empirical data was collected through face-to-face 
interviews with senior officials of the IRBM and tax practitioners in Malaysia to 
elicit the interviewees’ perceptions of risk and IRBM risk management practices. 
To enrich data collection, secondary data was collected from a range of published 
and unpublished printed materials from the IRBM.  
Findings from this study suggest that IRBM risk management strategies conform 
to responsive regulation theory. Various education programmes are conducted by 
the IRBM to assist and encourage voluntary compliance. The study reveals that 
Malaysian taxpayers’ compliance behaviour is influenced by tax knowledge, 
culture and their perceptions of the government administering the revenue. 
Knowledge gained from this study would provide insights for tax administrations 
in other developing countries of IRBM risk management practices in fostering 
voluntary compliance and self-regulation.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Objective and Motivation  
The aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of risk management in 
practice as conducted by tax administrations in developed countries and of the 
problems faced by developing countries that prevent them from managing risks 
efficiently and effectively
1
. To understand the practice of managing risks, this 
research explores the potential compliance risks affecting revenue collection for 
tax administrations in developing economies generally, and the Malaysian tax 
administration, also known as the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM), in 
particular. The study also investigates risk management practices by the IRBM 
and obtains insights of IRBM officials’ perceptions of these risk management 
strategies. Hence, this study seeks to fill the literature gap in risk management 
strategies for tax administration in developing countries. Furthermore, the 
objective of the research is to study the risk management systems and compliance 
models implemented by other countries and to analyse whether the systems or 
models are appropriate for the Malaysian tax administration.  
This research focuses on tax administrations in the developing countries because, 
according to the literature (Trasberg, 2004; Katsios, 2006, Baurer, 2005, Bird and 
Zolt, 2008), there are many issues pertaining to internal or external risks faced by 
these tax administrations. Previous studies have presented the success that the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
and the Internal Revenue Service of the USA (IRS) have had in increasing 
                                                          
1
 “An effective tax administration requires establishing an environment in which citizens are 
induced to comply with tax laws voluntarily, while efficient tax administration requires that this 
task be performed at minimum cost to the community” (Bird, 2004:138). 
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taxpayer compliance through their risk management strategies. By learning about 
their strategies and adopting some of them, tax administrations in developing 
countries may be able to improve taxpayer compliance in their own countries. As 
one of the developing countries, Malaysia is chosen as a case study for this 
research to explore how the IRBM manages compliance risk since the 
implementation of Self-Assessment Systems (SAS) to individual taxpayers for the 
2004 assessment year.  
At the time of study, to the best of my knowledge, there is no published study 
relating to the issue of risk management in Malaysian tax administration or the 
perceptions of IRBM officials towards managing compliance risks in the era of 
SAS. The lack of empirical evidence has shaped the motivation for this study, 
which sets out to fill the knowledge gaps related to risk management strategies by 
the IRBM. SAS has been implemented in Malaysia since the 2004 assessment 
year for individuals, businesses, partnerships and cooperative taxpayers. With 
nine years’ (2004 to 2012) experience of running the SAS, it is time to explore 
how IRBM officials manage the internal and external risks which may impede the 
effectiveness of SAS.  
Until 2008, according to my experience working in the IRBM, there was no 
formal risk management process formulated by the organisation. I was aware of 
the subject of risk management after reading an article published in a tax journal 
in Malaysia. Curiosity about risk management motivated me to explore this 
subject to find out if tax compliance activities conducted by the IRBM meet the 
criteria of the risk management process. When I started my PhD, I was interested 
to explore this subject in academia so I could bridge the knowledge gap in terms 
3 
 
of risk management in the Malaysian tax administration whilst conducting an 
empirical investigation of the internal and external risks faced by the IRBM and 
examining how risks are managed and how the IRBM officials perceive the risk 
management practices. Internal risks are risks or challenges faced by the IRBM 
resulting from factors within the organisation itself (Black, 2005; EC, 2006; 
OECD, 2001), whilst common external risks faced by revenue bodies (regulators) 
would be law and policies, stakeholders, customers, safety, security, economics, 
financial and politics, to name but a few (Black, 2005; OECD, 2010; EC, 2006; 
Braithwaite, 2003; Bird, 2004).  Moreover, a more specific risk often faced by tax 
administration is compliance risk in relation to implementation of the SAS, which 
is explored in this study. Best practices in managing compliance risks by tax 
administrations, such as the ATO, the HMRC and the New Zealand Inland 
Revenue (NZIR) are described.  
Appropriate regulatory response strategies by regulators may encourage taxpayers 
(regulatees) to cross-over the compliance boundary from non-compliance to 
compliance (Gracia and Oats, 2012). Thus, this study addresses the means by 
which the IRBM manages internal and external risks responsively. Findings from 
this study can inform other tax administrations, particularly from developing 
countries, about how Malaysia manages tax compliance risk. The findings can 
provide a platform for the IRBM and other tax administrations of developing 
countries to evaluate their existing risk management practice and to understand 
how the risk management concept can be applied to improve voluntary 
compliance in their administrations.  
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This chapter begins by describing the research questions of the study in Section 
1.2. This is followed by Section 1.3, which outlines the empirical, methodological 
and conceptual contributions of the research. Next, Section 1.4 provides the 
research background of the study. The research methodology and methods for   
gathering data are described in Section 1.5, whilst Section 1.6 justifies the scope 
of this research. Finally, the chapter concludes with the structure of the remainder 
of the thesis, in Section 1.7. 
1.2 Research questions 
Empirically, this study places the focus on practices for managing compliance risk 
by tax administrations of developing countries. As this study investigates the 
IRBM current practice in managing compliance risk in its administration, it 
addresses the main research question: “In what way does the IRBM 
manage tax compliance risks?” 
This question is concerned with understanding the potential strategies to be 
adopted by the IRBM to manage risks. In order to answer the main research 
question, three sub-questions were derived to explain the study further. The sub-
questions are: 
i. “What are the internal and external risks faced by the IRBM?” 
ii. “What are the perceptions of IRBM officials and Malaysian tax 
practitioners of Malaysian taxpayers’ behaviour?” 
 
iii. “How does the IRBM manage internal and external risks including 
non-compliance risk?” 
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To the question of “What are the internal and external risks faced by the 
IRBM?” the study explores the internal and external risks faced by the 
administration, which are discussed in Chapters Five and Six. Interview data and 
secondary data are analysed to obtain answers to the research question, which 
seeks insight into the risk management practices in the IRBM and sets out to 
explore the officials’ perceptions of the current practice.  
Further, the question “What are the perceptions of IRBM officials and 
Malaysian tax practitioners of Malaysian taxpayers’ behaviour?” explores 
participants’ understanding of the EC’s compliance pyramid and their views of 
how the IRBM should improve its risk management strategies. These findings are 
presented in Chapter Seven. During the interviews, it was found that one of the 
major activities undertaken by the IRBM to manage tax compliance risks is 
taxpayer education programmes. Hence, to provide answers to the final question, 
which is “How does the IRBM manages internal and external risks including 
non-compliance risk?” Chapter 8 discusses various educational activities 
designed to encourage voluntary compliance by Malaysian taxpayers.  
Answers to the research questions comprise one contribution of the study. The 
next section lists other contributions of the research.  
1.3 Contributions of the research 
1.3.1 Empirical contribution 
The study contributes to knowledge of how tax administrations operate in 
practice, particularly those in developing countries. Most of the empirical studies 
on tax administration in Malaysia are of tax education, tax compliance, tax 
evasion, taxpayer behaviour, and recently more technical subjects, such as transfer 
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pricing and forensic accounting. However, so far, there is no empirical study of 
risk management in Malaysian tax administration. This study fills the literature 
gap in relation to managing risk by tax administration in Malaysia. Moreover, the 
area of responsive regulation in tax administration warranted further study, 
particularly from the perspective of tax administration of developing countries. As 
this study also addresses responsive regulation extensively, the relationship 
between responsive regulation and risk management is highlighted in the study.  
Furthermore, the vast majority of tax research in the Malaysian context has been 
written from the perspective of taxpayers, salaried earners as well as small-
business or sole-proprietors taxpayers, to understand their compliance behaviour 
(Azmi and Perumal, 2008; Sapiei and Abdullah, 2008; Pope and Mohdali, 2010; 
Choong and Wong, 2011). However, this study provides an important insight and 
contributes to an understanding of how tax officials, particularly Malaysian tax 
officials, operate in the SAS environment. Interviews have been carried out to 
explore IRBM officials’ perceptions of taxpayers’ compliance behaviour and also 
of the risk management practices by the IRBM.  
Previous research has made a small contribution to the literature based on 
interviews with revenue officials, such as that of Boll (2011) on Danish Tax and 
Customs Administration responses towards tax compliance, and Tuck (2007) on 
HMRC responses towards corporate tax compliance. ATO officials’ were also 
interviewed to obtain their perceptions of the compliance pyramid and the 
responsive regulation approach when first introduced in Australia (Murphy, 2004; 
Job and Honaker, 2003; Hobson, 2005); whilst Morris and Lonsdale (2005) have 
studied the compliance model of NZIR. Thus, this study adds to the literature by 
examining Malaysian tax officials’ perceptions of enforcement strategies to 
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increase voluntary compliance in Malaysia. As an IRBM officer, the author has 
privileged access to meet and interview senior executives of the IRBM and collect 
some internal documents for the study. 
1.3.2 Methodological contribution 
With reference to other studies conducted by IRBM officials and academic 
researchers in the Malaysian context, most of the researchers have used a 
quantitative approach in their studies (Palil, 2010; Sotimin, 2010; Sia, 2008; 
Ibrahim and Pope, 2011; Kasipillai and Abdul Jabbar, 2006).  The use of surveys 
(Song and Yarbrough, 1978), questionnaires (Eriksen and Fallen, 1996) or 
laboratory experiments (Alm et al., 1992) is a common research design for data 
collection, particularly in tax research. There are very few qualitative studies that 
have been conducted in Malaysia for tax compliance related research. However, 
this study enriches the existing qualitative research by providing a methodological 
and empirical contribution using a qualitative approach.  
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with IRBM officials and Malaysian tax 
practitioners to obtain insights into interviewees’ perceptions of SAS and tax 
compliance in Malaysia as well as compliance risk management by the IRBM. 
The interview has been selected as a research method for this study because the 
author believes that rich information could be obtained through interviewing. The 
interviewer would be able to request participants to elaborate on their answers to 
gain in-depth information. Semi-structured interviews were used in preference to 
structured questions because the rigidity of the latter would deprive interviewers 
of the freedom to ask other questions. The semi-structured method, on the other 
hand, allows interviewers make a note beforehand of questions they might ask 
depending on the flow of the interview, and then add these questions 
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spontaneously, thus obtaining richer responses. To enrich data collection, 
secondary data was collected from a range of published and unpublished printed 
materials from the IRBM. The documents were then analysed to look for related 
themes and to establish findings for the study. 
1.3.3 Conceptual framework contribution 
Another contribution of the study is that it provides a conceptual framework 
which combines two main compliance risk management models from the EC 
(2010) and the OECD (2004). Both models are addressed in Sections 3.4.2 and 
3.4.3 respectively. The OECD and EC models have been chosen as components of 
the framework as both provide guidelines to tax administrations in managing 
compliance risks, which is related to this study.  
The risk management process incorporated in the models also applies the common 
or standard risk management steps suggested in the risk management literature 
(IRM, 2002; Black, 2005; Thompson, 2008). The conceptual framework 
integrates three main themes of this study: tax compliance, compliance risk 
management and responsive regulation. The pyramid shape of compliance model, 
which has been adopted by a number of tax administrations such as the ATO, 
HMRC and NZIR, has been modified into a lamp-shade shape to represent the 
size of the shadow economy, one of the main risks faced by developing countries. 
The conceptual framework is presented and discussed further in Section 8.8. 
To understand further the objective of the study, the following section presents a 
general overview of the research background, such as the risks faced by tax 
administrations, especially in developing countries, and the concept of risk 
management. Furthermore, the section describes tax compliance risk as the type 
9 
 
of risk emphasised in this study. The section also introduces briefly the responsive 
regulation theory as a strategy for compliance risk management.  
1.4 Research Background  
1.4.1 Risk faced by tax administration in developing countries 
Taxation plays a crucial role in promoting economic activity and growth. Through 
taxation governments ensure that resources are channelled towards the 
development and welfare of its people. For this reason, tax administrators 
shoulder a heavy responsibility to assist their government in bringing about this 
economic development. It is the expectation of stakeholders that tax 
administrators will be highly professional, skilful and competent in order to 
provide better delivery of service, effective compliance strategies and an increase 
in revenue collection. In the effort to achieve the targets set by the government to 
collect revenue, tax administrations are faced with various challenges, both 
internally and externally. Inefficient administration, technological change, 
corruption and the cash economy are among the high category risks identified in 
the literature that affect the efficiency of revenue administrations in developing 
countries (Trasberg, 2004; Katsios, 2006, Baurer, 2005, Bird and Zolt, 2008).  
Developing countries, in the context of the present study, refer to those where 
citizens have an upper-middle-income
2
, as listed by the World Bank. These 
countries fall into the same income group as Malaysia, hence a fair comparison 
can be made in terms of economic and financial ability to develop the country. 
However, other countries may learn from the experience of the Malaysian tax 
                                                          
2 Economies are divided among income groups according to  its gross national income (GNI) per 
capita for 2010, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, 
$1,005 or less; lower-middle income, $1,006 - $3,975; upper-middle income, $3,976 - $12,275; 
and high income, $12,276 or more (World Bank, 2011) 
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administration and use its current practice of risk management as a platform to 
formulate or enhance risk management strategies in their administrations. This 
study explores the types of risk faced by tax administrations in developing 
countries in the following sections. 
1.4.1.1 Poor administration 
Low tax compliance is a serious concern for tax administrations of many 
developing countries since it affects revenue collection for state development 
(Das-Gupta et al., 2004; McCarten, 2006). One of the major challenges is how to 
foster voluntary compliance with the tax laws (Baurer, 2005), due to a number of 
factors that create inefficiency: corruption, a large informal sector,  ambiguity in 
tax laws, a weak legal system, high marginal tax rates, insufficient information 
and a culture of non-compliance (Das-Gupta et al., 2004; McCarten, 2006; Alm et 
al., 2006). The literature (Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Torgler, 2003; Wenzel, 
2002; Feld and Frey, 2005; Kirchler et al., 2008; Alm et al., 1992; Frey and 
Torgler, 2007) also suggests that tax non-compliance is influenced by various 
factors, such as culture, personal values, norms, government policies and 
demographics. In addition, tax administrations in developing countries appear 
weak because governments have deliberately chosen not to make them stronger 
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 1992, p.98) and have tended to resort to the 
traditional approach of enforcement (Braithwaite, 2005). McLure Jr. and Pardo 
further state that income tax laws that are recognised as impossible to administer, 
inviting the taxpayer to “cheat in self-defence, knowing that everyone else is 
cheating” (1992, p.127).  
Many studies of tax administrations in developing countries acknowledge that 
these countries still lack an efficient administration (Bird, 2008; Brautigam, 2008; 
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Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 1992). Hogye (2004) points out that a government is 
unable to achieve the desired target in revenue collection if the operation of the 
tax administration of a country is inefficient. Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1992) 
and McCarten (2006) assert that outdated procedures, lack of enforcement activity 
and insufficient training for staff have resulted in inefficient tax administrations. 
Consequently, their objective to collect a targeted amount of revenue is not 
achieved and this has resulted in insufficient funds being amassed to strengthen 
their countries’ economies. 
Moreover, Baurer (2005) identifies numerous characteristics of tax 
administrations in developing countries, such as a lack of interest in implementing 
a self-assessment system; lack of specialization among the tax personnel; lack of 
attention to taxable non-filers (yet unnecessary attention towards registered 
taxpayers); inadequate controls to prevent corruption both internally and 
externally; inadequate written operating procedures as well as minimal taxpayer 
education and assistance. Other features include poor internal communication; 
lack of training for personnel; limited use of technology and the absence of 
identification numbers for taxpayers. Tax administrations are further characterised 
by inadequate numbers of staff and revenue offices; the lack of a strategic 
business plan from the management; political influence; lack of coordination 
between revenue bodies and other government agencies and large tax liabilities 
due to a focus on enforcement rather than collection, which is not aggressively 
pursued.  
1.4.1.2 Corruption 
Another risk faced by tax administrations, particularly those of developing 
countries, is corruption. Akdede (2006, p.141) defines corruption as “an illegal 
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activity of a government official to gain a personal benefit”, while Kunio Senga3, 
speaking at the ADB/OECD Initiative for Asia and the Pacific meeting in 
September, 2010, stated that “corruption challenges remain serious in the Asia 
and Pacific region”. Senga’s statement is consistent with those of Olken and 
Pande who claim that “corruption is high in developing countries” (2011, p.2), 
and Bridi who posits that “revenue administration is often ranked as one of the 
poorest performing public sectors in terms of corruption” (2010, p.1).  
The literature suggests a number of elements that provide the opportunity for 
corruption in tax administration: poverty, poor leadership, low risk of punishment, 
poor internal detection and a low level of technological advancement (Bridi, 2010; 
Bird and Zolt, 2008, Kangave, 2005). Bridi (2010, p.1) attributes corruption to 
complex tax legislation, lengthy procedures, the high discretionary powers given 
to officials and the “low cost of punishment”.  Bird (2010) further states that: “in 
some countries, bribery is so common that it is considered a regular part of the 
compensation of tax officials”. This unethical activity causes the country to suffer 
revenue leakages and creates a sense of distrust in the tax system on the part of the 
taxpayers. The Times of India (June, 2010) reports a statement made by an 
official of the World Bank that “corrupt practices are robbing the developing 
nations of as much as USD 40 billion annually”. Bridi (2010) also states that 
corruption leading to tax evasion has caused some tax administrations to lose 
revenue.  
There is a mixed response in the literature over whether an increment in wages is 
a solution to the issue of corruption. An increase in the salaries of personnel is 
consistent with suggestions by Gill (2003), USAID (2007) and Abdullah (2008) 
                                                          
3 Director General of the Asian Development Bank’s Southeast Asia Regional Department.  
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that this may motivate staff to work harder and may prevent corruption. However, 
Fjeldstad (2005) argues that a higher salary might even encourage corruption as 
there may be an expectation from the community that an officer should earn more 
to help them.  
Tax reforms may be a further step towards managing corruption risk if the 
automation of certain procedures reduces human intervention in the process (Bird 
and Zolt, 2008). However, Bridi (2010) finds that tax reform may not be possible 
in some tax administrations due to rampant corruption activities in the 
administration itself, as demonstrated in the early 1990s, when Indonesian tax 
officials (the main participants in corruption practices in the agency) protested 
against efforts to reform the Indonesian tax administration  (Bridi, 2010, p.3).  
This author reports an interesting conversation in January 2012, with an officer 
from the Bangladesh tax administration, whose statement is consistent with the 
Indonesian scenario. According to the officer, reform of the Bangladesh tax 
administration appeared to be difficult since a culture of corrupt practices had 
become the norm within the organisation. It might therefore be challenging to first 
reform the attitudes of the people before reform of the organisation could take 
place.  
It has been further recommended that corruption may be reduced by practising 
transparency of access to information, and “enabling information about 
government actions, thus citizens can better monitor government officials” (Olken 
and Pande, 2011, p.30). Moreover, corruption is one of the elements hindering a 
country’s development since governments are dependent on revenue collection to 
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stimulate their country’s economy. Consequently, tax administrations may need to 
develop efficient risk management strategies to manage the corruption risk.  
1.4.1.3 Shadow Economy 
Managing shadow economies presents another major challenge to tax 
administrations. The shadow economy - also known as the underground economy, 
the black market, the unofficial economy and the hidden economy - is a business 
activity operating outside the tax system (Russell, 2010a). Frey and Schneider 
(2000, p.2) note additional terms by which the shadow economy is known: 
“informal, irregular, parallel, second, underground, subterranean, hidden, 
invisible, unrecorded and/or moonlighting”. The threat brought by the shadow 
economy has been addressed quite broadly in many tax administration 
conferences and seminars, such as the OECD conference, meetings of the IMF 
and the World Bank seminars, as well as the revenue authorities’ own meetings.   
As the shadow economy results in loss of revenue due to tax evasion, it is a major 
issue in both developing and developed nations (Frey and Schneider, 2000). 
However, in the developed nations, this is not considered to be too serious, due to 
stringent enforcement of punishments by the law and an effective system of 
tracking and monitoring such activities (Schneider, 2006).  
Katsios (2006) divides shadow economy activities into two categories of activity, 
legal and illegal, both of which involve monetary and non-monetary transactions 
and eventually lead to tax evasion and tax avoidance. Various reasons, such as a 
high tax burden on individuals and companies, the onus of government 
regulations and weak tax administrations, have been attributed to shadow 
economy activities (Trasberg, 2004; Katsios, 2006).  
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In addition, Frey and Torgler (2007, p.144) assert that “a large shadow economy 
reduces the state’s ability to collect taxes and thus affects revenues that the 
government uses to provide public goods and to build trustworthy insti tutions”. 
The incentive for enterprise to evade tax increases and more bribes are paid in 
exchange for a promise of protection. Furthermore, according to Schneider (2006, 
p.5), the underground economy includes “all market-based legal production of 
goods and services that are deliberately concealed from the public authorities for  
reasons, such as  avoiding payment of tax and social security contributions,  
avoiding having to meet certain legal labour market standards and avoiding 
compliance with certain administrative procedures.”  
In order to curb the shadow economy, Frey and Schneider (2000) suggest 
deterrence as a more effective enforcement approach by imposing higher fines and 
imprisonment on those involved. They also assert that other measures should be  
taken “by improving the efficiency of public services, reducing the tax and social 
security burden imposed on labour and/or by raising civic virtue has been used 
only rarely” (Frey and Schneider, 2000, p.10). Also, Schneider and Buehn (2007, 
p.36) found that the shadow economy “increases corruption in low income 
countries”. Therefore, it is a responsibility of every government to formulate 
strategies to manage the shadow economy effectively so that such activities could 
be reduced and revenue increased. 
1.4.1.4 Lack of sufficient information and communication technology 
Most tax administrations encounter the same problems in their administration, 
such as an expanding workload, an increase in operational costs and high 
expectations from taxpayers for an improved service. Tax administrations of most 
developing economies still run their operations manually due to inadequate 
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financial resources to invest in modern technology, a lack of expertise in using the 
technology and insufficient infrastructure to accommodate the new technology 
(Gutierrez, 2002). The Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators 
(CATA) encourages tax administrations in developing nations to introduce 
computerised information systems to improve customer service, facilitate 
information-gathering, increase tax compliance and save operational costs.  
The World Bank (2000, p.1) notes “computerization to be an important element of 
capacity-building in revenue administration”. Even though many agree that 
technology is an efficient tool to enhance efficiency in an organisation, the high 
cost of obtaining and maintaining the hardware and software, including 
consultation fees, has delayed  efforts to use modern technology in the 
administration (Bird and Zolt, 2008; Olken and Pande, 2011; Gutierrez, 2002).  
Bird and Zolt (2008) identify a few problems faced by developing countries when 
considering the use of technology in their administration. One of these is 
resistance to change: when presented with a new challenge most existing staff are 
comfortable with current practices and refuse to cooperate with plans to change. 
Another issue is lack of personnel who are sufficiently trained and skilled in 
technology to ensure that technological innovation can be implemented 
successfully. Lack of political will is yet another element to cause failure in 
implementing technology in some tax administrations. Nevertheless, tax 
administrations, especially those in developing nations, are encouraged to use the 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to ensure efficiency in 
information processing, effectiveness in service deliveries and in reducing the 
administrative burden (OECD, 2010a).  
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Technology can be successfully employed  to enable taxpayers to file their return 
forms through e-Filing, while  modern call-centres can provide taxpayers with fast 
and easy access to tax information and, at the same time, improve communication 
between tax administration and taxpayers (OECD, 2010a). Improving system 
technology may also expedite the process and improve procedures whilst easing 
and simplifying compliance, which eventually facilitates effective revenue 
collection (World Bank, 2000). In addition, computerisation of work processes 
may improve efficiency in revenue collection, provide faster services such as 
refunds, and expedite enforcement activities in detecting non-compliant taxpayers 
and selection of cases for audit. But while computerisation seeks to enhance 
revenue, this should not be the sole objective of tax computerisation projects. 
Information technology can also increase the transparency of tax administrations 
and reduce corruption. It can improve taxpayer service and integrate 
communication between tax authorities and the private sector, as well as the 
exchange of data with other government agencies (OECD, 2010a). 
This section discusses the type of risks identified by the literature. The next step is 
to learn about the process of managing risks by tax administrations. Thus, next 
section introduces one of the main themes of the study, which is risk management. 
1.4.2 Risk management 
One of the government’s regulatory agencies is tax administration, which has the 
main role of collecting revenue for the development of the country. In the effort to 
achieve the objective of collecting revenue and fostering tax compliance, tax 
administration faces a variety of risks and challenges of its own. Unlike the army, 
the police or nuclear scientists, tax officials may not have to face a life-threatening 
crisis in their daily operation but there are certain risks that threaten the 
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administration’s ability to achieve the desired objectives of increasing collection 
of revenue. Economic down-turns, financial crises and natural disasters, are 
among major threats that may result in taxpayers’ inability to pay the taxes they 
owe. The 2007-2009 financial crises in the UK has resulted in the closure of many 
businesses and flooding in some areas has resulted in the loss of income to 
businesses and damage to financial documents. In such cases, the traditional 
approach of strict and harsh enforcement is not an appropriate method to be 
implemented to demand compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Black and 
Baldwin, 2010).  
As agreed by the European Commission, “historically, many tax administrations 
have addressed compliance risks only in terms of enforcement programmes” (EC, 
2010, p.19). When faced with circumstances beyond the control of the public, tax 
regulators are advised to be more understanding and sympathetic towards 
unforeseen events faced by taxpayers (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite 
et al., 2005; Black and Baldwin, 2010). While tax authorities need to carry out 
their responsibility of ensuring compliance, at the same time a softer approach can 
be applied to achieve compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite et al., 
2005) through negotiation for instalment payment or allowing extension of the 
due date for return forms submission, among other considerations. Through this 
responsiveness, revenue officers may gain more respect and trust from the public 
(Kirchler et al., 2008; Feld and Frey, 2005; Alm et al., 1992) whilst maintaining 
compliance in tax payment and tax form submission.  
The OECD (2001) suggests that a systematic process needs to be developed to 
respond to these challenges should they recur in the future. These processes, 
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which are also known as risk management, ensure that the objectives of tax 
administrations are achieved and, at the same time, the safety of the revenue staff 
is protected (OECD, 2001). However, in their effort to meet objectives, tax 
administrations should: “use their limited resources in the most cost effective 
manner” (OECD, 2010d, p.3). A well-designed and properly planned risk 
management strategy may enable tax administrations to identify, assess, prioritise 
and treat the compliance risks faced by the administrations effectively 
(Thompson, 2008; IRM, 2002; EC, 2006; OECD, 2010a). Thus, the literature 
suggests that tax administrations should be proactive and innovative in looking for 
solutions to manage the risks (OECD, 2004; EC, 2006; Bird, 2004). 
As discussed earlier, regulators in developing countries are faced with various 
constraints, such as human resources, financial resources, the shadow economy, 
the information technology system and inefficiency resulting from lack of 
technical knowledge, which can all result in weakness in their enforcement 
capabilities (McCarten, 2006; Bridi, 2010; Russell, 2010a; Bird and Zolt, 2008).  
Consequently, “many tax administrations in developing countries still resort to 
deterrent measures in their attempt to create fear among tax evaders to prevent 
future tax offenses” (Braithwaite et al., 2005).  
Empirical evidence suggests that a stricter enforcement regime is likely to induce 
greater compliance (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 
2002; Sandmo, 2004). Enforcement tools such as penalty imposition and auditing 
probabilities may be effective methods of reducing tax evasion (Franzoni, 1998; 
Devos, 2007). Taxpayers who always comply with the law may regard the 
deterrent approach as fair treatment by the authorities towards non-compliance 
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and may increase their trust in the administration. However, eliciting compliance 
through enforcement measures involves high cost (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Welsh, 2009) and therefore may not be an appropriate strategy to be employed by 
developing countries.  
As suggested by the OECD (2010a), in the process of increasing voluntary 
compliance, tax administrations need to reduce administrative burdens as the 
government expects (OECD, 2010a). “Tax administrations must foster, and not 
simply enforce, tax compliance. This includes facilitating compliance, monitoring 
compliance and dealing with non-compliance” (EC, 2010, p.19). Therefore, to 
encourage voluntary compliance and foster self-regulation, the OECD (2004) and 
the EC (2006) recommend that tax administrations understand the attitudes of 
taxpayers that motivate them to comply or evade tax law. “Without knowledge 
about taxpayer behaviour and the effectiveness of treatment strategies, good 
decisions cannot be made” (EC, 2010, p.19).  
Understanding taxpayer behaviour may assist regulators in encouraging taxpayers 
to comply voluntarily when dealing with their tax obligations, especially under the 
SAS which requires taxpayers to self-report and self-assess their tax liabilities. 
Failure of taxpayers to meet their tax obligations results in compliance risk 
(OECD, 2004). The next section discusses the compliance risk faced by regulators 
in the SAS environment. 
1.4.3 Compliance risk in Self-Assessment System 
Compliance risk appears to be the main risk faced by all tax administrations.  It 
results in loss of revenue and consequently affects the economic contribution to 
the country (OECD, 2004). The literature suggests that non-compliance of tax 
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laws is due to non-lodgement; late lodgement of current returns; incorrect 
information declared in the returns and non-payments or late payments of tax 
liabilities (Alm, 1999; Franzoni, 1998; Kirchler et al., 2008). In addition, 
taxpayers who fail to provide updated details, such as their new address and other 
relevant information, are also considered as not complying with the laws (OECD, 
2001). According to Walpole (2009), under the SAS environment, taxpayers may 
tend to understate their tax liability, thus opening up opportunities for dishonesty.  
Many tax administrations in developed and developing countries, such as the 
USA, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Indonesia and a few others, have 
adopted SAS into their administration to enhance voluntary compliance, simplify 
submission of tax return and minimise massive workload problems faced by the 
administrations (Walpole, 2009; Loo et al., 2009; Loo and Juan, 2005). Tax 
authorities encountered challenges during the early stage of implementation of 
SAS, such as taxpayers’ lack of tax knowledge and the refusal to self-assess tax 
returns (Sarker, 2003; Kimura, 2006; Palil, 2010).  
Japan’s initial challenge with the introduction of SAS was the problem of sole-
proprietor taxpayers failing to keep proper accounting books, thus making it 
difficult for them to report their tax liabilities correctly (Kimura, 2006). During 
the early stages of SAS implementation, the HMRC experienced similar issues, 
whereby taxpayers perceived that the SAS was too complex and they were 
confused by some of the tax terminology used in the tax return (Palil, 2010). This 
problem was also due to taxpayers’ lack of tax knowledge and confidence in the 
new system. These problems are not unique to HMRC alone but other tax 
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administrations share similar issues as well (Loo et al., 2009; Kimura, 2006; 
Sarker, 2003). 
From the perspective of the developing countries, among the challenges faced by 
Bangladesh during the early years of SAS implementation was “a lack of tax 
education among taxpayers, poor public relation activities by the Bangladeshi tax 
authority and inadequate penalty provisions for tax defaulters” (Sarker, 2003). 
Other developing countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Cambodia and Sri Lanka 
share the same challenges in the SAS regime, which are lack of tax knowledge in 
self-assessment tax returns, lack of understanding of the benefits of SAS and a 
refusal to embrace SAS.  
There also remain misconceptions about the objective of SAS, which is to reduce 
the tax administration burden whilst increasing the taxpayer’s contribution, in 
addition to tax administration inefficiency in managing the new system. All these 
issues have resulted in low compliance and a lack of trust in the tax 
administration. Hence, it is a challenge for revenue bodies to formulate risk 
management strategies to educate taxpayers of their responsibilities towards tax 
systems in the country. In order to manage compliance risks, the literature 
suggests that responsive regulation could be one of the approaches taken. Thus, 
next section addresses how responsive regulation could be adopted by tax 
regulators to encourage voluntary compliance. 
1.4.4 Responsive regulation 
Responsive regulation was first introduced by Ayres and Braithwaite in 1992 in 
their book “Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate”. This 
book has become a major reference by scholars and researchers when addressing 
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the topic of responsive regulation. The idea of responsive regulation “started out 
as a theory of business regulation and has now been applied to crime, peace 
building, and a wide range of other private and public governance applications” 
(Braithwaite, 2011, p.1).  
The theory of responsive regulation is that compliance should be fostered through 
persuasion and not punishment (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2007). 
Responsive regulation promotes the concept that regulators should make an 
attempt to adopt soft approaches in managing compliance rather than the 
traditional hard approach commonly enacted by regulators. As noted by 
Braithwaite (2011, p.489), “the job of responsive regulators is to treat offenders as 
worthy of trust, because the evidence is that when they do this, regulation more 
often achieves its objectives”. In order to be responsive to their conduct,  
regulators are encouraged to be “fair, open-minded, respectful, not stigmatizing, 
and persuasive and cooperative” in the effort to promote compliance (Nielsen and 
Parker, 2009, p.382). 
Ayres and Braithwaite formulated an enforcement pyramid (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992, p.35) which illustrates the enforcement of law through various 
strategies based on the compliance responses of regulatees, as shown by each 
layer of the pyramid. The idea of the pyramid is that enforcement should start 
from the base, where persuasion and education encourage compliance. The broad 
base of the pyramid illustrates the majority of taxpayers have the intention to 
comply with the law; however they still require assistance and encouragement 
from the authorities. When regulatees display an act of non-compliance, 
regulators move up to the next layers to demonstrate another enforcement 
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strategy. Finally, at the peak of the pyramid, punishment such as sanctions and 
prosecutions will be enacted upon serious offenders.  
In the 1970’s regulators were known for adopting deterrence to enforce 
compliance (Murphy, 2004). Normally, punishment and sanctions create fear and 
resistance to compliance (Murphy, 2004; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Feld and 
Frey, 2005) and may affect future compliance (Murphy, 2005). Punishment also 
could be time consuming and expensive (Murphy, 2004; Welsh, 2009; Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992) due to punitive activities, such as sanctions, penalty imposition 
and litigation procedures. In view of the negative impact of the deterrence 
approach, such as high cost to the regulators and resistance to comply by 
regulatees, responsive regulation champions (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Braithwaite, 2003; Murphy, 2004) argue that responsive approaches such as 
persuasion and encouragement promote the efficient use of resources and 
encourage voluntary compliance and cooperation.  
A soft approach, as recommended by responsive regulation, appears to be a 
strategy to nurture compliance because people generally prefer to be persuaded to 
comply and resist hard approaches (Murphy, 2005). They may regard the soft 
approach as procedural fairness and be more likely to self-regulate themselves to 
comply (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001; 
Murphy, 2004). While promoting soft approaches to encourage compliance, 
responsive regulation also allows for punitive mechanisms to be enacted as 
deterrence, but this should be the last resort.  
According to the regulatory pyramid, hard-approaches or punitive actions are 
enacted at the peak of the pyramid, targeted at the high-risk group of offenders. 
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By focussing on a specific group of regulatees, the efficient use of resources, such 
as human resources, time and funding would be devoted to manage these high risk 
people (Scholz, 1984; Ayres And Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2003; Murphy, 
2004). However, enforcement mechanisms should not be seen as a form of 
punishment but as an education to correct or inform offenders of the offences they 
have committed (Scholz, 1984). 
The concept of responsive regulation is applied, adopted and adapted as a 
regulatory policy in various fields, such as health, nursing homes, the 
environment, security and tax administration. Tax administrations, including the 
ATO, NZIR, HMRC and some European countries, have adapted responsive 
regulation  in their administrations to replace the traditional deterrence mechanism 
previously applied (Murphy, 2004; Waller, 2007; Hobson, 2003).  
Through this theory, tax administration may improve compliance strategies from a 
command-and-control approach to a more responsive approach based on 
taxpayers’ compliance responses. The enforcement pyramid suggests a range of 
enforcement mechanisms from which to choose, depending on the compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers. From the description above, responsive regulation appears 
to be the most suitable enforcement mechanism to be adopted by tax regulators to 
manage compliance risk; as noted by Leviner (2009, p.1) “responsive regulation 
may therefore constitute a superior method for regulating compliance.”  
The responsive regulation theory was adopted by Valerie Braithwaite and the 
Cash Economy Task Force to develop a compliance pyramid model in 1998 
(CETF, 1998). The compliance pyramid has further been used by the ATO in its 
compliance strategies to improve voluntary compliance in Australia. Prior to 
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implementation of the compliance pyramid, the ATO was accused of ‘bully-boy 
tactics’, ‘excessive and unfair use of power’, that it was ‘out of touch’, ‘lacked 
understanding’ and made ‘poor use of penalties’ (Murphy, 2004, p.12). 
Eventually, with the application of responsive regulation in its administration, the 
ATO managed to increase the voluntary compliance of Australian taxpayers and 
helped taxpayers to comply (Murphy, 2004; Hobson, 2003; Job and Honaker, 
2003).  
The Compliance Model focuses not only on the taxpayers’ perspective but also 
provides understanding and enables ATO officials to treat taxpayers responsively 
(Hobson, 2003; Job and Honaker, 2003). ATO compliance strategies have become 
best practice and been referred to by many tax administrations. The pyramid 
model has also been adopted and adapted by various tax agencies such as the 
HMRC, NZIR, Timor Lester Inland Revenue and Inland Revenue Authority of 
Singapore (IRAS) and used as a guide by the European Commission (EC, 2006).  
The HMRC has adopted a customer-focused approach in their effort to apply the 
concept of responsive regulation concept to their service delivery to taxpayers. 
Use of the term ‘customer’ instead of ‘taxpayer’ is an initiative to improve 
regulatory relationship between HMRC and taxpayers, hence enhancing voluntary 
compliance (Tuck et al., 2011). 
The concept of responsive regulation is further enhanced by Baldwin and Black 
(2007) through the idea of risk-based responsive regulation. According to 
Baldwin and Black (2007, p.12) “the key components of the approach are 
evaluations of the risk of non-compliance and calculations regarding the impact 
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that the non-compliance will have on the regulatory body’s ability to achieve its 
objectives”.  
The advantage of the risk-based regulation approach is that it provides “a 
systematic framework that allows regulators to relate their enforcement activities 
to achieve the objectives. This approach enables resources to be targeted in a 
manner that prioritises highest risks and they provide a basis for evaluating new 
regulatory challenges and new risks” (Baldwin and Black, 2007, p.13).  
The HMRC has adopted a risk-based approach to investigation and compliance to 
monitor and enforce compliance with regulations by business (Black, 2008; 
HMRC, 2012). This approach applies the idea of responsive regulation whereby 
resources are used effectively to manage high risk taxpayers. According to HMRC 
(2012), the risk-based approach “uses comprehensive risk assessment to 
concentrate resources in the areas that need them most”. Furthermore, this 
approach appears to be “the most cost-effective way to control the risks”; in the 
HMRC context, of money laundering
4
 and terrorist financing
5
 and it “allows focus 
on efforts and resources where the risks are highest” (HMRC, 2012a).  
As noted by Singh (1993, cited in Loo et al., 2010) IRBM officials appear to 
conduct a command-and-control approach by adopting audits and penalties to 
enforce compliance. This study attempts to elicit the perceptions of IRBM 
officials and tax practitioners to verify the claims. The research also explores the 
                                                          
4 ‘Money laundering is the process by which criminally obtained money and other assets (criminal 
property) are exchanged for ‘clean’ money or other assets with no obvious link to their criminal 
origins. Criminal property may take any form, including money or money’s worth, securities, 
tangible property and intangible property. It also covers money, however come by, which is used 
to fund terrorism’ (HMRC, 2010, p.3). 
5
 ‘Terrorist financing includes proliferation financing which is assisting in the financing and/or 
development of nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical weapons and/or their means of 
delivery’ (HMRC, 2010, p.3). 
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adoption of responsive regulation in encouraging compliance by tax 
administrations of developing countries, particularly by the Malaysian Tax 
Administration. Previous research relating to responsive regulation is discussed 
further in Section 3.5. 
1.5 Overview of Research Design 
As stated in Section 1.3.2, a qualitative approach is adopted as the research 
methodology for this study. This approach is well suited to obtaining insights and 
understandings about risk management practices of the IRBM and Malaysian 
taxpayer compliance behaviour. In line with this qualitative approach, empirical 
data was collected through face-to-face interviews with officials of the IRBM and 
Malaysian tax practitioners to obtain insights into the interviewees’ perceptions of 
SAS and tax compliance in Malaysia as well as compliance risk management by 
the IRBM.  
According to Yin (2003), a qualitative approach appears to be a suitable form of 
investigation to obtain some answers to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. This is 
due to the fact that these questions are more explanatory and a survey alone might 
not be able to provide sufficient answers or information to the study. During an 
interview, the researcher may ask participants to elaborate on her/his thoughts, 
beliefs and ideas so that in-depth and more meaningful data could be collected 
(Silverman, 2000; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
To enrich data collection, secondary data was collected from a range of published 
and unpublished printed materials from the IRBM. The primary and secondary 
data collected were then analysed and coded using NVivo, computer-aided data 
analysis software. In addition, a risk-based responsive compliance model was 
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developed as a conceptual framework of the study. This framework represents the 
convergence of the theoretical concepts of tax compliance, risk management and 
responsive regulation.  
1.6 Scope of Study 
The scope of the study would be too large if all groups of taxpayers in Malaysia 
were to be investigated. Therefore, this study is confined to individual taxpayers.  
The literature review and the recommendations focus on individual taxpayers, 
who include employed and self-employed taxpayers, also referred to as business-
income taxpayers and sole-proprietors. Out of a total of 5.07 million taxpayers in 
Malaysia, 5.04 million are individual taxpayers and self-employed or sole-
proprietors. In terms of tax collection, this group of taxpayers has contributed 
20.58% of the total revenue collected in 2010 (IRBM, 2010). Even though the 
percentage of revenue collected from these taxpayers is lower than that of 
corporate taxpayers (50.64%), the majority of taxpayers lie within the individual 
taxpayer group. By instilling in this group of taxpayers the notion of voluntary 
compliance, their tax affairs can be administered efficiently and IRBM personnel 
can instead concentrate their efforts on tax education, audit and investigation. 
With the correct strategies, the IRBM would be able to reduce the number of 
personnel required to manage individual taxpayers whilst adopting an efficient 
strategy to monitor this group to ensure high level of compliance.  
The literature suggests that individual taxpayers, especially self-employed ones, 
seldom pay much attention to their tax obligations as they perceive taxation as a 
complicated subject and most of them are reluctant to make the  time and effort to 
learn more about taxation (Kirchler et al., 2011; Rothengatter, 2005; Chong and 
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Wong, 2011). As a result, there is a tendency for this group of taxpayers to evade 
tax. In contrast, even though the corporate tax structure is evidently more 
complicated than the individual tax structure, having tax consultants to manage 
their tax affairs has resulted in corporate taxpayers  being more compliant and 
systematic in managing their tax liabilities. Further, Pope and McKerchar (2011, 
p.7) have argued that “individual tax compliance is well-recognised as a complex 
and widely-researched behavioural issue which contains considerable scope for 
further research.”  
In this light, it is a challenge for tax administration to manage the individual 
taxpayers, who appear to have minimal knowledge of tax subjects. By 
understanding their responses towards tax compliance, tax administrations may be 
able to adopt suitable responsive approaches to manage them. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Following the introduction to the research, where the background to the problem 
is discussed in Chapter One, the thesis is presented in Chapters Two to Nine. The 
background of the IRBM and its administration reforms are described in Chapter 
Two.  
Next, Chapter Three summarises the previous literature of key themes to emerge 
from the research, which are tax compliance, taxpayer behaviour and attitudes 
towards tax compliance. The chapter also includes a review of the literature of 
other major themes of the study, which are risk management and its processes, 
along with the concepts of responsive regulation and risk-based responsive 
regulation.  
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This is followed by Chapter Four, which describes the methodology adopted in 
this research and data collection methods as well as the data analysis process. The 
empirical findings of this thesis are presented in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and 
Eight, which are organised to answer the research questions. The conceptual 
framework which puts together the process of compliance risk management and 
the concept of risk-based responsive regulation are also introduced in Chapter 
Eight. 
Finally, Chapter Nine is the concluding chapter which discusses the findings and 
the contributions of this research to risk management for tax administrations. It 
also incorporates the research limitations, suggestions for future research and 
policy implication for the IRBM. 
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Chapter 2 
Background of Malaysian Tax Administration 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the background of this study and highlighted the 
research objectives, its contribution, the questions it raised, the scope and design 
of the research and the structure of the thesis. This research has selected the 
Malaysian tax administration, as a case study, which offered a close examination 
of how it managed its own risks as a developing country. In Section 2.2, the 
history of taxation, the current taxation systems in Malaysia and their background 
problems are presented. The tax administration explored in this case study, the 
IRBM, is then introduced in Section 2.3. The tax systems, the scope of charges, 
the functions of IRBM and tax administration reforms in Malaysia are also 
explained in this section. In Section 2.4, the Self-Assessment System in Malaysia 
is described and its scope for individuals, tax compliance challenges and tax 
education programmes are discussed. A description of the functions of the Risk 
Management Department in IRBM follows in Section 2.5, and, finally, Section 
2.6 summarizes the earlier discussion of this chapter. 
2.2 Tax Administration in Malaysia 
2.2.1 History of tax administration in Malaysia 
During the era of the Melaka and Johor-Riau Sultanate, also known as the Malay 
rulers, in Malaya, there had been a tax administration system and structure in 
existence which related in particular to the maritime and harbour activities of local 
and foreign merchants. During that period all tax-related matters, including tax 
collection, were the responsibility of the Chief of the Exchequer (Wilkinson, 
1935, cited in RMCD, 2009). The responsibility for collecting taxes was bestowed 
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on the Harbour Master, who was entrusted by the king with the power to enforce 
rules on the tax laws.  
In the early nineteenth century, the British colonial government introduced a 
systematic tax administration in Malaya, whereby government agencies were 
established to collect taxes, administer land, provide services to the people and 
develop the states (RMCD, 2009). The Malay Peninsula achieved full 
independence from the British in 1957, and the formation of Malaysia followed in 
1963, consisting of the Malay Peninsula, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. 
However, due to social unrest and political disputes, in 1965 Singapore was 
declared an independent republic. 
2.2.2 Tax System in Malaysia 
Income tax was first introduced in the Malay Peninsula in 1948, in Sabah in 1957 
and in Sarawak in 1961. Before then, there had been a series of events which led 
to the establishment of the income tax system.  
According to Kasipillai and Shanmugan (1996), the process of proposing the 
income tax in Malaya started in 1910, but it encountered strong opposition from 
the people until the drafting of the Income Tax Ordinance in 1947, which marked 
“the beginning of a new era in taxation on a permanent basis in Malaya”. Prior to 
1967, the Malay Peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak each had its own tax laws which 
were administered by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) (Mahfar, 1994).The 
Income Tax Ordinance of 1947 was the first legislation governing income tax, 
taking effect on 1 January, 1948. It was subsequently repealed and replaced by the 
Income Tax Act (ITA) in 1967, which came into effect on 1 January, 1968 (Singh, 
1992). 
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2.2.3 Scope of charge 
The Malaysian taxation system consists of the direct and indirect imposition of 
taxes. Direct taxes comprise Income tax, Real property gains tax, Petroleum 
income tax and Stamp duty. The stamp duty is a tax on certain types of documents 
such as land transfers, loan agreements and lease agreements.  
Direct taxes are administered by the IRBM, while the indirect taxes, which are 
administered by the Royal Malaysian Customs, consist of excise duty, import and 
export duty, sales tax and service tax (Kasipillai and Shanmugam, 1996). In 2010, 
the direct tax contributed 50.6% towards the total federal government revenue, 
compared with the indirect tax, which contributed 19.0% (MER, 2010).  
The direct tax is imposed on income accruing in or derived from Malaysia. 
Malaysia’s taxes are also assessed on a current year basis and are regulated by a  
self‐assessment system for all corporate and individual taxpayers. The Tax 
Department in the Ministry of Finance is responsible for drafting tax regulations 
and legislation, while the IRBM is responsible for the implementation of the 
regulations and legislation at state and district levels.  
2.3 Case Study:  Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia  
The Inland Revenue Department of Malaysia (IRD) was formed in 1957, 
becoming a board on 1 March, 1996, and is now formally known as the Inland 
Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) (also referred to as the ‘Board’ in this thesis). 
As an agent of the Malaysian government, it is one of the main revenue collecting 
agencies of the Ministry of Finance of Malaysia and provides services in 
administering, assessing, collecting and enforcing payment of all types of taxes. 
The mission of IRBM is “To provide taxation services with quality and integrity 
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towards promoting voluntary compliance” while its objective is “To create and 
implement a fair and effective tax management system” (IRBM website).  
IRBM was established in accordance with the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
Act, 1995, to give it more autonomy, especially in financial and personnel 
management, and to improve the quality and effectiveness of tax administration. 
IRBM is responsible for the overall administration of direct taxes under the 
various acts, including the Income Tax Act, 1967; the Petroleum (Income Tax) 
Act, 1967; the Real Property Gains Tax Act, 1976; the Promotion of Investment 
Act, 1986; the Stamp Act, 1949, and the Labuan Offshore Business Activity Tax 
Act, 1990 (IRBM website). 
2.3.1 Functions of the IRBM 
The government of Malaysia has entrusted IRBM with various functions and 
responsibilities to ensure that the administration of direct taxes in Malaysia is 
implemented efficiently and effectively. As stated on the IRBM website, the 
Board acts as an agent of the government to provide administrative services in 
assessing, collecting and enforcing payment of income tax, petroleum income tax, 
real property gains tax, estate duty, stamp duties and such other taxes as may be 
agreed between the government and the Board. IRBM also is required to advise 
the government on matters relating to taxation and to liaise with the appropriate 
Ministries and statutory bodies on such matters. Furthermore, the Board has to 
participate within or outside Malaysia in respect of matters relating to taxation. It 
should also perform such other functions as are conferred on the Board by any 
other written law. Finally, IRBM may act as a collection agent for and on behalf 
of any body for the recovery of loans due for repayment to that body under any 
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written law (IRBM website). In its effort to inculcate a corporate culture in its 
administration, IRBM has developed a vision to be a Leader in Tax 
Administration and a mission to provide taxation services with quality and 
integrity towards promoting voluntary compliance.  
Its objective is to create and implement a fair and effective tax management 
system, while its slogan is ‘Together We Develop the Nation’. IRBM has also 
introduced a quality policy which aims to work with integrity as its foundation, 
and to commit to giving the best service to its customers. Finally, the service 
motto, to provide ‘The Best Service for You’ (IRBM website), has been 
developed as a reminder to its personnel and also as a vow to the public on 
IRBM’s highest commitment towards ensuring an efficient tax administration in 
Malaysia. The organisation structure of IRBM is shown in Appendix 1. 
2.3.2 Tax Reform in IRBM 
“Generally tax reform is a restructuring and improvement in the tax system that 
includes the removal of imperfections, faults, errors or shortcomings in the tax 
system and the change in the distribution of tax burden” (ADBI, 2006, p.3). 
IRBM has undergone various transformations in its administration to improve the 
standard of Malaysian tax system. Since the mid-1980s until recently such 
changes have included the restructuring of tax rates, tax reliefs and tax rebates. 
New tax incentives were introduced and former tax incentives were reviewed to 
promote investment (ADBI, 2006). Other reforms were made, for instance, to the 
data processing system and service delivery, as well as the enhancement of the 
database system and the establishment of new branches (Veerinderjeet, 2003).  
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A significant change was the transformation of data processing from stand-alone 
data processing in 1985 to widespread ICT in early 2000. With the introduction of 
SAS for corporate taxpayers in 2001 and individual and other groups in 2004, 
IRBM has moved forward in the tax reform process to improve its administration 
and to foster voluntary compliance.  
To further enhance the simplicity of SAS, e-Filing was introduced in 2006 to ease 
and expedite self-assessment of tax returns by taxpayers. More electronic services 
such as e-Payment, e-Ledger and e-Stamping were introduced to increase the 
quality of service delivery to the public.  
McCarten (2006, p.427) has suggested that tax administrations should improve 
their taxpayer services by providing a single point enquiry system, a unique 
identification number for registered taxpayers and a single and integrated 
accounting framework; he has also recommended enforced collection and audit, 
dedicated information processing operations and support functions such as ICT, 
human resources and training. As highlighted in the IRBM Annual Reports, the 
Board had already taken some initiatives to improve its service delivery: 
 A call-centre was established in 2005 as a one-stop centre for taxpayers’ 
enquiries through telephone calls, e-mails and walk-ins.  
 A unique number called a Tax Reference Number (TRN) was allocated to 
new taxpayers. The TRN has been issued since the early 1980s when IRBM 
started to automate the process which hitherto had been manual.   
 An integrated accounting system known as Standard Accounting for 
Government Agencies (SAGA) was applied, designed to meet all the 
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requirements of accounting and auditing standards set for financial reports; 
it is also being used by other public sectors in Malaysia.  
 To ease payment of tax, taxpayers are provided with a few options such as 
IRBM payment counters at headquarters, the Kuching (Sarawak) branch and 
the Kota Kinabalu branch (Sabah), at five selected commercial banks and at 
post offices, as well as by postal payments and internet banking to IRBM.  
 Audit activities were improved, using an audit tool known as  Computerised 
Audit Selection (CASE) which is designed to facilitate the selection of 
taxpayers to be audited in accordance with predetermined criteria 
established in CASE. With CASE, the selection process for audit cases is 
faster, audit actions can be executed quickly and the number of cases to be 
audited has increased.  
 To support various functions in IRBM, office-automation was introduced in 
the late 1990s as a means of communication among IRBM staff, in order to 
support various functions in IRBM  
 The information system and data processing was transformed from 
electronic data processing in the 1980s to server-based data management in 
the 1990s and later, to the automatic data storage and retrieval in 2005.  
This modernisation is evidence of IRBM’s serious commitment to introduce 
reform to become an efficient tax administrator in Malaysia by delivering 
excellent customer service to its customers in its effort to increase voluntary 
compliance. The automation also has achieved one of its objectives, which is to 
reduce administrative costs in revenue collection. IRBM has successfully reduced 
these costs from MYR1.19 (£0.242) in 2007 to MYR1.17 (£0.238) in 2008; there 
39 
 
were further reductions to MYR1.04 (£0.212) in 2009 and 2010 (Administrative 
Cost, 2010).  
2.4 The Self-Assessment System in Malaysia 
The new assessment system is a challenge not only to the taxpayers but also for 
IRBM (Loo, McKerchar and Hansford, 2009). As a result of their new 
responsibility for completing the return forms themselves, the taxpayers are 
required to know and understand the law and to learn the new system. While 
IRBM officials need to study the new regulations and systems, they also have to 
adapt to changes in procedures because the previous focus was on raising the 
assessment, but in the new environment they have to concentrate on auditing and 
service delivery. The objectives for adopting self-assessment in Malaysia are “to 
reduce administration costs, improve voluntary compliance rates and facilitate tax 
collections” (Loo et al., 2009, p.181). 
2.4.1 Self-assessment for individuals  
The SAS requires taxpayers to keep records and documents properly, fill the 
returns correctly, compute the tax accurately and finally submit the return form on 
time with the final payment of tax (if any). Prescribed return forms such as BE 
(for salaried income), B (for business income) and M (for non-resident 
individuals) are issued to individual taxpayers in the January of the following 
year, or earlier, and the deadline for submission is by 30 April. For the business 
income earners, such as sole proprietors and partnerships, tax filing is due on 30 
June each year (ADBI, 2006).  
With regard to the filing process, taxpayers first have the options of using the 
electronic return form, whereby assessment is completed electronically through 
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the e-Filing system; printing a pre-printed form from IRBM’s website; or 
obtaining a hard copy from the IRBM office.  
Taxpayers are required to calculate their taxes and furnished the return to IRBM 
as per the due date
6
 mentioned in the Act according to the categories of taxpayers. 
Under the tax law, “the DGIR is deemed to have made an assessment on the day 
the return is filed, the return is deemed to be the notice of assessment and the 
notice of assessment is deemed to be served on the date the return is filed” (ADBI, 
2006, p.8).  
No notice of assessment will therefore be issued for completed returns received in 
time. However, for late returns the DGIR issues an assessment with a penalty for 
late lodgement. If the return is not filed by the due date, a penalty for late 
lodgement of return will be imposed. The amount of penalty depends on the 
number of offences that the taxpayer has committed.  A range of offences, fines 
and penalties rates is attached in Appendix 2. 
On submission of Form BE/B/M, the forms are deemed to be the notice of 
assessment for which tax is due and payable on the same date as the filing deadline. 
Under the SAS regime, IRBM monitors taxpayers’ compliance with the law 
through a desk audit and, if necessary, would conduct a field audit to check on 
some of the documents.  
As stated in the Tax Audit Framework, taxpayers are required by the law to keep 
for seven years all the financial documents or receipts for payments they have 
                                                          
6
 “For companies, cooperative societies and trust bodies it has to be filed seven months from the date 
following the close of the accounting period. For other categories of taxpayers, the due dates are 30th April 
for those without business income and 30th June for those with business income.” (ADBI, 2006, p.8) 
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claimed, for the purpose of tax relief (TAF, 2009). IRBM officials would request 
the receipts and documents if any claims being made by taxpayers are suspicious.  
Payment of tax liability should be made at the latest on the due date, either 30 
April or 30
 
June depending on the category of taxpayer (ADBI, 2006). However, 
to ease the burden of payment on taxpayers, they are allowed to pay in 
instalments. Non-business income taxpayers are allowed to pay through Monthly 
Tax Deduction (MTD) system from their payroll, while business-income tax 
payers are permitted to pay instalments every two months according to the 
instruction provided by IRBM under Section 107B of ITA, 1967. 
The SAS relies primarily on voluntary compliance by taxpayers (D’Ascenzo, 
2008). As one of the objectives for the implementation of SAS in Malaysia is to 
reduce the number of IRBM officials required to raise the assessment (Loo and 
Juan, 2005), the workforce can therefore concentrate on tasks related to education, 
compliance and investigation. The Board faces challenges in fostering voluntary 
compliance among individual taxpayers due to their lack of understanding of 
taxation. Most individuals feel that taxation is a complex matter and refuse to 
enhance their knowledge of the tax system (McKerchar, 2003). As SAS requires 
taxpayers’ voluntary compliance and self-regulation, individuals need to have 
sufficient knowledge in taxation to assist them in completing their return forms 
accurately and in being aware of their tax obligations as well as tax laws.  
Moreover, the sole-proprietor or business-sourced taxpayers present another 
challenge to IRBM. As noted by Rothengatter (2005), there is a greater possibility 
of tax evasion by sole-proprietors due to the nature of their business structure, 
especially in documenting invoices and recording business transactions and 
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income.  In the formal sectors, these groups of self-employed taxpayers are the 
hard-to-tax individuals (Alm et al., 2006). Tax administrations thus need to 
increase their effort in enacting enforcement mechanisms upon these groups of 
taxpayers. Hiring tax practitioners would increase their compliance cost, hence 
their reluctance in having professionals to assist them in handling their tax 
matters. Efforts by IRBM to invite them to attend tax seminars were unsuccessful 
because of their refusal to spend time on learning about tax due to the demands of 
their business. 
2.4.2 Tax compliance in SAS regime in Malaysia 
The challenge of SAS is that there is a tendency by some taxpayers to understate 
their tax liability, and Malaysia, like any other country, also faces issues of tax 
non-compliance. Moreover, with the implementation of SAS, various compliance 
challenges have emerged that demand IRBM doubles its effort in managing such 
challenges and also in promoting voluntary compliance. Prior to implementation 
of SAS, taxpayers manually completed their return forms, which were assessed by 
tax officials who raised final assessment based on the data provided by taxpayers 
in their forms. However, this scenario created opportunities for bribery during the 
negotiation of the tax settlement between taxpayer and tax assessor (McCarten, 
2006).  
As part of the administrative reform at IRBM, automation has been embedded in 
SAS to help to reduce any possibility of corruption taking place between 
taxpayers and IRBM officials. At IRBM, the return forms had to undergo various 
processes, most of these completed electronically. This way, there was little or no 
opportunity for human intervention, in terms of corruption, since the system was 
secured with identifications and passwords and was restricted to a certain number 
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of staff from the outsourced company as well as from IRBM. Entrance into the 
premises was also controlled, whereby only members of staff possessing an access 
card are allowed to enter the building. Automation of return form processing in 
IRBM has not only expedited processing time and posting to taxpayers’ accounts, 
but has also highlighted the transparency of the processing system and minimises 
opportunities for corruption within the organisation. 
To facilitate further knowledge of the compliance issues, there have been a few 
empirical studies conducted by Malaysian researchers on tax compliance in the 
country. Literature suggests that the success of SAS in Malaysia, and also in other 
countries, is determined by taxpayers’ attitudes towards tax compliance and their 
behaviour (Abdul Jabbar and Pope, 2008). Most recent studies are related to the 
implementation of SAS in Malaysia and taxpayer behaviour towards the new tax 
system. These include research by Palil and Lymer (2009) and Loo et al. (2009) 
on tax knowledge for SAS, Sia’s study (2008) of taxpayer compliance behaviour 
under SAS, and an investigation by Loo and McKerchar (2009) on the challenges 
of SAS. Other Malaysian studies demonstrate that taxpayers’ behaviour is 
affected by significant factors such as ethics (Kasipillai and Abdul Jabbar, 2006), 
compliance cost (Ibrahim and Pope, 2011; Abdul Jabbar and Pope, 2008), 
demography (Kasipillai and Abdul Jabbar, 2006) and religiosity (Pope and 
Mohdali, 2010).  
Furthermore, Loo et al. (2009) note that, in a multi-racial country such as 
Malaysia, ethnicity might also be an important factor that affects tax compliance 
attitude and behaviour. Kasipillai and Abdul Jabbar’s investigation (2006) and the 
findings of Loo et al. (2009) agree that culture and beliefs bear influence on 
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taxpayers’ attitudes towards compliance. By understanding these factors, IRBM 
and other tax administrations may be able to formulate appropriate plans and 
strategies to enhance their tax education programmes in order to improve tax 
knowledge among members of the public and ultimately to maximise voluntary 
compliance by taxpayers. Identifying different categories of taxpayers based on 
their responses towards compliance may enable IRBM to adopt a regulatory 
responsive approach to encourage voluntary compliance. One of the latest 
mechanisms to provide responsive services to taxpayers is the introduction of e-
Filing.  
Many tax administrations have adopted e‐filing of tax return forms, with the IRS 
being the first to implement the service in 1986 (Palil, 2010). This was then 
followed by the ATO in 1991, the CRA (Canada) in 1992, the IRAS (Singapore) 
in 1999 and the HMRC in 1997 (Palil, 2010). Other tax administrations adopting 
e-Filing include Brazil in 1997, Chile and Spain in 1999, Guatemala and France in 
2001 and Argentina 2002 (Ibrahim, 2010). To promote voluntary compliance, 
IRBM has taken the initiative by introducing its e-Filing service to assist 
taxpayers in completing and filing their tax returns. The e-Filing is an electronic 
system whereby the taxpayer fills in the return form through an interactive on-line 
facility accessed from IRBM’s website. The completed return form is then 
submitted electronically, using digital signature via the internet, to IRBM’s e-
Filing database. On submission of their forms, taxpayers receive an online 
acknowledgement as acceptance of the successfully filed return. IRBM launched 
e-Filing in 2002 for corporate taxpayers and subsequently enhanced the system 
for individual taxpayers in 2006. Further, in 2008, the system was improved and 
another module was designed for tax agents (IRBM website).   
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Since its implementation for individual taxpayers in 2006, e-Filing has reduced 
costs on printing, imaging, postage and storage of return forms as well as 
lowering taxpayers’ costs in terms of time and money (IRBM CEO, 2010). When 
filing manually, taxpayers spent an average of MYR95 on postage and travelling 
expenses in order to submit their returns (Ibrahim and Pope, 2011).  
A further benefit of e-Filing is that the system assists in accurate, automatic tax 
calculation and allows no error as it detects miscalculation and incomplete fields 
in the electronic forms. This system is available to taxpayers twenty-four hours a 
day, and is accessible from anywhere via the internet. Moreover, through e-Filing, 
taxpayers receive faster refunds - within two weeks to a month, compared with 
about three months when submission is made with hard copy return forms (IRBM 
CEO, 2010).  
In addition, e-Filing increases productivity since it reduces workloads during the 
peak filing season, accelerates the processing of return forms and speeds up 
recovery of tax (OECD, 2011). The system is also secure and assures secrecy, 
validity and integrity via Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital signature 
(IRBM CEO, 2010).  
IRBM receives positive responses from taxpayers due to its cost effectiveness, 
fast submission and ease of usage. This wide acceptance of e-Filing is proven by 
the increase in electronic submissions since its inception in 2006, the number of 
submissions received then was 189,048; in 2007 this figure leapt to 875,051; to 
1.19 million in 2008; 1.55 million in 2009;  and increasing further to 1.90 million 
e-filers in 2010 (IRBM Annual Report 2006 - 2010).  
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An investigation by Loo, McKerchar and Hansford (2009) indicate that numerous 
errors in tax return forms prepared by Malaysian taxpayers are due to lack of tax 
knowledge. The new assessment system is a challenge not only to the taxpayers 
but also IRBM (Loo, McKerchar and Hansford, 2009). For the taxpayers, they are 
required to know and understand the law and learn the new system due to the new 
responsibility to fill in the return forms themselves. Most small business owners 
or traders appear to lacked tax knowledge especially the SAS mechanism as there 
was no formal tax education in primary, secondary and tertiary levels in Malaysia 
(Choong and Wong, 2011). Only accountancy programmes at the universities in 
Malaysia incorporate taxation as one of their subjects to be learned only by 
accountancy students. Thus, it is a challenge for IRBM to foster voluntary 
compliance amongst individual taxpayers due to various factors which influence 
their compliance behaviour.  
As reported by IRBM Annual Reports, tax non-compliance of individual and sole-
proprietors in Malaysia in the SAS environment is illustrated by Table 1.  
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Table 1: Number of tax non-compliance cases in Malaysia 
 
Source: IRBM Annual Report (2007-2009) 
 
Travel restriction  
As stated by Section 104, the Income Tax Act of Malaysia (ITA) 1967, taxpayers 
who have outstanding amount of tax unpaid will be issued of Section 104 
notification to prevent them from leaving the country. According to the travel 
restriction procedure, when a delinquent taxpayer is invoked with Section 104, a 
copy of notification is sent to the Police Department and another copy to the 
Immigration Department. Even though the Act stated that notification to be sent to 
one of the departments, in practise IRBM delivers the notification to both 
agencies.  
This sanction was introduced to ensure non-payment offenders settle their tax 
owed to IRBM before they plan to leave Malaysia. Table 1 shows that more than 
40,000 tax offenders have been prevented from leaving the country since SAS 
was introduced in 2004. Even though there seems to be a slight increase in 2008, 
from 43,628 to 46,655, the number of taxpayers sanctioned under this section has 
reduced in 2009 to 42,779. This report suggests a rather large number of taxpayers 
still refuse to comply with payment of tax obligation. 
Enforcement activities 
2007 2008 2009 
Travel restrictions (number of 
taxpayers) 
43,628 46,655 42,779 
Civil Suits (number of taxpayers) 8,293 7,030 9,642 
Desk Audit (number of cases) 272,316 1.04millions 1.39millions 
Field Audit (number of taxpayers) 6,428 13,985 13,619 
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Civil Suits 
Under the ITA, a civil suit can be taken against a taxpayer who fails to pay taxes. 
Legal action is taken on a case-to-case basis to collect outstanding taxes, 
depending on the amount of taxes involved. In 2007, IRBM filed 8,293 civil suits 
in court for individual taxpayers. However, the number of cases taken to court in 
2008 has reduced for 1,263 cases. But the decrease was temporary because in 
2009, civil suits cases have risen to 9,642. The civil suit cases taken to court as 
depicted in Table 1 indicates that non-compliance of payment is still one of the 
major risks to be managed by IRBM.  
Desk Audit 
Under the SAS, tax audit is one of the main activities conducted by IRBM to 
ascertain higher compliance rate. Desk audit is an activity that requires officials to 
review taxpayers’ tax reporting and accounts at IRBM premises. In 2009, IRBM 
has published a Tax Audit Framework to inform the public of tax audit procedures 
and requirement and “to ensure that tax audit is carried out in a fair, transparent 
and impartial manner” (TAF, 2009, p.1). The framework “aims to assist audit 
officers to carry out their tasks efficiently and effectively and assist taxpayers in 
fulfilling their obligations” (TAF, 2009, p.1). A desk auditor reviews all 
information on income, expenses and claims made by taxpayers in their tax return. 
The tax auditors may request some financial documents from taxpayers for 
verification, or taxpayers may be invited to IRBM office for additional 
information. For a specific desk audit case, it can be referred for field audit action, 
where taxpayer will be notified in writing of the action to be taken by a field audit 
team (TAF, 2009, p.3). 
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As reported by IRBM Annual Reports, the main objectives of desk audit are to 
review and raise additional assessments, to impose penalties on cases of 
underreporting, failure to report income, and making excessive claims, based on 
financial information submitted by the taxpayers and to manage refunds. Table 1 
shows number of cases audited through desk auditing from 2007 to 2009. In 2008, 
1,044,480 cases were audited, a sharp increase of 284% from the previous year. 
The number of cases continued to increase in the following year of about 350,000 
cases.  
Field Audit 
Field audit is conducted to detect any tax-reduction measures taken by the audited 
taxpayers. At the same time, it is intended to create awareness among taxpayers 
who have not been audited on the possibility that they too may be selected to be 
audited in the future. Field audit takes place at taxpayers’ premise which involves 
examination of the taxpayers’ business records. “In the case of a sole-
proprietorship or partnership, if the taxpayer’s business records are incomplete it 
may involve the examination of non-business records such as personal bank 
statements, etc.” TAF (2009, p.3). IRBM will notify taxpayers prior to a field 
audit. In 2008, number of cases audited was 13,985, an increase of 118% from 
2007 whilst 2009 shows a slight decrease of 366 compared to 2008, in the number 
of taxpayers audited by IRBM (IRBM, 2009). 
Looking at Table 1, it appears that IRBM still adopts traditional enforcement 
strategies as deterrence approaches such as travel sanction, civil suits, and 
auditing through desk audit or field audit. Even though this “punishment driven 
compliance” (Job and Honaker, 2003, p.117) is conducted every year, the table 
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shows that number of cases or taxpayers violating the law do not indicate any 
major improvement in the way IRBM enforcing compliance since implementation 
of SAS. Furthermore, IRBM may incur additional expenses and increase 
administration cost in terms of manpower, financial and time taken due to length 
of time, procedures and bureaucracy to process the sanctions, civil suit and 
auditing (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Murphy, 2004; Scholz, 1984). 
To be successful, SAS requires voluntary compliance and self-regulation from the 
taxpayers (Loo et al., 2010a; Walpole, 2009). Thus, sufficient knowledge in 
taxation enables taxpayers to file return forms correctly and accurately and aware 
of their tax obligations as well as tax laws. Further, appropriate regulatory 
responses by tax regulators are encouraged to motivate voluntary compliance by 
the regulatees (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Sparrow, 2000; Braithwaite and 
Braithwaite, 2001). As noted by Loo et al. (2010a) from their study of individual 
taxpayers in Malaysia, and Kasipillai and Baldry (1998 cited in Loo et al. 2010), 
compliance behaviour was determined by taxpayers’ experience during their 
encounter with tax officials.  
Russell (2010, p.2) adds that voluntary compliance in SAS could be optimised 
through “an appropriate balance of taxpayer education and assistance, simple laws 
and procedures, and risk-based verification programs”. Therefore, tax regulators 
responsive approach toward taxpayers may develop perception of fairness by 
taxpayers (McKerchar, 2003; Feld and Frey, 2005; Kornhauser, 2007) and likely 
to increase compliance. Nevertheless, tax non-compliance in Malaysia may not 
appear as alarming due to its high ranking position based on Riahi-Belkaoui’s 
(2004) comparative study of taxpayer compliance among 30 countries as 
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illustrated in Table 2. From the table, it is shown that Malaysia is ranked 8
th
 in tax 
compliance which indicates that tax compliance in Malaysia appears to be 
relatively high compared to its neighbouring countries such as Indonesia and 
Thailand, and surprisingly higher compared to some developed countries such as 
Canada, France, Japan and Germany.  
Table 2: Tax Compliance Index amongst 30 countries 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Name of country   Tax compliance index*                                      
Singapore     5.05 
New Zealand    5.00 
Australia     4.58 
UK      4.67 
Hong Kong     4.56 
Switzerland    4.49 
USA      4.47 
Malaysia     4.34 
Chile      4.20 
Japan      4.41 
Norway      3.96 
France      3.86 
Canada      3.77 
Denmark    3.70 
Austria      3.60 
Finland      3.53 
Germany     3.41 
Thailand     3.41 
Philippines     1.83 
Netherlands     3.40 
Spain      3.29 
Taiwan      3.25 
Indonesia     2.53 
Mexico      2.46 
Argentina     2.41 
Poland     2.19 
Portugal     2.18 
Turkey      2.07 
Sweden      1.91 
Italy      1.77  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) 
*Tax compliance is measured by an assessment of tax compliance based on a scale from 0 to 6 
where high scores indicate higher compliance (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004, p.138). 
 
Loo et al. (2010) also observe that Malaysian taxpayers have high ethics where 
tax compliance is concerned, hence contribute to high tax compliance index as 
indicated in Table 2. Nevertheless, IRBM may desire to increase voluntary 
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compliance which is now in-between 68% to 76% as shown by Table 3. Even 
though the table only illustrates compliance rates of return forms received against 
return forms issued, the data indicates that compliance rate in-terms of return 
forms submission is relatively good. Data on other compliances such as non-
payment of tax or reporting errors are unavailable.   
Table 3: Compliance rate of return forms received 
 
 
 
 
Source: IRBM Annual Report (2004, 2005, 2006)  
 
Literature suggests responsive regulation approach to be adopted by tax regulators 
to encourage voluntary compliance and manage non-compliance (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001; Andreoni et al., 2003). In 
an effort to manage compliance risk, IRBM has established a Risk Management 
Division to identify various risks encountered by IRBM and to formulate 
strategies to manage the risks. 
2.5 Risk Management Division of IRBM 
In line with current government efforts to improve the effectiveness of the 
delivery system of governance, the Malaysian government has found it essential 
to ensure that the best system of public service delivery can be achieved. A 
Guideline for Enhancing Corporate Governance in the Public Sector was therefore 
issued by the Secretary of State on 9 March, 2007. The guideline aims to 
institutionalize the principles and best practices of governance in the public sector 
Year 2004 2005 2006 
Return Forms issued (million) 3.43 3.91 3.93 
Return Forms received (million) 2.34 2.99 2.85 
Compliance rate 68.22% 76.47% 72.52% 
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in order to enhance and strengthen its ability to achieve the National Mission 
towards particular missions of the organisation.  
Since its inception in 2009, there have been various transformations in the 
structure of the Risk Management Department (RMD) to improve its functions 
and roles as risk administrator in IRBM. To ascertain risk management activities 
can be executed effectively, the RMD was removed from the Investigation 
Department and placed under the IRBM CEO’s office on 1 July, 2011. 
Furthermore, to strengthen the role of RMD, one of the Deputy DG of IRBM is 
appointed as a Chief Risk Officer (CRO). The CRO is responsible to standardise 
implementation of a comprehensive risk management policy. He also monitors 
policies and directives related to risk are implemented efficiently by risk owners. 
The structure of functions of the RMD is depicted in Figure 1.   
Figure 1:    Organisation Chart of the Risk Management Division of IRBM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Risk Management Division IRBM (RMD, 2012) 
Board of 
Directors 
Audit 
Committee 
IRBM Top Management 
Risk Management Committee 
Risk Management Division 
Risk owners (other departments 
and divisions in IRBM) 
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Figure 1 illustrates the roles and functions of various entities in the RMD 
organisation structure. The Board of Directors (BoD) conducts the monitoring of 
risk management at IRBM. It receives information and risk management reports 
from the Audit Committee (AC) which is responsible for certifying risk 
management reports and monitoring the compliance of risk management activities 
with pre-determined procedures. The top management of IRBM ensures that risk 
management is practised in all work processes at IRBM and supports the 
implementation of risk remedial action. In addition, the Risk Management 
Committee (RMC) acts as an advisor to top management in making strategic 
decisions in order to protect both the reputation of IRBM and government 
revenue.  
The key player in the risk management process is the RMD team which is 
responsible for carrying out various risk management activities, some of which 
are listed below: 
 Assist risk owners to manage risks at IRBM in a uniform and systematic way 
according to the Risk Management Plan based on the Risk Management 
Framework. 
 Provide a Risk Management Framework, Risk Management Plan and 
Guidelines to the Department / Division / State / Tax Academy Malaysia for 
endorsement by the RMC. 
 Coordinate all risk management activities, including training and awareness 
sessions, to handle risk management related to risk owners. 
 As a Service Continuity Management, support organisations to manage 
holistically the risks related to critical functions of IRBM and to the impact of 
the threat of such risks, in order to ensure that regular services of the 
organisation can continue despite the disruption or disaster. 
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Finally, risk owners at IRBM departments, divisions and branches perform risk 
management activities at their respective levels and provide risk management 
reports to the RMD for analysis. Various functions of the RMD display its 
responsibility in monitoring and reporting to respective committees to ensure that 
the risk management framework is complied with effectively and efficiently.  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter first provides a general overview of the taxation system in Malaysia. 
The Malaysian tax administration is then selected as a case study in terms of its 
risk management strategies, and an explanation is given of various action plans 
that have been carried out by IRBM to ensure risks can be managed efficiently 
and effectively. Among the action plans are the reform of tax administration in 
terms of procedures and computerisation of processes which involves SAS return 
form submissions and processing of data electronically.  
This chapter also highlighted some non-compliance issues faced by IRBM where 
non-payers of tax are prevented from leaving Malaysia whilst those involved in 
non-compliance in reporting of tax liabilities are subjected to desk-audit and field 
audit. Resorting to traditional approach of enforcement, does not appear to 
improve compliance as illustrated in Table 1. Thus, IRBM has established a Risk 
Management Division so that a special team is assigned to understudy risks faced 
by IRBM and to advice other risk owners of IRBM to manage the risks. The RMD 
monitors risk management strategies is implemented according to the guidelines 
and policies issued by the management of IRBM. The next chapter addresses a 
wide range of literature and previous studies pertaining to tax compliance 
behaviour, risk management and responsive regulation.   
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presents risks faced by regulators in developing countries. 
The backgrounds both of Malaysia and of the IRBM are also discussed in order to 
highlight IRBM’s challenges during the implementation of SAS. In the present 
chapter, the thesis provides earlier research findings on three major underpinning 
themes of this study, namely, tax compliance, risk management and responsive 
regulation. Section 3.2 reviews the extensive prior research that has been 
conducted on tax compliance, while in Section 3.3 factors that influence the 
behaviour of taxpayers and their attitude towards tax compliance are examined.  
This discussion is followed by appraisals of risk and the management of risk in 
Section 3.4; the application of risk management by tax administrations in 
developed countries is also reviewed in this section. Further, the section highlights 
literature on the compliance pyramid models constructed and implemented by 
various tax authorities as a methodology of applying responsive regulation theory 
in regulatory administration. The main aspects of this literature, particularly 
responsive regulation, are drawn upon to construct a conceptual framework for 
this research.  
Section 3.5 sets out responsive regulation literature and is structured on the basis 
of responsive regulation - how it originated, who created the idea, how the 
concept is used and the gaps in this theory. To emphasise the theory of responsive 
regulation, Section 3.6 lists compliance pyramids adopted by the ATO, HMRC, 
NZIR and EC. In Section 3.7, the gaps in responsive regulation concept are 
addressed. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes by establishing the relationship between 
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tax compliance, risk management and responsive regulation by addressing how 
responsive regulation theory can be applied by regulatory bodies to manage risk 
and to procure compliance.  
3.2 Tax compliance  
The main challenge confronting governments and tax authorities is non-
compliance with tax rules and regulations (OECD, 2001): “Compliance has 
always been, and almost certainly always will be, a central problem in tax 
administration” (Mason, 2008, p.3). According to Leviner (2009), research has 
proven that “tax non-compliance is a serious and complex problem, subject to a 
wide range of causes and influences”. Most tax researchers, such as Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972), Andreoni et al. (1998), Jackson and Milliron (1986), James 
and Alley (2002), Franzoni (1998), Walpole (2009), Kirchler et al. (2003) and 
Eisenhauer (2008) agree that tax non-compliance is a universal problem faced by 
all administrators of tax.  
 
Existing studies on taxation provide extensive discussion on this issue. Tax non-
compliance is one of the risks which must be managed by tax administrations in 
order to meet their objective to collect revenue for their country’s development. In 
line with the viewpoint expressed by researchers, tax authorities also acknowledge 
the fact that not all taxpayers are willing to declare their income and to pay tax. In 
fact, studies have proven that there are taxpayers willing to do anything to avoid 
complying with tax laws (Braithwaite et al, 2005; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Kirchler et al., 2003). By understanding tax compliance, it would be easy for tax 
authorities to find ways to address this issue and to plan for strategies to manage 
it.  
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As discussed in the literature, various definitions are proposed by researchers and 
institutions on tax compliance. However, these definitions are quite similar in 
their use of key words such as reporting, paying and tax law. The commonly cited 
definition of tax compliance is that “taxpayer files all require tax returns at the 
proper time, and the returns accurately report tax liability in accordance with the 
rules, regulations and court decisions applicable at the time the return is filed” 
(Roth, Scholz and Witte (1989), cited in Pope and Mohdali, 2010, p.371). Alms 
(1991, p.577) simplified the definition in “reporting all income and paying all 
taxes in accordance to the applicable laws, regulations and court decisions”.  
 
Tax compliance is also defined as taxpayers paying the right amount of tax at the 
right time, filing the tax return accurately and submitting the return in time 
(OECD, 2001; Franzoni, 1998). Similarly, according to McKerchar and Evans 
(2009, p.3), tax payers are complying with the tax law when they register with the 
revenue authority, file the return on time, report the tax liability accurately, pay 
any outstanding taxes due and maintain all records. Failure to comply with the 
requirement of tax law is known as tax non-compliance. 
  
Other terms commonly used in a non-compliance context are ‘tax evasion’ and 
‘tax avoidance’ (Silvani, 1992; OECD, 2008; Kirchler et al., 2003; Franzoni, 
1998). Silvani further analyses tax evasion as evasion with fraud, i.e. having 
intention to cheat in tax reporting, while evasion without fraud are unreported 
taxes without committing fraud. Meanwhile, tax avoidance implies taxpayers’ 
behaviour which takes advantage of legal loopholes to under-report their taxes. 
Similarly, Kirchler et al. (2003) also divide tax non-compliance into tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. Literature suggests that tax avoidance is legal and moral, and 
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is associated with an intention to save taxes, with cleverness and with a good idea. 
Tax evasion, on the other hand, is perceived as illegal and immoral, and is 
associated with fraud, criminal prosecution, risk, tax-audit, and with penalty 
(Kirchler et al., 2003; Franzoni, 1998; James and Alley, 2002; Sandmo, 2004).  
From previous empirical studies, it seems that most tax researchers agree that 
taxpayers are complying with tax law when they declare their income, pay their 
tax obligation and abide by tax law and regulation. As tax evasion is regarded as a 
serious matter (Franzoni, 1998), the public is to be informed that non-compliance 
may cause the government to receive less revenue than the actual amount due 
(Eisenhauer, 2008). Since revenue is important for the benefit of the society, 
controlling and discouraging non-compliance is not only the responsibility of the 
tax authority but also of society (Walpole and Evans, 2001; Brautigam, 2008).  
Literature suggests that revenue authorities identify and understand the reasons 
which motivate taxpayer non-compliance in order that appropriate strategies are 
adopted and resources allocated to overcome these issues. Under SAS, voluntary 
compliance by taxpayers is crucial to ensure the success of self-assessment as it 
does not require taxpayers to enclose any financial documents to prove their 
claims in their return forms (Loo and McKerchar, 2009; Walpole, 2009; 
D’Ascenzo, 2008; James and Alley, 2002). Compliance risk management is 
underpinned by an understanding of the non-compliant behavioural factors 
influencing the decision of non-compliance, so that more effective regulatory 
responses can be implemented (OECD, 2010b). One of the steps in compliance 
risk management is the assessment of risk. In this context, assessment of risk 
includes understanding and analysing taxpayer compliance behaviour (OECD, 
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2010c). This response is in line with Braithwaite’s (2003) compliance pyramid 
which includes the BISEP model.   
The BISEP model (see Figure 2 below), comprising Business, Industry, 
Sociology, Economy and Psychology, identifies factors influencing taxpayers’ 
attitude and behaviour towards tax compliance and relates this behaviour with 
their responses to compliance. BISEP was first introduced by the Cash Economy 
Task Force of Australia as a recommendation to the ATO to manage compliance 
issues pertaining to cash economy (OECD, 2010b; CETF, 1998). Subsequently, 
this model has been studied and used by other tax researchers and tax 
administrations to attain a better understanding of taxpayer compliance behaviour.  
 
Figure 2: The BISEP Model 
 
Factors influencing taxpayer behaviour and the spectrum of taxpayer attitudes to 
compliance.  
Source: OECD, Tax Compliance and Tax Accounting System (OECD, 2010b). 
 
Figure 2 depicts two major elements in the tax compliance regime, namely 
BISEP, which lies within the circle, and the compliance pyramid in the triangular 
shape. The circle illustrates factors influencing taxpayer behaviour, such as 
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Business, Industry, Sociology, Economy and Psychology and the motivation 
towards their attitude to compliance. Further, the compliance pyramid shows the 
compliance strategy to be adopted by regulators in order to respond to the 
regulatees’ behaviour.  
Promoting voluntary compliance is as important as punishing non-compliance 
(Silvani, 1992, p.292-293). Voluntary compliance means self-complying without 
the efforts of any parties, especially the tax authority (Kornhauser, 2007). In line 
with their goal and mission, all revenue bodies should aim to improve the overall 
level of ‘voluntary compliance’7 and rely less on ‘enforced compliance’8 OECD 
(2008).  
As indicated in Section 3.4.3, under the SAS regime, voluntary compliance is 
crucial due to the systems requirement that taxpayers self-declare their income 
and compute their tax obligation in the tax return form. Taxpayers’ perception of 
the tax system is therefore important because if a system is fair, it will instil 
compliant behaviour among taxpayers which will motivate them to complete their 
returns accurately and truthfully without the presence of tax authorities. With 
regard to tax administrations, understanding taxpayers’ motivation and developing 
tax policies and strategies that can influence compliance may result in more 
revenue and incur less administrative cost to the tax authority (Che Azmi and 
Perumal, 2008; OECD, 2010a).  
Further, McKerchar and Evans (2009, p.22-23) recommend three strategic 
propositions for tax administrations to improve tax compliance. Firstly, the 
credibility of revenue authorities needs to be established and enhanced; the goals 
                                                          
7
 Compliance by taxpayers is achieved voluntarily  (OECD, 2008) 
8
 Compliance by enforcement actions carried out by revenue body (OECD, 2008) 
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and objectives of tax reform should be clearly outlined; and a risk management 
approach should be adopted. They elaborate that good governance is essential in 
determining the credibility of a government as well as having a legitimate and 
responsive state to ensure the ‘consensual’ relationship between the state and the 
citizens, especially where taxation is concerned. Secondly, tax administrations 
should have a clear vision of where the tax reform is intended to lead and set the 
right policy to achieve this vision. Finally, by adopting risk management 
strategies, tax administrations would be able to develop different mechanisms to 
address different types of compliance behaviour (McKerchar and Evans, 2009).   
Some of the strategies to be implemented by tax administrations seek to adapt the 
administration of the compliance model. A few compliance models have been 
developed by researchers and revenue authorities as a framework for strategic 
planning and policies aiming to reduce non-compliance and improve compliance 
among the taxpayers. The ATO, HMRC, NZIR and EC compliance pyramid 
models are discussed in Section 3.6.  
There appears to be an evolution of tax compliance literature from Allingham and 
Sandmo’s equation model (1972) to the twin pyramids of supports and sanctions 
presented by Braithwaite (2011). According to Andreoni et al. (1998), Allingham 
and Sandmo’s model (1972) is one of the earliest and best-known models of tax 
compliance, which queries if higher tax or penalty rates generate more or less 
compliance and may influence taxpayers towards tax evasion. This command-
and-control framework has been expanded in several different ways over the past 
twenty-five years. However, the weaknesses of the model are the assumptions that 
the probability of audit is constant and that taxpayers are risk neutral (Andreoni et 
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al., 1998). These compliance models promote responsive measures by regulators 
when dealing with taxpayers.   
In addition, Riahi-Belkaoui’s (2004) investigation of tax compliance from thirty 
countries reveals that tax compliance is highest in countries characterized by: 
“high economic freedom, important equity markets, effective competition 
laws and low serious crime rates. It shows that a powerful deterrent to tax 
evasion is the creation of a tax morale or climate where citizens are 
guaranteed economics rights and safe lives. Where individuals can exercise 
their economic rights in terms of economic freedom, important equity markets 
and effective competition laws, in a safe environment that improves their 
quality of life, they are more prone to view tax compliance as less of a burden 
and more of a citizenship duty.” (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004, p.141)  
As moral considerations are highest where the tax morale is high (Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004), tax authorities should recognize and take into account both institutional 
and moral factors determining tax compliance. To ensure the success of SAS and 
to increase voluntary compliance, a better understanding of factors motivating 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour will assist tax administrations to design and 
implement responsive compliance strategies (Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Shaw et 
al., 2010; OECD, 2010a; Braithwaite, 2003).   
The next section addresses taxpayer behaviour and attitude as motivational factors 
that contribute to tax compliance decision-making. 
3.3 Taxpayer Behaviour and Attitude 
Many tax researchers (Braithwaite, 2005; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Hasseldine et al., 2007; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Wenzel, 2002; Song and 
Yarbrough, 1978) agree that the key task of any tax administration is to secure 
compliance with the tax rules. Non-compliance therefore poses a significant risk 
to the government revenues and has to be managed by tax administrations 
(Andreoni et al., 1998; McKerchar and Evans, 2009; Black and Baldwin, 2010; 
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OECD, 2010). Non-compliance is when a taxpayer fails to comply with the 
factors stated earlier, either deliberately or unintentionally.  
 
In order to increase effectiveness and decrease non-compliance, LeBaube (1992, 
p.308-309) reports a study conducted for the IRS in which taxpayers are divided 
into four groups: those who understand and comply willingly with the law; those 
who want to comply but do not understand; those who understand but choose not 
to comply fully; and those who deliberately do not comply. Further, tax personnel 
should understand taxpayers’ behaviour and move the taxpayers from one group 
to another (LeBaube, 1992) and then take necessary actions to overcome the 
problems according to the categories. 
 
Different people demonstrate a variety of behaviours: there are those who are 
honest and consistently comply with the law, and there are also dishonest people 
who always look for an opportunity to cheat (Alm, 1999; Eisenhauer, 2008). The 
literature addresses a wide range of factors that influence a taxpayer’s decision 
whether or not to comply with the tax law. Empirical study on tax non-compliance 
behaviour has found that various determinant factors are relevant in influencing 
tax evasion behaviour (Groenland and Veldhoven, 1983; Song and Yarbrough, 
1978; Torgler, 2003; Wenzel, 2002; Feld and Frey, 2005; Kirchler et al., 2008; 
Alm et al., 1992; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Jackson and Milliron, 1986).  
 
To improve compliance requires tax administrations to understand the motivating 
factors that influence taxpayer attitude, which then contributes to the non-
compliant behaviour of taxpayers (Walpole, 2009; OECD, 2010c; Alm, 1999). In 
the context of attitude and behaviour, there appears to be a strong link with tax-
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paying, and “people bring their attitudes in line with their behaviour” Hessing et 
al. (1993, as cited in Mitton, 2009, p.240).  
 
Another aspect of the relationship between behaviour and attitude is provided by 
Song and Yarbrough (1978), who posit that there are two dimensions of tax 
ethics: attitudinal and behavioural. The attitudinal dimension is the taxpayers’ 
attitude towards their tax responsibilities, while the behavioural dimension is 
represented by taxpayers’ compliance behaviour towards the tax regulations. Song 
and Yarbrough’s analysis provides better understanding of the dimension of 
attitude and behaviour towards tax compliance.  
 
Empirical evidence has proven that factors influencing taxpaying behaviour 
include ethics, perceived fairness, social norms, psychological orientation and tax 
morale (Wenzel, 2002; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Kornhauser, 2007; Walpole, 2009; 
Franzoni, 1998). Naturally, people do not like to part from their hard-earned 
money, particularly if they perceive that they do not receive any benefit or 
privilege in return for their contribution (Muehlbacher et al., 2008; Ho et al., 
2006). However, people still report their income and pay taxes due to their fear of 
detection and punishment (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Kornhauser, 2007).  
 
Prior studies of taxpayers’ behaviour indicate that there are various determinant 
factors which influence the behaviour of taxpayers to comply or evade the tax 
laws, and, if complying, whether to comply fully or partially (Franzoni, 1998). 
Findings from the empirical studies reveal that some of the factors affecting 
taxpayers’ behaviour include tax knowledge (Alm et al., 2010); punishment 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972); trusting the tax system and the government (Feld 
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and Frey, 2005; Kirchler et al, 2008); demographic factors (Jackson and Milliron 
(1986); tax morale (Feld and Frey, 2005; Kornhauser, 2007; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004); and religiosity (Torgler, 2003; Pope and Mohdali, 2010), as well as 
economic factors such as compliance cost (Le Baube, 1992; Abdul Jabbar and 
Pope, 2008) and tax rates (Swenson, 1988; Sillamaa, 1999).   
 
By determining factors affecting the behaviour and perception of taxpayers 
towards their tax obligation, tax administrations would, significantly, be able to 
find solutions to ensure that tax defaulters voluntarily comply with tax laws. 
However, before finding the solutions, tax administrations should first take the 
initiative to understand the behaviours and attitudes of taxpayers which influence 
their decision-making on tax compliance.  
 
In addition to these factors, negative behaviour such as refusal to learn about 
taxation, cheating the tax system, failure in proper record keeping, and 
indifference towards tax regulations, are common attributes of taxpayers (Marti, 
Wanjohi and Magutu, 2010; Alm et al., 1992). To obtain further understanding of 
evidence given in other studies, these determinant factors influencing tax non-
compliance are discussed further in the following section.  
 
There is a wide range of discussion in the literature on factors that influence 
taxpayer decision-making in tax compliance. Reviews from the literature provide 
motivational factors that shape an individual’s perception and judgement about 
whether to comply with or evade the tax law. It is therefore challenging for tax 
administrations to understand the various factors that influence compliant and 
non-compliant tax behaviour. An awareness of why people comply willingly - or 
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refuse to comply - will assist tax administrations in developing motivational 
strategies for voluntary compliance and at the same time to discourage non-
compliant behaviour. In order to increase tax compliance, revenue bodies could 
plan and develop regulatory strategies through ‘persuasive appeals’ to increase an 
ethical approach to taxpaying (Wenzel, 2002). Wenzel’s suggestion is consistent 
with a responsive regulation regime where the first step to promote compliance is 
through persuasion and encouragement.  
 
For the purpose of this study, only six determinant factors are selected for 
discussion in this section: trust in the tax system and in the government; the cost 
of compliance; education and knowledge; personal and social norms; and tax 
morale and deterrence. These factors are relevant to this study and will provide 
answers to the research questions. Furthermore, strategies to be implemented by 
tax administrations to manage these factors are addressed in depth in the empirical 
chapters.  
 
3.3.1  Trusting the system and the government 
Many researchers, including Kirchler et al. (2008), Braithwaite (1998, 2003); Alm 
et al. (1992), Feld and Frey (2005) LeBaube and Vehorn (1992), Franzoni (1998) 
and Wenzel (2002), agree that one of the factors affecting compliance is that of 
perceptions of transparency and fairness of tax administration. The 
trustworthiness of the government (Feld and Frey, 2005; OECD, 2006), and fair 
procedures and good governance (Feld and Frey, 2005; LeBaube and Vehorn, 
1992) may encourage better tax compliance by taxpayers. Trust in the authorities 
will increase when the enforcers demonstrate efficient enforcement against non-
complying taxpayers (Wenzel, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2008), thus “good 
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governance and fair procedures lead to higher tax compliance by taxpayers” (Feld 
and Frey, 2005, p.20).  
 
Fairness of revenue agencies in their treatment of taxpayers is also a motivational 
factor that contributes to compliance. Literature describes fairness in three 
categories, namely, distributive fairness, procedural fairness or justice and 
retributive fairness (OECD, 2010c). 
“Distributive fairness is the perception that the government acts as a good 
custodian and wise spender of tax revenues; procedural fairness is the 
perception that the revenue body adheres to the procedures that are fair in 
dealing with the taxpayers; and retributive fairness is the perception that the 
revenue body is fair in the application of punishment when the rules are 
broken.” (OECD, 2010c, p.6) 
 
Voluntary compliance relies on reciprocity between regulators and regulatees. If 
the public trusts the enforcement institutions for their fair treatment and 
procedural justice, and recognises a high level of integrity among tax personnel, 
reciprocal trust may lead to self-regulation and voluntary compliance 
(Kornhauser, 2007; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Wenzel, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2003; 
Rothengatter, 2005).  
 
Further, as noted by Alm et al. (2010), when taxpayers have greater interaction 
with the tax authorities and receive quality services from them, then this group of 
taxpayers may have a more accurate perception of tax administration and may 
increase their compliance with the tax law. Friendly interaction and supportive 
participation of regulators with small-business taxpayers may result in a feeling 
of respect and social trust on the part of the taxpayers and may encourage 
voluntary compliance among the business social network (Rothengatter, 2005).  
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McKerchar (2003, p.10) also finds that “perception of fairness would appear also 
to be influenced by how wisely taxpayers perceive government to be spending 
monies raised by taxation.” If they therefore perceive that the government spends 
the collected revenue wisely, then their perception of fairness would increase, 
hence there could be greater compliance. On the other hand, if taxpayers perceive 
failure by the government to spend the revenue wisely, then their perception of 
fairness would decrease, which eventually would lead to less commitment to 
comply.  
 
Regulators may use their authority to achieve compliance; however, they would 
lose the trust of taxpayers who feel threatened by such power (Kirchler et al., 
2008). On the other hand, if tax authorities treat taxpayers equally, responsibly 
and show respect, the taxpayer may learn to trust the government; thus could 
result in higher voluntary compliance rate (Kirchler et al., 2008). A psychological 
tax contract – a concept where “taxpayers and the tax authority treat each other 
like partners, that is, with mutual respect and honesty” (Feld and Frey, 2007, 
p.104) - is also one of the elements that contribute to compliance behaviour. Tax 
authorities are advised to use a psychological contract to analyse tax compliance 
where respectful treatment is an essential factor that determines tax compliance 
(Feld and Frey, 2005).  
 
Previous studies have proven that taxpayers will be willing to comply when they 
receive public benefits and services from the government in return for the taxes 
they pay (Feld and Frey, 2007; Feld and Frey, 2005; Franzoni, 1998). These 
factors appear to motivate them to comply voluntarily even though there is no 
threat of punishment or sanction (Alm et al., 1992). However, if taxpayers believe 
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that the government is untrustworthy, they may consider cheating on taxes is 
justifiable (Frey and Torgler, 2007):  
“If taxpayers think they are in a better position to monitor and control politician, their 
willingness to cooperate and pay taxes may increases. Therefore, a higher degree of 
satisfaction with a country’s democratic institution should lead to higher tax morale.” 
(Frey and Torgler, 2006, p.144)  
 
Finally, compliance also relates to the power of the authority and trust in it 
(Kirchler et al., 2008). The Slippery Slope framework suggests the power of tax 
regulators and the level of trust in them may influence the level of tax 
compliance: if the authority’s power is weak and taxpayers trust is low, then the 
level of compliance is likely to decline.  
 
According to Kirchler et al. (2008, p.212), “… tax compliance can be achieved 
through increasing levels of power and trust; however, the resulting compliance 
is enforced in the former case and voluntary in the latter case. The impact of 
changes in one dimension is assumed to depend on the level of the other 
dimension …” Further, Kirchler et al. illustrate how the power of authorities, 
trust in them and tax compliance, are three dimensions which shape the Slippery 
Slope framework. Previous literature has indicated that voluntary compliance 
could be achieved if taxpayers have confidence in the government, a perception 
of fairness of the tax law and a psychological contract with their tax authority. 
Thus, it is suggested, revenue bodies to be fair, transparent and friendly in their 
conduct in order to gain the trust of the public and its cooperation. 
3.3.2 Cost of compliance  
As stated by Song and Yarbrough (1978, p.442), “taxation is an unwelcomed 
burden to be endured”. With the implementation of SAS, taxpayers may incur 
additional costs in order to comply with SAS laws, since self-assessment requires 
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them to manage their own tax affairs in keeping proper records and assessing their 
tax obligation by reporting their income, calculating the tax to be paid and paying 
the tax owed. Shaw et al. (2010, p.1106) state: “…taxpayers would still need to 
spend time and money finding their way through the increasingly complex maze 
of tax laws”. Cost of compliance, also known as compliance cost, is the 
administrative cost incurred by taxpayers in the process of complying with tax 
regulation (OECD, 2010a). The process may consist of storing documents and 
information, reporting information in return form, reconciling the report with 
financial and other relevant documents, telephoning the revenue office, taking 
time to read instructions, and other activities related to return form submission 
and payment of tax (OECD, 2010a).   
 
There is a wide range of literature on compliance cost and its influence on 
taxpayers’ behaviour (Ibrahim and Pope, 2011; Shaw et al., 2010; Abdul-Jabbar 
and Pope, 2008; Evans, 2003; Le Baube, 1992). High compliance cost, which 
results in a financial burden on taxpayers, is one of the determinant elements that 
contribute to tax evasion (Franzoni, 1998; Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Shaw et al., 
2010; OECD, 2010c). Some taxpayers, particularly small business taxpayers, may 
require tax practitioners to assist them in managing their tax matters due to the 
complexity of reporting the business (Hasseldine et al. 2007; Rothengatter, 2005; 
McKerchar, 2003; Choong and Wong, 2011). Thus, compliance cost may affect 
businesses, especially small firms, as it is part of their expenses and could 
therefore reduce their profit (OECD, 2010a; Rothengatter, 2005; Hasseldine et al., 
2007). Compliance cost may therefore become one of the influencing factors that 
contribute to a lower level of voluntary compliance (Jenkin and Forlemu, 1993; 
Ibrahim and Pope, 2011; Abdul-Jabbar and Pope, 2008; Shaw et al., 2010; Evans, 
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2003). Similarly, McKerchar’s mixed method research which seeks to understand 
the unintentional non-compliance demonstrated by Australian taxpayers suggests: 
“Complexity and high levels of commitment caused personal taxpayers to 
experience high levels of compliance cost, which in turn reduced their perception of 
fairness of the income tax system. As the perception of fairness decreased, there was 
a decrease in commitment to compliance.” (McKerchar, 2003, p.9) 
 
Tax administrations are advised to improve their enforcement strategies to 
simplify compliance activities by the taxpayers, which in turn may result in a 
reduction of compliance cost for the taxpayers and also minimise administrative 
cost for the revenue bodies (OECD, 2010b).  
 
HMRC has taken the initiative to lessen the administrative burden of small 
business taxpayers by identifying interaction cost between taxpayers and HMRC. 
Once the cost and process involved during interaction with the taxpayers was 
identified, HMRC developed plans and strategies to “influence customer 
behaviour and attitudes to risk” by improving interactions with the taxpayers, 
hence facilitating them to comply with their tax obligation (OECD, 2010a, p.19).   
 
Other tax administrations such as the IRS, Austria, Ireland and Canada have also 
adopted compliance cost assessment by re-engineering their administration for the 
purpose of reducing cost of compliance for their taxpayers. As the priority of 
revenue bodies is to enable taxpayer compliance with their tax obligation in order 
to reduce compliance cost, they have improved the process by simplifying and 
shortening the tax return form; further, they have increased the use of electronic 
submission and enhanced the employment of ICT (OECD, 2010a; Evans, 2003). 
Other tax administrations, especially in developing economies, may learn the best 
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practices used by their counterparts in order to take the necessary approaches to 
reduce compliance cost and thus encourage voluntary compliance. 
3.3.3 Knowledge and Education  
“The manner in which information is communicated to a taxpayer can have a 
major impact on his willingness to comply with the tax laws” (Kornhauser, 2007, 
p.609). Previous studies (Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; 
Torgler, 2003) suggest that taxpayers with a higher level of tax knowledge tend to 
adopt a positive attitude towards their tax obligation. More highly educated 
taxpayers may acquire more knowledge about tax law and would thus be in a 
better position to understand the requirement to comply (Torgler, 2003; Song and 
Yarbrough, 1978).  
 
From their empirical survey, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) have discovered that tax 
ethics and perception of the fairness of the tax system can be improved by 
providing more tax information to the public, hence preventing the tendency for 
tax evasion. Similarly, Richardson’s cross-borders survey on tax compliance 
(2006) finds that the level of taxpayer education does influence their decision-
making in tax compliance and tax evasion. Empirical evidence given by Alm et al. 
(2010) has proven that uncertainty reduces compliance while information or 
knowledge has a positive impact. On the other hand, Vogel’s survey findings 
(1974, p.500) indicate that less well-educated taxpayers have less access to tax 
compliance information, are less informed about relevant tax regulations, and 
require assistance more often. However, people with a higher level of education 
may be less compliant because they better understand the opportunities for 
evasion and may find ways to cheat the system.  
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Literature suggests that tax administrations to use communications as an effective 
tool to deliver relevant tax knowledge; continuous tax education programmes 
conducted by revenue bodies will encourage taxpayers to comply and deter them 
from non-compliance (Eriksen and Fallen, 1996; Kasipillai et al., 2003; 
Hasseldine et al. 2007; OECD, 2010c). Further, education programmes should not 
only facilitate urban taxpayers, but also extend to rural and hard-to-reach 
communities, thus improving cultural behaviour by creating awareness and 
providing knowledge that tax compliance is important for asset building (Robles, 
2010). 
 
3.3.4 Personal norms and social norms 
“Norms, personal or social, are considered by revenue bodies to be the most 
important drivers of compliance” (OECD, 2010c, p.5). Individual actions are led 
by both personal and social norms (Feld and Frey, 2005; Wenzel, 2002).  A 
taxpayer complies with the tax law if he/she perceives or anticipates that his/her 
fellow citizens declare their incomes truthfully (Sugden, 1984, cited in Feld and 
Frey, 2005, p.13). Individuals with strong personal tax ethics may be more 
compliant with the law and will avoid evasion (Wenzel, 2002). Personal tax ethics 
as part of personal norms are “the intrinsic motivations or the feeling of obligation 
which motivates a person without being forced or paid externally” (Mitton, 2009, 
p.23).  
 
Taxpayers’ compliance decision-making is also likely to be influenced by social 
norms (Wenzel, 2002; Mitton, 2009) where some individuals will refer to their 
close relatives and friends in complying with the law (Franzoni, 1998; Sandmo, 
2004; Torgler, 2003; OECD, 2010c). When people in the group or society are 
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against the law, then there will be people following this attitude, which may create 
a “non-compliance epidemic” (Franzoni, 1998, p.7). Franzoni’s point of view is 
supported by Frey and Torgler who note that: 
”if many citizens pay their taxes, an individual taxpayer would also feel obligated to 
contribute and pay taxes. Alternatively, if many individuals evade taxes, an 
individual taxpayer will not feel obligated to pay taxes.” (Frey and Torgler, 2006, 
p.138)  
 
Due to the complexity of income tax laws that are known to be impossible to 
administer, taxpayers may have the opportunity to cheat in self-defence, knowing 
that everyone else is cheating (McLure Jr. and Pardo, 1992, p.127). However, if it 
seems that a society comprises law-abiding citizens, then individuals within that 
society will be compliant (Torgler, 2003; Wenzel, 2002).  Frey and Torgler (2007, 
p.142) agree that “if people believe that others are honest, their own willingness to 
pay taxes increases”.  
 
Society is also influenced by the culture or life-style of people within a specific 
group. Some empirical evidence proves that culture also is another factor that may 
influence compliance decision-making. Further, individuals’ exposure to the tax 
system varies in different countries (Torgler, 2003; Muehlbacher et al., 2008; 
Richardson, 2008; Alm and Torgler, 2004). In his empirical studies on voluntary 
tax compliance among migrant small-business entrepreneurs in Australia, 
Rothengatter (2005) finds that a distinctive ethnic culture appears to have a 
different attitude towards tax compliance.  
 
Furthermore, Yong’s investigation of the Maori and Pacific ethnic groups in New 
Zealand reveals that “Pacific and Maori placed their group obligations over their 
personal interests, resulting in more tax compliance difficulties” (2011, p.157). 
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Therefore, knowledge about the culture of certain ethnic groups may therefore 
assist regulators to formulate effective strategies to deliver compliance messages 
to them and encourage them to obey the law (Rothengatter, 2005; Robles, 2010; 
Yong, 2011). To promote a strong social norm to remain compliant, revenue 
bodies are advised to inform the public that most taxpayers are honest and 
compliant; otherwise the public will have the impression that non-compliance is 
the norm which may result in more non-compliance (OECD, 2010c, p.5). 
3.3.5 Tax morale 
Torgler and Schneider (2007) describe tax morale as the “moral obligation to pay 
taxes, a belief in contributing to society by paying taxes” whereby the intrinsic 
motivation to pay tax may come from the desire to be a good citizen or from the 
desire to contribute to the common good. Kornhauser (2007) defines tax morale as 
referring to taxpayer attitudes and beliefs, and not their behaviour. Further, Frey 
and Torgler address tax morale as:  
“the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. It measures an individual’s willingness to pay 
taxes, in other words, the moral obligation to pay taxes or the belief that paying 
taxes contributes to society.” (Frey and Torgler, 2007, p.140) 
 
 
Prior literature also agrees that high tax morale has a significant impact on tax 
compliance (Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Kornhauser, 
2007; Eisenhauer, 2008). Moreover, “if taxpayers believe tax evasion to be 
common, tax morale decreases. Alternatively, if they believe others to be honest,  
tax morale increases” (Frey and Torgler, 2007, p.153). Tax morale also answers 
the question of “why people pay taxes instead of evading them” (Kornhauser, 
2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Eisenhauer, 2008; 
Cummings et al., 2009).  
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It appears that tax morale also plays a major role in tax compliance.  Both social 
norms (shared beliefs of how people should behave) and personal values (moral, 
ethics) affect tax morale (Kornhauser, 2007). Pope and McKerchar (2011) concur 
that revenue authorities need to understand taxpayer tax morale issues in order to 
increase voluntary compliance, especially in the SAS environment. By 
understanding personal and social norms, tax administration could formulate a 
compliance management policy to foresee and deter tax evasion in order to 
increase compliance (Franzoni, 1998; Kornhauser, 2007; Wenzel, 2002; Frey and 
Torgler, 2007).  
 
A fuller understanding of the relationship between tax morale and the opportunity 
for either non-compliant or compliant behaviour may assist revenue authorities on 
how to adopt a responsive approach to improve compliance (Pope and 
McKerchar, 2011). Thus, responsive mechanisms could be adopted to manage 
non-compliance resulting from tax morale factor. Only when soft approaches fail 
to motivate taxpayer to comply, a stricter mechanism could be employed as 
deterrence to manage non-compliance.  
3.3.6  Deterrence  
To change personal and social norms is not an easy task to be addressed by tax 
authorities. A stricter deterrent may therefore be a more suitable approach to 
enhance compliance (Franzoni, 1998). One of the motivational factors to ensure 
that taxpayers comply with the law is the threat of detection and punishment 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; McKerchar and Evan, 2009; Cummings et al., 
2009; Frey and Torgler, 2007).  Prior literature suggests that taxpayers should face 
78 
 
the certain threat of punishment if they fail to comply with the tax laws. As “the 
way power of authorities is perceived by citizens can determine tax compliance” 
(Bergman, 2003), a stricter enforcement policy may result in a higher level of 
compliance (Sandmo, 2004, Devos, 2007). Furthermore, Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein (1998), and Slemrod and Yizhaki (2002) both predict that if punishment 
is higher, then there is less non-compliance. “Deterrence is based on the concept 
that the risk of detection and punishment will improve compliance behaviour” 
(OECD, 2010c, p.14).  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that a traditional approach to enforcement using 
deterrence tools, such as auditing, investigation, imposition of penalty, 
prosecution and sanction implemented by tax authorities, may be an effective 
method to adopt in order to reduce tax evasion (Franzoni, 1998; Feld and Frey, 
2005; Braithwaite, 2003; Hasseldine et al., 2007). “Tax evasion can therefore be 
mitigated if expected fines are sufficiently high to deter taxpayers from cheating” 
(Feld and Frey, 2005, p.5). If a taxpayer is found guilty of making a false 
declaration with the intention of cheating the authority, then an appropriate 
treatment, such as penalty imposition, should be rendered on him or her. On the 
other hand, if, for instance, the taxpayer has made mistakes in the calculation of 
tax liabilities, the tax authority should refrain from imposing harsh penalties, but 
instead should attempt to contact the taxpayer to obtain an explanation of the 
errors (Feld and Frey, 2005).  
 
Literature indicates that penalty rate may have an influence on compliance. 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Sandmo (2004) and Devos (2009) suggest that a 
high rate of penalty may increase compliance. In addition, low fines for minor tax 
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evasion and high penalties for tax fraud may influence tax morale and is likely to 
instil a sense of responsibility to obey the rules (Feld and Frey, 2005; Alm et al. 
1992; Sandmo, 2004; Eisenhauer, 2008).  
 
In the context of auditing, compliance among low- and middle-income taxpayers 
is increased by threatening them with scrutiny of their returns, but among high-
income taxpayers compliance decreases (Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian, 
2001 cited in Kirchler et al., 2008). This is due to taxpayers’ perceptions of 
mistrust in the authorities. By strengthening tax audit capabilities, the tax 
authority would be able to identify taxpayers’ intention when submitting their 
return forms, so appropriate steps should be taken. The deterrent treatment 
adopted by tax authorities towards taxpayers is important for compliance in order 
to manage those who tend to violate the law.  
 
Revenue bodies are therefore advised to use audit as a deterrent rather than as a 
means of revenue collection (Franzoni, 1998). Franzoni also suggests that audit 
strategy is a cost-effective enforcement approach since the audit activities are 
conducted on the basis of specific information obtained from taxpayers and their 
tax liability. Audit probability should therefore vary for different taxpayers. 
However, Hasseldine et al. (2007) disagree that tax audit by tax agencies would 
be cost-effective because the authorities would need to spend more on auditing, 
involving additional operational cost and less revenue collection.  
 
James and Alley (2002) also argue against an enforcement approach since it ‘too 
readily’ imposes a penalty for non-compliance, which may result in a low rate of 
voluntary compliance, particularly under the SAS regime. Similarly, Braithwaite 
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et al. (2005) and Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) also concur that threat and 
enforcement should only be the last action to be taken by the revenue authorities 
after education and persuasion has failed. A harsh enforcement mechanism may 
defeat the purpose of ensuring voluntary compliance and affect taxpayers’ 
willingness to comply (James and Alley, 2002).  
 
Other than imposing a penalty, adopting a shaming approach to publicise law 
offenders among the public may improve compliance (Makkai and Braithwaite, 
1994; Kornhauser, 2007; Murphy, 2008; Devos, 2009). People perceive 
punishment as humiliating; they may therefore resist complying in the future or 
resent the regulators for the punishment (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Murphy, 
2008). On the other hand, a friendly service-oriented method is far more effective 
in influencing behaviour and encouraging voluntary compliance because 
“education and support of taxpayers are more promising than control and 
unreasonable severity in persuading taxpayers to comply” (Kirchler et al., 2008, 
p.220).  
 
By understanding the variety of behaviours and attitudes of taxpayers, tax 
administrations require a more flexible regulatory approach which considers 
different compliance levels of taxpayers but at the same time works towards 
upholding the tax laws. The alternative approach to the traditional enforcement 
regime may encourage positive behaviour, and thus may have a positive influence 
on taxpayer compliance decision-making. This may also improve taxpayers’ 
perceptions about the government’s policies and tax system, and thus may in turn 
increase voluntary compliance and discourage non-compliance (Braithwaite et al., 
2005; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Feld and Frey, 2005; Alm, 1999).  
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As addressed earlier, previous literature on tax compliance and taxpayer 
behaviour indicates a number of factors, including tax morale, norms and trust in 
the government, which could influence taxpayers in deciding whether or not to 
comply with the tax law. Additionally, considerations such as corruption, culture 
and ineffective tax administration within developing countries, have also been 
addressed in Chapter 1. Attention has previously been drawn to the ways in which 
different people exhibit a variety of behaviours; there is therefore no single 
approach to manage non-compliance issues (Alm et al., 1992). By understanding 
taxpayers’ behaviour and motivation, tax administrations would be able to 
develop tax policies and compliance risk strategies to gain taxpayers’ cooperation 
in voluntary compliance.  
 
In an effort to understand determinant factors motivating taxpayer attitude and 
behaviour, the ATO took the initiative to conduct a study in 2000/2001 
(Niemirowski et al., 2003) when a survey was undertaken on non-business 
taxpayers to understand their compliance behaviour. Behavioural indicators 
provided by this study enable the ATO to identify and develop compliance 
strategies to improve compliance behaviour, which ultimately may increase 
greater compliance. Other tax administrations are encouraged to learn from the 
ATO so that similar research can be conducted to understand taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour and thus improve compliance. 
 
As deterrence requires “intrusive, tough-minded inspections, stringent prosecution 
of even minor violation, expedited sanctioning procedures and other deterrence-
based actions” (Scholz, 1984, p.396), the cost incurred to implement these 
enforcement measures would be higher. On the other hand, cooperation by 
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regulatees would not only reduce compliance costs for the taxpayers, but also help 
regulators to minimise their enforcement cost. Commitment by both parties may 
bring more revenue to the states as well as reduce the administrative costs in 
handling non-compliance. As suggested by previous studies, when regulators can 
identify risk factors that influence taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, they may be 
able to develop strategies to manage those risks effectively and efficiently. The 
next section presents definitions of risk, the risk management process and risk-
based approaches to manage risks.   
3.4 Risk management 
‘Risk is inherent to life. The future is always uncertain and the outcomes of events 
unpredictable’ (Wilson-Grau, 2003, p.1). In the literature, risk is identified 
variously as uncertainty, threat, hazard, the unknown, challenges, danger, 
phenomenon and jeopardy (Bernstein, 1996; Vesper, 2006; Wilson-Grau, 2003; 
Power, 2004; Murphy, 2008). The word ‘risk’ has its roots in the old French word 
risqué, which means “danger, in which there is an element of chance” (Littre, 
1863, as cited in Vesper, 2006, p.1). According to Bernstein (1996) “risk doesn’t 
mean danger; it just means not knowing what the future holds”. However, while 
Vesper suggests that the word ‘risk’ has French origins, Bernstein (1996) notes 
that it derives from the early Italian word risicare which means ‘to dare’. As 
stated by Bernstein, risk is a choice rather than a fate which means we dare to take 
action based on the decision which we have made. Meanwhile, Murphy (2008, 
p.39) defines risk as “the danger of future loss”. He adds that risk is “any 
phenomenon which could affect our ability to meet our objectives”. Similarly, 
TDC (2009) looks at risk as “the chance or possibility of loss, damage, injury or 
failure to achieve objectives caused by an unwanted or uncertain action or event”. 
83 
 
Another reference to risk as ‘uncertainty’ was made by OECD, which defined it as 
an “uncertain consequence of an event or activity with respect to something that 
has human value” (OECD, 2010, p.18).  
Such definitions endow risk with negative connotations, entailing uncertainty of 
current or future events that may prevent achievement of objectives. Power (2004) 
points out that, since the mid-1990s, risk has become a major concern in both 
private and public sectors in the UK, where the concept of risk is introduced to 
monitor outcomes and performance of the sectors. In the private sector, the focus 
is to achieve organisational objectives in control activities (Power, 2009), while in 
the public sector the concern is about managing risk in order to improve the 
delivery service to the public (OECD, 2010). Black (2005) further elaborates the 
meaning of risk in the public sector as failure of government departments to 
achieve their objectives or to deliver public services.   
Research has shown that “people are not very good at estimating risks and our 
ability to make sense of risk is limited” (Hutter, 2005, p.73). By having 
knowledge and understanding about potential risk in our daily work activities, the 
risks or uncertainties could be managed in an effective manner. The process of 
dealing with different kinds of uncertainty is called ‘risk management’ (Vesper, 
2006, p.10). Vesper adds that knowledge acquired through responding to hazards 
and incidents has contributed to the evolution of risk management. Over a period 
of time, organisation is therefore able to identify and control hazards and 
eventually it develops measures to prevent recurrences.  
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By identifying the external and internal risk factors of the organisation, risk 
managers may use risk management as guidance to assist decision-making on 
certain strategies suitable for specific types of risks (Bernstein, 1996; Power, 
2004; Holt, 2004; Vaughan, 2005; Hutter, 2005; Black, 2005; TDC, 2009). Risk 
management is also a process which ensures that undesirable events do not occur 
(Power, 2004). Ideally, risk management should provide some activities to be 
taken in anticipation of unforeseen events, rather than a response to them as they 
occur. Further, it enables risk managers to decide about when to avoid and 
minimize the negative risks, and how to take up opportunities with some positive 
risks (Power, 2004; Thomson, 2008). As noted by Hopkin (2010, p.4), “the key 
benefit of risk management is to enhance the efficiency of operations within the 
organisation.” This is to ensure that decisions are made correctly to achieve 
objectives of the organisation (Hopkin, 2010, p.4) 
 
3.4.1 Risk management processes 
As proposed by Bernstein (1996, p.3), “to discover the nature of risk, 
organisations should have the ability to define what may happen in the future and 
to choose among alternatives as strategies to manage the risk”. Furthermore, what 
had occurred in the past could be used to anticipate what would happen in the 
future (Bernstein, 1996). Efficient risk management takes place when resources 
are used effectively to address challenges faced by an organisation (Vesper, 2006; 
Thomson, 2008; IRM, 2002). It entails the implementation of several processes to 
be successful: risk identification, risk analysis, risk assessment, risk treatment and 
risk evaluation (Black, 2005; Thompson, 2008; IRM, 2002; EC, 2006; OECD, 
2004). However, different organisations may have more or less processes 
depending on their culture, environment and requirements.  
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To further enhance the effectiveness of risk management planning, previous 
studies (Black, 2005; Thompson, 2008; IRM, 2002; EC, 2006; OECD, 2010a) 
propose that regulators adopt regulatory enforcement strategies so that compliance 
risk management can be enforced efficiently. 
3.4.2 Compliance Risk Management  
Compliance Risk Management is described by the European Commission (EC) as: 
“a systematic process in which a tax administration makes deliberate choices on 
which treatment instruments could be used to effectively stimulate compliance and 
prevent non-compliance, based on the knowledge of all (taxpayers’ behaviour) and 
related to the available capacity.” (EC, 2010, p.5) 
A Compliance Risk Management model was introduced by the EC in 2006 to 
provide a risk management guide to the EC members in managing risks 
particularly in tax administrations including the customs and excise. However, in 
2010, the EC has published an updated guide where the focus is more on 
influencing behaviour of taxpayers (EC, 2010, p.2) compared to the 2006 version 
which emphasised on the risk management processes. The latest Risk 
Management Guide keeps abreast with recent developments in managing risk, in 
particular compliance risk based on behaviour of taxpayers.  
The Compliance Risk Management model, illustrated in Figure 3 below, 
comprises various activities such as risk identification, risk analysis, risk 
assessment, risk prioritization and risk evaluation.  
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Figure 3: The European Commission Compliance Risk Management Model 
 
Source: European Commission: Compliance Risk Management Guide for Tax Administration 
(EC, 2010, p.8)  
 
As illustrated by Figure 3, ‘context’ appears to be the centre of the model. EC 
(2010, p.8) defines context as “circumstances that surround an organisation” or as 
“the environments in which the tax administration operates”. The next level in the 
model is the ‘objectives’ of the organisation. For tax administration, common 
objectives are mainly to collect revenue and increase compliance and at the same 
time to reduce non-compliance (OECD, 1988; EC, 2010). The third factor in the 
circle of the model is ‘strategy’, which lists the five steps to be taken, namely, 
Identification, Analysis, Prioritisation, Treatment and Evaluation, to manage 
compliance risks. The compliance risk management strategies suggested by the 
EC are similar with the basic risk management process discussed in Section 
3.4.2.1. The EC guideline notes:  
“Context can be viewed as the playing field together with the rules of the game. This 
is the framework that compliance risk management is applied within. The objectives 
describe the purpose of the game, what to achieve. The strategy describes how to 
play the game in order to reach the objectives.” (EC, 2010, p.9) 
 
As stated above, the strategy comprises of five steps in a cycle which indicates 
that managing risks is a continuous and iterative process. Risk identification is the 
first step in the process to identify lists of potential risks (EC, 2010, p.25). EC 
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states that risk identification is an important step because ‘if risks are not 
identified here, they are unlikely to be identified, and therefore, may not be 
covered’ (EC, 2010, p.25). The second step is risk analysis, where risk which has 
been identified is analysed based on ‘frequency (the number of risks/risky 
traders), the likelihood (the chance that the risk materialises) and consequence (for 
example, how much money is involved)’ (EC, 2010, p.31). It was also suggested 
by EC that during the risk analysis process, the tax administration should explore 
reasons for non-compliant behaviour so that the risks can be assessed and treated 
efficiently and effectively. The third stage is risk prioritisation, the main objective 
of which is to treat risks related to taxpayer behaviour. In this phase, risk 
assessment is the major activity to assess risks that has been analysed. According 
to EC (2010), risk treatment is a process where risks which have been assessed are 
treated effectively and efficiently. The EC (2010) suggests risk treatment to be 
undertaken through taxpayer education, supporting tax compliance and treating 
non-compliance.  
Finally, risk evaluation evaluates impact (effect) and process: “An impact 
evaluation estimates how much a programme, policy or intervention has caused an 
observed outcome or change. In contrast, a process evaluation asks how or why it 
works (or doesn’t work)” (EC, 2010, p.51). Even though evaluation is the final 
process in the risk management cycle, EC suggests risk evaluation could be 
implemented at each stage of the process. The OECD has also developed a 
compliance risk management model as a guideline to its member countries. The 
model is presented in the next section.  
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3.4.3 OECD Compliance Risk Management Model 
In addition to EC guides on compliance risk management (2010), the OECD has 
also improved its 2004 compliance risk management guideline. Compliance risk 
management is based on understanding and identifying factors that influence 
taxpayers’ behaviour and their attitudes to comply and to implement effective 
responses to manage non-compliant behaviour (OECD, 2010).  
Prior to that, in 2004 OECD had produced a set of compliance risk management 
guidance notes to promote a systematic approach to managing compliance risk. 
The process outlined a series of iterative steps for the systematic identification, 
assessment, ranking and treatment of tax compliance risks to support improved 
decision-making (OECD, 2004, p.9), as illustrated in Figure 4. In addition, 
activities such as evaluating compliance outcomes and monitoring performance 
against plans are also being taken. OECD (2010) suggests that the CRM process 
may be applied by a revenue body as a systematic process for compliance risk 
management.  
As depicted in Figure 4, OECD suggests that the first step to be taken by a tax 
administration is to establish an Operating Context. The main component of the 
Operating Context is the organisation’s objectives of tax administration, 
particularly in managing compliance risk (OECD, 2004). OECD notes that 
internal risks within tax administration and external risks outside the 
administration may be factors affecting the context; tax administrations may 
therefore need to look into these factors in order to manage risks effectively and 
efficiently (OECD, 2004).   
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Figure 4: The OECD Compliance Risk Management Process 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD: Forum on Tax Administration: Compliance Sub-Group Information Note 
Managing and Improving Compliance: Recent Developments in Compliance Risk Treatments, 
March 2009.  (OECD, 2009, p.10) 
 
The first process of managing risk as suggested by OECD (2004) is to identify 
risks in determining categories of non-compliant behaviour and the type of risks 
involved through characteristics of taxpayers and amount of tax involved to 
reflect the level of risk posed by taxpayers (OECD, 2004).  By exploring potential 
high-risk taxpayers, a variety of treatments could be given to different categories 
of taxpayers (OECD, 2004).  
In the second stage, risks which have been identified are assessed to separate 
major and minor risks. Prioritisation of risks is necessary since the tax 
administration may not be able to address all risks; OECD (2004) therefore 
advises priority be given to treat major risks that may affect the tax administration 
to achieve its objectives. Action taken at this stage is in line with Black and 
Baldwin’s (2010) really responsive regulation whereby prioritization of major risk 
and minor risk is recommended so that major risks could be managed effectively.  
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Next, in the third stage, OECD (2004) suggests that taxpayer compliance 
behaviour be analysed to identify economic factors, namely, “financial burden, the 
cost of compliance, disincentives and incentives”; while behavioural analysis has 
interest in “individual differences, perceived inequity, perception of minimal risk 
and risk taking” (OECD, 2004, p.37).  
After compliance risks are analysed, the following step is to determine strategies 
to treat the risks. OECD (2004) recommends various strategies be adopted by the 
tax administration. OECD agrees with Feld and Frey (2005), Kirchler et al. (2008) 
and Wenzel (2002) that the tax authority should treat taxpayers respectfully and 
fairly in order to gain respect and trust from them. OECD (2004) also 
recommends that the tax administration adopt Braithwaite’s model of compliance 
in order to understand factors influencing taxpayer behaviour, so that an 
appropriate response could be made based on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. 
Tax administrations are advised to take some initiatives to ensure taxpayers 
understand clearly their tax obligations where information delivered is 
“transparent, easy to understand, simple and non-confusing” (OECD, 2004, p.48). 
Further, tax administrations are recommended to improve service deliveries such 
as providing electronic services, simplifying forms and procedures and developing 
less burdensome regulations. Other strategies suggested by OECD (2004) include 
informing the public through media coverage of successful prosecution cases and 
court decisions on matters of tax law and practice, to warn them of the power of 
authority by tax administrations. These suggestions are consistent with 
Kornhauser’s (2007) reviews that a shaming approach, in particular on high-
profile individuals, may be an effective strategy in order to inform them of the 
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repercussions of non-compliance to the public and thereby to encourage 
compliance with the law.   
Revenue authorities are also encouraged by OECD to provide incentives to 
taxpayers to manage non-compliance risk; it cites HMRC’s experience in 
introducing an incentive scheme to improve compliance related to businesses’ 
failure to register for VAT (OECD, 2004, p.52). OECD notes that a unique 
identifier such as a Taxpayer Identification Number or Employer Identification 
Number is important for tax authorities in order to match data against areas of 
potential non-compliance (OECD, 2004, p.52). OECD also believes that a 
withholding system is an effective method of tax collection because it enables tax 
to be collected at the same time as income is earned; tax administrations are 
therefore encouraged to have such systems to improve compliance. Improved 
record-keeping by taxpayers is a strategy to manage cash economy risk, while an 
audit trail of transaction records is an effective mechanism to prevent money 
laundering and tax evasion (OECD, 2004). OECD therefore suggests tax 
administrations should promote these mechanisms to manage non-compliance 
risk.  
Another strategy is to build partnerships with tax practitioners, industries and 
other community groups to develop trust and cooperation from the community, 
which may enhance compliance (OECD, 2004). Finally, OECD recommends the 
adoption of sanctions such as field audits, investigations, higher penalties and 
prosecution for serious non-compliance (OECD, 2004, p.57). In order to 
implement these strategies, the next process is the allocation of human resources, 
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expenditure and capital effectively in order to maximize the utilization of limited 
resources, particularly for taxpayer programme (OECD, 2004).  
After these five processes are implemented, OECD (2004) advises that the 
outcome of the treatment strategy should be measured to evaluate its success; thus 
determining the effectiveness of the compliance programme. OECD (2004) also 
recommends an evaluation framework be developed to improve the treatment 
compliance strategy. The final phase in managing compliance risk is to monitor 
the performance of compliance strategy. As this model is an iterative process, the 
phase may not be the last stage of the process and can continue with identifying 
new risks.  
The risk management models promoted by EC and OECD are practical guides 
that provide knowledge and assistance to tax administrations in managing risks 
systematically. The steps involved in the process are similar to those suggested by 
Black (2005), Holt (2005), Vaughan (2005), Hutter (2005), Power (2004), 
Bernstein (1996) and Hopkin (2010). Furthermore, risk management can be 
incorporated as a set of strategies to enforce compliance by regulators, as 
presented in the next section.   
3.4.4 Regulatory Enforcement Strategies 
Compliance risk appears to present a major challenge to most regulatory agencies 
(Baldwin and Black, 2007; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; OECD, 2010). A wide 
range of enforcement strategies are in place and implemented by regulatory 
agencies to foresee that compliance of the law is established. These enforcement 
strategies, namely, responsive regulation and the compliance pyramid (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite et al., 2005), risk-based regulation (Hampton 
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Report, 2005; Black, 2005), really responsive regulation (Baldwin and Black, 
2007) and risk-based responsive regulation (Black and Baldwin, 2010), are among 
the regulatory enforcement approaches adopted by regulators as their risk 
management plan to enforce compliance. Literature pertaining to these strategies 
addresses the way they have been adapted depending on their suitability and 
applicability to the agencies’ requirements. In this section, each strategy is 
discussed and the strengths and weaknesses of each mechanism are highlighted.  
3.4.4.1  Really responsive regulation 
The concept of ‘really responsive regulation’ is promoted by Baldwin and Black 
(2007) in their effort to overcome shortcomings in other enforcement strategies 
such as responsive regulation and risk-based regulation. Really responsive 
regulation entails five functions to be implemented: the detection of non-
compliant behaviour; response to the behaviour through tools and strategies; 
enforcement of tools and strategies; assessment of their success or failure; and 
modification of the tools and strategies (Baldwin and Black 2007, p.25). These 
functions accord with the risk management process as discussed in Section 3.4.1, 
whereby, in general, the process comprises risk identification, risk analysis, risk 
assessment, risk treatment and risk evaluation. However, in contrast with other 
enforcement approaches, really responsive regulation emphasises the development 
of tools and strategies to identify, respond to and enforce non-compliance. The 
recommended tools  can be technologies or equipment used by the regulators and 
the strategies would be the enforcement actions to be taken to identify, respond to 
and enforce the risks and challenges, such as inspections and sanctions.  
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A further aspect emphasised by Baldwin and Black (2007) is the importance of 
measuring performance in order to determine the success or failure of the 
enforcement strategy. Really responsive regulation requires regulators to measure 
their performance in “detection, response tool development, enforcement, 
assessment and modification” (p.43). The results from this measurement will be 
used to determine the success or failure of the method carried out and further to 
improve the method accordingly. Moreover, regulators are able to evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the measuring systems (p.37) and to take appropriate 
action to optimise the strengths or to improve the weaknesses.  
Another advantage of really responsive regulation is that the approach suggests a 
switch in “regulatory direction” in order to respond to changes in “circumstances, 
priorities and objectives, including organisational culture” (Baldwin and Black, 
2007, p.24). This implies that really responsive regulation is a flexible approach to 
enforcement whereby the direction can be shifted to accommodate changes that 
may occur during the course of action. These changes may be driven by external 
and internal factors of the regulatory bodies. Really responsive regulation thus 
draws the attention to the capability of regulators to respond to the changes by 
assessing the need for change, by understanding the implications of the change 
and, finally, by making improvements to adopt the changes (p.40).  
Application of the really responsive regulation regime by the UK National Audit 
Office on Defra
9’s regulation of sea fishing is addressed in detail by Baldwin and 
Black in their Really Responsive Regulation literature (Baldwin and Black, 2007, 
p.25). In adapting this approach, regulators should be responsive to five elements: 
                                                          
9 Defra: The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Baldwin and Black, 2007, p.25) 
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regulatees’ behaviour, attitude and culture; constraints and opportunities within 
regulators’ institutional environments; interactions of regulators’ regulatory tools 
and strategies; regulators’ performance measurement; and adaptation to changes 
of these elements (Baldwin and Black, 2007; Black and Baldwin, 2010). 
Therefore, in order to be a really responsive regulator, literature suggests 
enforcement bodies to be responsive to the internal and external surrounding of 
the organisation.  
3.4.4.2 Risk-based regulation  
As discussed previously, a responsive regulation approach enables enforcement 
agencies to secure compliance and mitigate risk. According to Baldwin and Black,  
“the key components of the approach are evaluations of the risk of non-compliance 
and calculations regarding the impact that non-compliance will have on the 
regulatory agency’s ability to achieve its objectives.” (Baldwin and Black, 2007, 
p.12)  
Risk-based regulation is another enforcement strategy adopted by regulatory 
bodies to manage non-compliance, whereby the focus is on risks and not rules 
(Black and Baldwin, 2010; OECD, 2010). This approach was first introduced in 
the 1990s during the “regulatory crises” in UK industrial society (Hutter, 2005a). 
Black (2005, p.3) provides two definitions of risk-based regulation. The first 
refers to regulators “to determine whether or not an activity should be regulated, 
or what level of preventive measures forms should take”. The second refers to 
“risk to agency itself that it will not achieve its objectives” (Black, 2005, p.3). 
Further, Black (2005, p.3) proposes that a risk-based regulator should develop 
frameworks and procedures to “prioritise regulatory activities and the deployment 
of resources, principally inspection and enforcement activities, organised around 
an assessment of the risks that regulated firms pose to the regulator’s objectives.” 
The idea of this mechanism is to analyse, control, communicate and monitor risks 
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(Hutter, 2005a). The advantage is that it provides a systematic framework that 
guides regulators to target their regulatory resources towards highest risks and 
also to measure new risks and future challenges (Baldwin and Black, 2007; Wood 
et al. 2010; OECD, 2010).  
Furthermore, when adopting the risk-based regime, regulators are advised to start 
the enforcement process by analysing and selecting risks that need to be managed 
and controlled. By prioritising the highest risks, regulators are able to concentrate 
on the most challenging event that may bring higher value in return and at the 
same time reduce enforcement cost because attention was given to specific risks 
rather than to all risks in general.  
As noted by Black and Baldwin (2010), the Hampton Review recommends the 
UK regulatory agencies to adopt this approach as their enforcement strategy, 
especially during the 2007-2009 financial crises, to cope with regulatory 
problems. The objective is to ensure focus on the outcome rather than on the 
process approach to regulation (Hampton, 2005, p.20). Hence, Hampton suggests 
regulators to utilise resources where they can benefit most and “end unnecessary 
inspections or data requirements on less risky businesses, identify businesses that 
need more inspection, and release resources to improve broader advice services” 
(Hampton, 2005, p.4).  
According to Black (2005, p.3), many regulators in the UK, namely “the Health 
and Safety Executive, the Environment Agency, the Financial Services Authority, 
the Food Standards Agency, HMRC, the Scottish Care Commission, the Housing 
Corporation, the Gaming Board, the Commission for Social Care Inspection and 
the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority” have adopted this approach in 
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their regulatory activities. However, the limitation of such an approach is that the 
focus of enforcement would be on the highest risk (Hampton, 2005) and thus less 
attention would be given to the lower risks, which may in turn create further risk; 
for lower risks, if not attended to, may lead to more serious risks (OECD, 2010).  
3.4.4.3 Risk-based responsive regulation 
Earlier discussion has drawn attention to the responsive regulation approach 
which enables enforcement agencies to secure compliance and manage risk. 
Compliance risk appears to be a major challenge faced by most regulatory 
agencies. According to Baldwin and Black (2007, p.12), “the key components of 
the approach are evaluations of the risk of non-compliance and calculations 
regarding the impact that the non-compliance will have on the regulatory body’s 
ability to achieve its objectives”. Further, Baldwin and Black suggest that the 
advantage of a risk-based regulation approach is that it provides  
“a systematic framework that allows regulators to relate their enforcement activities 
to achievement of objectives. This approach enables resources to be targeted in a 
manner that prioritises highest risks and they provide a basis for evaluating new 
regulatory challenges and new risks.” (Baldwin and Black, 2007, p.13)  
These regulatory regimes to enforce compliance can be used as tools to guide 
regulatory agencies in implementing effective risk management in their 
institutions. Risk-based responsive regulation suggests a combination of two or 
more approaches and selecting the best methods from these to produce those that 
are the most suitable for regulatory strategy (Black and Baldwin, 2010). By 
mixing the methods from really responsive regulation and risk-based regulation, 
regulators may achieve a “really responsive risk-based regulation”, an approach 
which is highly recommended by Black and Baldwin (2010). While risk-based 
regulation normally works when combined with other strategies to mitigate risks, 
in contrast, really responsive risk-based regulation entails interacting logics of 
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different regulatory strategies and tools to understand various behaviours, cultures 
or institutional environments of other regulators (Black and Baldwin, 2010). This 
is crucial as a pre-emptive measure to respond to the risks and to ensure an 
effective risk management strategy.  
Command-and-control strategy might work during a crisis (Baldwin and Black, 
2007), but under different circumstances, this method should be abandoned for a 
more cooperative style of crisis management (OECD, 2003). For example, in a 
major catastrophe, a command-and-control mechanism might be the most suitable 
approach to be taken to respond to the emergency (Baldwin and Black, 2007) 
whereby instructions will be given by the authority and must be obeyed by the 
victims instantly. There is no time for persuasion and back-patting because 
attention should be given to save more lives which might be threatened under the 
circumstances. On the other hand, during a hostage crisis, persuasion and ‘sweet-
talking’ with the criminals would be the best way to cope with the critical 
situation at that moment. That is why in most hostage crises, the presence of a 
negotiator is required to persuade the criminal to release the hostages and to 
negotiate the criminals’ terms and demands for the release. Risk managers should 
be able to decide the best mechanism to adopt when faced with threats and to 
undertake the best solution in order to save more lives and to avoid additional 
damage to the crisis (IRM, 2002).  
The risk-based regulatory regimes discussed above can be applied to a variety of 
disciplines, including finance, health, security and environment (Black, 2005). 
These disciplines have shown interest in understanding and managing risk in 
response to crises which may jeopardise organisations’ ability to achieve their 
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objectives (Hutter and Power, 2005). In addition to these fields, tax administration 
has begun to show serious commitment to risk in the area of taxation. 
As a summary, Table 4 illustrates the differences between really responsive 
regulation, risk-based regulation and risk-based responsive regulation. 
 
Table 4: Key features of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies 
Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies 
Key Features 
 
really responsive regulation  Develops tools and strategies to identify, respond and 
enforce non-compliance risk 
 Measures performance to determine the success or 
failure of the enforcement strategies. 
 Switches regulatory direction to respond to changes in 
the situation or behaviour to comply. 
 
 
risk-based regulation 
 Prioritises the highest risks.  
 Targets regulatory resources towards specific risks 
rather than to all risks in general. 
 Focuses on the outcome of regulation rather than the 
process to regulate. 
 
 
risk-based responsive 
regulation 
 Adopts risk-based responsive approaches to manage 
risks. 
 Entails interacting logics of different regulatory 
strategies/tools to understand risks. 
 Combines several strategies to respond to risks 
 
 
3.4.5 Risk management in tax administration 
The main objective of tax administration is to collect revenue for state 
development (Brautigam, 2008).  In order to achieve their target for revenue 
collection, the revenue authorities should focus on encouraging high levels of 
voluntary compliance and to minimise compliance costs. Taxpayers comply with 
tax law and regulation when they register in the system; file or lodge requisite 
taxation information promptly; report complete and accurate information; and pay 
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taxation obligations on time (OECD, 2004). Failure to meet the obligations would 
create non-compliance risk to tax administrations. 
Arlinghaus (1998, as cited in Wunder, 2009, p.16) acknowledges that no universal 
definition of the term ‘tax risk’ exists, but offers the following: “the likelihood 
that tax outcome differs from what is expected, due to a variety of reasons, for 
example, the judicial process, changes in the law, changes in business 
assumptions, an increased intensity of audits, and uncertainty in the interpretation 
of the law; and any action emanating from the tax function that subjects the 
company to adverse publicity”. It seems that most of the factors stated by 
Arlinghaus (1998) are external factors which have become risks or threats to the 
organisations. Tax administrations, along with other regulators, encounter internal 
and external challenges to enforce compliance with the regulation (OECD, 2010; 
EC, 2006; Thomson, 2008). External risks are identified as economic activities, 
industry changes and business structures; complex legislation related to tax laws 
and government policies; and taxpayers’ behaviour and perceptions toward tax 
authorities and government (EC, 2006; OECD, 2001; Thomson, 2008; IRM, 
2002). Internal factors involve organisation culture and structure; financial 
constraints; staff incompetency and technology infrastructure (EC, 2006; OECD, 
2001; Thomson, 2008; IRM, 2002).  
Based on the definition of risk provided in Section 3.3.1, risk can, in the context 
of tax administration, be considered as any event that will have an impact on the 
tax administration’s objectives (TDC, 2009). Other risks that tax agencies have to 
face are “tax shelters, large-scale fraud, tax code complexity, customer service, e-
commerce and globalization requiring consideration and response” (Hasseldine, 
2007, p.4). Effective risk management is therefore imperative to assist tax 
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administration in order to identify, respond to and address current as well as future 
risks efficiently (Baldwin and Black, 2007; OECD, 2010; EC,  2006; Hasseldine, 
2007).  
Tax administrations in countries such as Australia, the UK, the US and the EC 
have also shown their concern about the effect brought by risks related to taxation 
which may affect their goal to increase revenue collection. These tax authorities 
have started to formalize strategies to understand and manage risks in their 
organisation. For example, in 2006 the ATO published Large Business and Tax 
Compliance, which addresses tax risk concepts (ATO, 2006); the IRS with its 
LMSB (IRSAC, 2008); the HMRC with its approach to compliance risk 
management for large business (HMRC, 2007); and the EC with its risk 
management guide for tax administration (EC, 2006).  
The IRS of the USA began its process of risk management by defining tax risk as: 
”any event, action, or inaction in tax strategy, operations, oversight reporting, or 
compliance that either adversely affects LMSB
10’s collection or business objectives, or 
results in an unanticipated or unacceptable level of oversight reprimands, lost appeals, 
diminished collections, harm to reputation, lost opportunities or reporting exposure.” 
(IRSAC
11
 Report, 2008)  
As ‘an evolutionary process’, the implementation of risk management is 
monitored by internal audit in the effort to measure its effectiveness and 
efficiency and, further, to improve the process (IRSAC, 2008). Continuous 
attention from the senior managers and leadership of the IRS are the crucial 
elements of an effective risk management plan.  
                                                          
10 The Large and Medium –sized Business Subgroup (LMSB) is a division in the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) of USA which handles tax profiles of large and medium size business taxpayers. 
11
“The Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council (IRSAC) provides an organized public forum 
for IRS officials and representatives of the public to discuss relevant tax administration issues. The 
Council advises the IRS on issues that have a substantive effect on federal tax administration.” 
(IRSAC, 2008) 
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Furthermore, the ATO (2009) has identified various risks that they must manage 
in order to overcome the non-compliance issues as well as to improve compliance. 
These risks are: environmental factors that influence decisions and behaviour of 
taxpayers (business, industrial, sociological, environmental and psychological 
factors); attitudes of taxpayers to compliance; and compliance strategies. To 
achieve long-term compliance, one of the strategies undertaken by the ATO is the 
compliance pyramid model - a strategic framework for compliance improvement. 
The compliance pyramid model is developed to encourage taxpayers to 
voluntarily meet their future taxation obligations. The risk management executed 
by the ATO requires a balanced approach to moderate any loss and ensure the best 
return to the revenue (ATO, 2009). 
The UK HMRC implemented a risk-based approach to benefit from a more cost-
effective use of resources and effective use of resolution of issue (HMRC, 2007).  
Thus the implementation of an audit approach which focuses on key risks is the 
HMRC’s response to compliance risk management for large businesses taxpayers. 
This action is in line with the suggestion from OECD (2010) that, when faced 
with limited resources and relatively large numbers of taxpayers to administer, 
revenue authorities require a systematic risk-based approach for identifying which 
taxpayers to audit. In the same way as the ATO, the HMRC also uses the 
compliance pyramid model as a strategy to mitigate risk and foster compliance. 
The EC has also adopted a risk-based compliance pyramid (EC, 2006) in an effort 
to manage risk and improve compliance. Various regulatory strategies such as 
marketing, education, audit and enforcement are executed as the risk management 
plan to reduce risk in its administration. In addition to the risk management plan, 
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the EC risk-based compliance pyramid also studies the behaviour of taxpayers in 
order to understand determinant factors that influence taxpayers’ decisions about 
compliance. Russell (2010) suggests that to encourage voluntary compliance, tax 
administrations need to “identify and respond to the most significant risks in the 
tax system through a range of measures aimed at the underlying causes of the 
noncompliant behaviour” (p.3). Therefore, regulators may need to prioritise high 
profile risks and develop suitable strategies to manage non-compliance taxpayers. 
Various studies have been conducted by tax researchers (Bird, 2004; Silvani and 
Baer, 1997; Braithwaite, 2006) and institutions (World Bank, 2004; OECD, 2004) 
on the tax administrations of developing countries. The researches investigate 
challenges faced by these tax administrations and recommend a systematic 
process for managing tax compliance risks as well as some improvement in the 
procedures and systems (OECD, 2004; World Bank, 2004; Bird, 2004). 
Cooperation among tax administrations is crucial in managing risk, and is 
achieved by sharing information on risk or threats faced by other tax 
administrations (OECD, 2003). Learning from the best practice of others in 
responding to the risks would reduce enforcement cost and improve regulatory 
strategies, particularly for tax administrations in developing countries. Risk 
management could be a strategic tool to assist organisations to control or mitigate 
the chance of failure and to enhance the possibility of success. These challenges 
are not unique to IRBM, since tax administrations in other countries face similar 
pressures and uncertainty. The next section will address the responsive regulation 
concept as a set of strategies to manage compliance risk. 
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3.5 Responsive regulation 
Various challenges and risks confronted by regulatory agencies in practice, 
particularly in the developing world, were highlighted in Chapter 1. These 
challenges and risks have resulted in non-compliance, which affects the extent to 
which regulators achieve their goals in supporting the government to develop the 
country. Scholars such as Bird (2008), Brautigam (2005) and Braithwaite (2006), 
and organisations such as OECD (2004) and the World Bank (2004) have urged 
regulatory agencies in developing economies to overcome the challenges by 
reforming their administration. In this context, regulatory agencies are the law 
enforcers, including the police, customs and revenue officials, the municipal 
council and other agencies that have law enforcement responsibilities to secure 
compliance of the law and regulation.  
According to OECD and World Bank, reform of tax administration is vital to 
enable regulators to encourage regulatees in complying with the regulation, in 
order to achieve their objective to procure compliance and at the same time to 
manage risks. While most regulatory agencies in developed economies have 
reformed and introduced responsive administration (OECD, 1988; Brautigam, 
2008; Braithwaite, 2006), regulators in developing countries are known for their 
traditional regulatory approach in enforcing compliance (Braithwaite, 2006). The 
old practice of enforcement was an authoritative interaction when communicating 
with the public, and a resort to punishing offenders by imposing penalties,  
prosecuting and proceeding to court. Although these punitive mechanisms may 
force regulatees to comply with the law, it appears to be an expensive course of 
action (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Welsh, 2009; Braithwaite, 2007) in terms of 
human resources, financial resources and time.  
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Furthermore, this ‘hard approach’ (Braithwaite, 2003) may not be a long-term 
solution for self-regulation and voluntary compliance due to resentment [ibid] on 
the part of the offenders towards the regulators. Thus, regulatory bodies in 
developing countries have been advised to reform by developing a responsive 
administration in order to improve their relationship with the public. Through 
administrative responsiveness, where regulatory agencies have the ability to 
respond to the need of the public (OECD, 1988), services to customers are to be 
delivered professionally, courteously, fairly and in a friendly manner to motivate 
the public to comply. Reciprocally, regulatory bodies will earn the trust, 
cooperation, and respect of the community (Braithwaite, 2003; Kirchler et al., 
2008; Mitton, 2009). The reform of responsiveness in the regulatory approach by 
the administration is also known as responsive regulation.  
The basic idea of responsive regulation is that regulatory agencies should be 
“responsible for the conduct of those they seek to regulate and law enforcers 
should be responsible for how effectively citizens are regulating themselves 
before they intervene” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). In the past, most regulatory 
agencies are known to operate in a ‘command-and-control’ manner to achieve 
their objective (Braithwaite, 2007; Leviner, 2009; Baldwin and Black, 2007). 
Command-and-control is an approach where regulators use direct enforcement or 
regulation to conduct the law (Braithwaite et al. 2005).  
Within a command-and-control mechanism, regulators ‘command’ regulatees to 
observe the law and ‘control’ regulatees’ behaviour with the threat of punishment 
(Sinclair, 1997). However, it is no longer considered appropriate to implement 
such a traditional approach of enforcement through use of the law and threat of 
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prosecution to force regulatees to comply. This change of attitude is due to cost 
factors, inefficiency, change in organisational culture, and the expectation from 
both the government and the public for more responsiveness in service delivery to 
the public (OECD, 1988; Jenny Job et al., 2007; Sinclair, 1997). Law enforcers 
should therefore investigate moving from command-and-control to a responsive 
approach of regulation; Sparrow (2000) highlights that responsive regulation is 
about how regulators should behave rather than how regulation should be 
changed. The idea is that, during interaction with regulatees, responsive regulation 
requires regulators to conduct in a responsive, respectful and professional manner.  
Through responsive regulation, compliance can be fostered, not through 
punishment, but through persuasion, education, encouragement and assistance. 
These ‘soft approaches’ (Braithwaite, 2003) would be a better strategy to be 
adopted by regulators since they may result in cooperation from the regulatees and 
achieve the goal of responsive regulation “to stimulate maximum levels of 
regulatory compliance” (Welsh, 2009, p.2). As noted by Braithwaite (2011, 
p.489), “the job of responsive regulators is to treat offenders as worthy of trust, 
because the evidence is that when they do this, regulation more often achieves its 
objectives.” 
As noted by Welsh (2009, p.2), “responsive regulation recognises that it is not 
possible for any regulatory agency to detect and enforce every contravention of 
the law that it administers”. Thus, regulators should be able to motivate regulatees 
to voluntarily comply with the regulations and encourage self-regulation 
(Braithwaite, 2007; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Welsh, 2009). Responsive 
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regulation also helps regulators to decide when to use ‘stick’ or ‘carrot’ to 
persuade regulatees based on their behaviour and responses towards compliance.  
The ‘carrot and stick’ approach has been discussed quite extensively by Andreoni, 
Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) and by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) who 
recommend  that enforcement agencies take appropriate action based on the type 
of public they are dealing with. ‘Carrot’ is a symbol of reward for those who 
comply with the law while ‘stick’ is a punishment to those who fail to comply 
(Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) and Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). 
Regulators are advised to use either carrot or stick according to the situation 
(Braithwaite, 2002; Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund, 2003). Various 
enforcement strategies could be enacted through the responsive regulation 
approach, as illustrated by the Regulatory Pyramid introduced by Ayres and 
Braithwaite, addressed in the next section. 
 
3.5.1 The Regulatory Pyramid 
The guidelines to enforce compliance, which applies the concept of responsive 
regulation, can be observed in the regulatory pyramid designed by Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992), and depicted in Figure 5 below. The regulatory pyramid is the 
most distinctive part of responsive regulation and the epitome of compliance 
pyramids adopted by regulatory agencies in many countries. The regulatory 
pyramid, which is expanded from the responsive regulation theory posited by 
Ayres and Braithwaite, provides guidelines to regulators on how to foster 
compliance effectively through hierarchical levels of the pyramid starting from 
the base and moving up to the peak of the pyramid. 
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Figure 5: The Enforcement Pyramid 
  
Source: Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the multi-tiered pyramid displays enforcement 
strategies implemented at various stages, depending on responses from the 
regulatees. According to Ayres and Braithwaite, the regulatory pyramid, also 
known as the enforcement pyramid, draws attention to the base of the pyramid 
where most regulatory action occurs to encourage compliance. The pyramid also 
shows when persuasion does not work, when regulators move up to the next level 
of the pyramid and warning letters will be issued. Should the warning fail to 
encourage the regulatees to comply, then the next strategy is to escalate to the 
next level of the pyramid where civil monetary penalties will be imposed. If this 
enforcement fails to secure compliance, then criminal prosecution will take place. 
Moreover, if this also fails, the licence to operate will be suspended temporarily. 
The final level of enforcement, which is at the peak of the pyramid, is permanent 
revocation of licence. From this enforcement pyramid we can learn that different 
types of enforcement mechanisms are suitable for specific regulatory fields.  
The hierarchical strategies begin at the base and escalate through higher levels of 
the pyramid depending on the responses from the regulatees. This shows that 
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responsive regulation educates regulators about the need to be flexible, to escalate 
or de-escalate the enforcement pyramid, in their action against offenders, and they 
should resort to strong enforcement only after persuasion fails and the offenders 
refuse to comply with the law. This strategy is called a ‘tit-for-tat’ approach 
(Scholz, 1984; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992).  
3.5.2 Tit-For-Tat 
According to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), adopting punishment as an 
enforcement measure may not be an effective approach to encourage voluntary 
compliance. Braithwaite (2006) also argues that punishment may not be a suitable 
mechanism to be adopted, particularly for developing economies, since it is 
expensive. Ayres and Braithwaite further suggest that a soft approach such as 
persuasion is a cheaper means of enforcement. However, both studies agree that 
punishment can be adopted after soft approaches fail to be effective in 
maintaining compliance. Ayres and Braithwaite therefore recommend the ‘tit-for-
tat’ strategy (TFT) which posits that persuasion and punishment is more likely to 
be an effective approach in both fostering voluntary compliance and preventing 
non-compliance.  
To apply the strategy effectively, a TFT approach recommends that regulators 
begin enforcement at the bottom of the pyramid and then “respond tit-for-tat to 
the regulatee’s response” (Nielsen and Parker, 2009, p.387). In the context of this 
study, TFT is about how regulators’ response would depend on regulatees’  
compliance behaviour. This means, if a regulatee is being cooperative, the 
regulator would respond with soft strategies. However, when a regulatee refuses 
to cooperate, then a harsher approach would be enacted by the regulator (Scholz, 
1984; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Murphy, 2004). When regulatee responds 
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cooperatively to comply, then the regulator should de-escalate down the pyramid 
to a lower level strategy to promote future compliance (Nielsen and Parker, 2009). 
Furthermore, TFT encourages regulators to be flexible in their regulatory 
enforcement by escalating up or de-escalating down of the pyramid depending on 
regulatees’ motivation to comply (Nielsen and Parker, 2009).  
The TFT strategy promotes cooperation by regulatees which may result in low 
compliance cost compared with paying for a higher cost for being prosecuted for 
violating the law (Scholz, 1984). However, due to its flexibility, Braithwaite et al. 
(2005, p.37) admit that responsive regulation has been criticised for its lack of 
consistency in enforcement; the traditional mechanism is more consistent in that 
all offenders would be punished for breaking the law. In practice, the flow may 
not be as simple and straightforward as consistently moving up from one level to 
another. Depending on the circumstances and the responses from the regulatees, 
the movement of the escalation may not flow. For example, in some 
circumstances, cooperation may be hard to obtain as expected because “dialogue 
and persuasion may be more difficult to accomplish for common crime offenders” 
(Daly, 2003). Nielsen and Parker also admitted that: 
”In real life it is quite difficult for regulators to be perceived to be behaving in a 
way that is tit-for-tat responsive, even if they are trying to behave tit-for-tat 
responsively.” (Nielsen and Parker, 2009, p.389) 
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3.5.3 The Pyramids of Supports and Sanctions 
In 2011, Braithwaite, with Dukes and Maloney, expanded the regulatory pyramid 
and developed the Pyramids of Supports and Sanctions, as illustrated in Figure 6 
below. Although these twin pyramids were established for the regulation of 
medicines (Braithwaite, 2011, p.482) they may also be applied to other 
regulations.  
Figure 6: Pyramids of Supports and Sanctions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Essence of Responsive Regulation (Braithwaite, 2011, p.482) 
 
As depicted by Figure 6, regulators are advised “to engage in, and exhaust, a 
pyramid of supports prior to accessing the pyramid of sanctions” (Sarra, 2011, 
p.792). Braithwaite (2011) proposes that regulators escalate or de-escalate the 
pyramid sanctions to apply appropriate responses to support compliance. Thus, to 
encourage compliance, Braithwaite advises regulators take the first step at the 
base of the pyramid of supports, which is to educate and persuade regulatees. 
Then, by moving further up the pyramid, approaches are adopted to promote and 
encourage regulatees to comply. At the peak is the highest acknowledgement or 
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reward for high achievers. Only after all efforts to support compliance are 
exhausted and non-compliance still persists, may regulators then proceed to 
employ enforcement mechanisms, as illustrated in the pyramid of sanctions, in 
order to prevent future non-compliance and to turn resistance into cooperation.  
Again, Braithwaite issues a reminder that enforcement measures through 
persuasion may incur lower cost than a punitive approach, which should be 
imposed only when persuasion fails; as implied by the pyramid, “if you violate, it 
is going to be cheap for us to hurt you (because you are going to help us hurt you” 
(Braithwaite, 2011, p.487). On the other hand, the pyramid of sanctions highlights 
responsive strategies that can be employed to manage problems or non-
compliance, starting in the same way as the supports approach, with education and 
persuasion on relevant issues. Consistent with the enforcement pyramid shown in 
Figure 6, as the steps escalate, more serious enforcement mechanisms are enacted, 
ending with strict punitive action at the top of the pyramid. The pyramid of 
supports, which applies responsive regulation concepts, appears to promote self-
regulation, while the pyramid of sanctions initiates self-punishment. As suggested 
by Braithwaite, the pyramid warns non-compliers: 
“Unless you punish yourself for law-breaking through an agreed action plan near the 
base of the pyramid, we will punish you more severely higher up the pyramid.” 
(Braithwaite, 2011, p.487) 
Further, in ‘The Essence of Responsive Regulation’, Braithwaite also advocates 
nine principles of responsive regulation, listed in Box 1 below, to simplify and 
clarify the theory of responsive regulation:  
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Box 1: Principles of Responsive Regulation 
1. Think in context; don’t impose a preconceived theory. 
2. Listen actively; structure dialogue that: 
a. Gives voice to stakeholders 
b. Settles agreed outcomes and how to monitor them; 
c. Builds commitments by helping actors find their own motivation to 
improve; 
d. Communicates firm resolve to stick with a problem until it is fixed. 
3. Engage those who resist with fairness; show them respect by construing their 
resistance as an opportunity to learn how to improve regulatory design. 
4. Praise those who show commitment: 
a. Support their innovation 
b. Nurture motivation to continuously improve; 
c. Help leaders pull laggards up through new ceilings of excellence. 
5. Signal that you prefer to achieve outcomes by support and education to build 
capacity. 
6. Signal, but do not threaten, a range of sanctions to which you can escalate; 
signal that the ultimate sanctions are formidable and are used when necessary, 
though only as a last resort. 
7. Network pyramidal governance by engaging wider networks of partners as you 
move up a pyramid. 
8. Elicit active responsibility, resorting to passive responsibility when active 
responsibility fails. 
9. Learn; evaluate how well and at what cost outcomes have been achieved; 
communicate lessons learned. 
 
Source: The Essence of Responsive Regulation (Braithwaite, 2011, p.476). 
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3.5.4 Self-regulation 
“The hallmark of responsive regulation is the pursuit of cooperation by the 
regulatee with the regulator” to promote self-regulation and voluntary compliance 
(Burton, 2007, p.74). Ayres and Braithwaite’s regulatory pyramid provides 
practical guidelines for regulators to apply responsive regulation theory in their 
enforcement practice. Regulators should initiate the practice by identifying 
categories of regulatees by their responses and behaviour towards compliance. 
The best approach is to begin at the base of the pyramid where tax authorities treat 
those who are willing to comply in a fair and supportive manner. Willingness to 
cooperate with the authority and to comply voluntarily is also known as self-
regulation
12
.  
Self-regulation motivates regulatees to control and regulate their responses to 
achieve goals (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007); which in the context of this study is 
to follow the rules. To promote self-regulation, the authority is advised to provide 
assistance and guidance to regulatees in order to enhance their compliance.  With 
reference to the enforcement pyramid, activities at the base of the pyramid suggest 
self-regulation, whereby taxpayers are responsible for regulating their tax 
compliance behaviour (Murphy, 2004). However, support and cooperation from 
tax regulators is desirable to ensure simplicity of procedures for taxpayers to 
comply (Murphy, 2004).   
                                                          
12  Self-regulation is ”the self’s capacity for altering its behaviours. It greatly increases the 
flexibility and adaptability of human behaviour, enabling people to adjust their actions to a 
remarkably broad range of social and situational demands. It is an important basis for the popular 
conception of free will and for socially desirable behaviour. It provides benefits to the individual 
and to society, and indeed good self-control seems to contribute to a great many desirable 
outcomes, including task performance, school and work success, popularity, mental health and 
adjustment, and good interpersonal relationships” (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007, p.1) 
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Self-regulation appears to be the most suitable method to foster compliance, 
especially for regulatory agencies with limited and insufficient resources (Sinclair, 
1997). When the majority of the community becomes self-regulated, the resources 
of regulatory agencies can be channelled to manage non-compliance at the peak of 
the pyramid; thus, law enforcers can focus their enforcement strategy towards 
hard-core offenders. The principle of responsive regulation entails guiding law 
enforcers towards making decisions about when to punish and when to persuade 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). However, regulators should not abandon the self-
regulated community who still require assistance, guidance and encouragement. 
Responsive customer service will motivate them to continue to be self-regulated 
in their compliance affairs so that long-term voluntary compliance can be 
established. Otherwise, this section of the self-regulated community will feel 
neglected by the regulators and may change their responses towards enforced self-
regulation (Braithwaite, 2003), which in turn may result in additional enforcement 
cost to the regulators. 
 Relevant information and education should be provided to those who wish to 
cooperate but who lack knowledge in the relevant area. When a regulatee has the 
inclination to cooperate but is reluctant in complying, then the regulator should 
move up to the next level of the pyramid to persuade and advise the person in 
order to secure compliance. Self-regulation enables regulatory agencies to deploy 
their “regulatory resources to address the recalcitrant few rather than the 
compliant majority” (Sinclair, 1997, p.537).  
Further, the final step is for regulators to deploy resources to enforce those who 
clearly disregard the law and refuse to comply despite efforts at persuasion 
(Braithwaite, 2003; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Burton, 2007). This is when the 
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traditional regulatory approach, using punishments such as penalty imposition, 
prosecution and imprisonment, is exercised to improve compliance. Nevertheless, 
law enforcers should be flexible in their courses of action and willing to move 
down the level of the pyramid in their regulatory practice if the response of the 
regulatees changes to a willingness to cooperate (Healy and Braithwaite, 2006). If 
appropriate approaches are exercised, not only will regulators be able to manage 
current non-compliance, but they can also prevent future offences from occurring. 
Nevertheless, Sinclair (1997, p.532) has observed that “in the vast majority of 
circumstances, neither pure self-regulation nor strict command and control will be 
appropriate; rather, some combination of the two will provide the optimal 
regulatory solution”. Regulatory agencies will therefore be able to adapt 
responsive regulation concepts in a manner suitable to various circumstances in 
the community. 
3.5.5 The responsive regulation approach 
Reward and punishment is an important concept to motivate compliance 
(Andreoni and Harbaugh, 2002). This concept, also known as the carrot-and-stick 
approach, implies that those who comply with the law will be rewarded and, 
naturally, those who refuse to cooperate will be punished (Andreoni et al., 2003; 
Leviner, 2009; Braithwaite, 2003). Responsive regulation promotes a soft, or 
carrot, approach, when dealing with the public. The soft approaches, which 
employ persuasion, education, encouragement and negotiation, appear to be 
effective in promoting self-regulation and voluntary compliance with the law by 
regulatees (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2007, Andreoni et al., 
2003). The responsiveness in the regulators’ treatment towards regulatees may 
improve services provided by the regulators, which in turn will increase the 
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public’s confidence in the system and their level of respect towards the regulators 
(OECD, 1988). The stick can only be used after efforts in using carrots fail to 
persuade regulatees to comply. However, even though the stick should rarely be 
used, it is an important and necessary tool to encourage cooperation in order to 
foster compliance. Interestingly, a further, and significant, feature of responsive 
regulation is that it may lessen psychological resentment by regulatees towards 
regulators. As highlighted by Brown (2001, cited in Welsh, 2009): 
“a driving motivation of this approach is to reduce the psychology of resentment, the 
prospect that firms and individuals confronted with inflexible commands and harsh 
punishments adopt a critical, non-cooperative posture toward compliance goals and 
enforcement personnel.” (Brown, 2001, cited in Welsh, 2009)   
 
This concurs with Bardach and Kagan (1982, cited in Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992) who posit that “one of the problems of punitive policy is that it fosters the 
culture of resistance to regulation”. They therefore recommend that, if persuasion 
is conducted first and is successful, “more resources are left to expand regulatory 
coverage” (p.25). The concept of responsive regulation motivates regulators to 
adopt a soft approach in order to instil cooperation from the regulatees. As 
discussed earlier, regulatees can be coaxed through persuasion, education and 
negotiation into complying willingly. If regulators fail to comply with the 
responsive regulation principle by employing the stick enforcement strategy, the 
effect is that, although regulatees may comply, they will harbour resentment 
against the authorities and thus the objective for self-regulation and voluntary 
compliance may be difficult to achieve. In order to achieve the compliance 
objective, regulators should realise that, when dealing with regulatees, the action 
taken should be ‘non-confrontational’ [ibid] to obtain their voluntary cooperation. 
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3.5.6 Application of responsive regulation  
Literature draws on a wide range of scenarios relating to the application of 
responsive regulation, ranging from the health care sector (Healy and Braithwaite, 
2006; Herbert and Buckley, 2006; Walshe, 2001) and justice (Braithwaite, 2002), 
to children and family policy (Adams and Chandler, 2004). It appears that 
responsive regulation theory has been adopted by various regulatory agencies 
throughout the world (Wood et al., 2010; Welsh, 2009; Braithwaite et al. 2005; 
Baldwin and Black, 2007) to improve customer service, manage risk and secure 
compliance. Wood et al. (2010) refer to the application of responsive regulation in 
the administration of various regulatory bodies in Australia, Britain, Canada, New 
Zealand, the European Union, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the USA.  
Practitioners of the responsive regulatory principle discussed by Wood et al. 
include Australia’s Productivity Commission with their “movement towards more 
responsive and self-regulatory strategies” (2010, p.5); the Queensland Health 
Quality and Complaints Commission, which aims to “bring together our two core 
roles – complaints and investigation management and standard-setting and quality 
improvement” (2010, p.10); the Office of Transport Security, which seeks “to 
ensure industry compliance with the law and regulations by effecting changes in 
industry participant behaviour towards their regulatory obligations” (2010, p.22); 
and the South Australian Environment Protection Agency, aiming “to protect, 
restore and enhance the quality of the environment” (2010, p.26).  
In the UK, Wood et al. have addressed the attempt by both The Hampton Review 
and The Macrory Review for the UK government to adopt responsive regulation 
in their enforcement strategies. While Hampton advises the UK regulatory 
agencies to be responsive in their enforcement strategies and to prioritise the 
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highest risk, Macrory suggests that the agencies should be flexible, efficient and 
responsive (Wood et al., 2010) in order to encourage compliance with the law.  
Responsive regulation is also applied in the enforcement of environmental crimes 
to educate firms about environmental rules and to assist them to comply (Welsh, 
2009). The health sector is one of the regulatory sectors which have applied 
responsive regulation in their administration. Many studies have been conducted 
to explore and understand the reasons behind the adoption of responsive 
regulation theory within the health sector (Healy and Braithwaite, 2006; Herbert 
and Buckley, 2006; Walshe, 2001; Braithwaite et al., 2005). According to Healy 
and Braithwaite (2006), changes in health care sectors - new technology and new 
global diseases - demand effective mechanisms to manage the risk.  
Literature has noted significant success achieved by NHS agencies that have 
reformed their regulatory practice and applied responsive regulation in their 
administration. The adoption of a regulatory mechanism by the health sectors has 
improved performance efficiency, the quality and safety of patient care and health 
management in the NHS (Healy and Braithwaite, 2006; Walshe, 2001; Herbert 
and Buckley, 2006). From the literature, it appears that most regulatory bodies 
agree that in order to establish an effective regulatory system, they should focus 
on the need for a responsive regulatory approach whereby persuasion and 
education are the best methods to foster compliance. While sanctions should be 
imposed on recalcitrant offenders, the responsive regulation principle suggests 
that strict enforcement should be acted upon only as the last step of enforcement 
action if regulatees have no intention to comply with the law. Regulatory agencies 
are also encouraged to initiate better regulation administration by formulating 
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policy such as ‘Regulatory Management Policy’ by the Nova Scotia Department 
of Environment, and The Hampton and Macrory Reviews (Wood et al., 2010).  
The main purpose of these documents and policies is to secure compliance 
through responsive practice. Furthermore, the regulatory bodies agree that 
regulators should be flexible in their enforcement strategies by escalating through 
various levels of the pyramid according to the responses of regulatees. However, 
they also should be willing to de-escalate (Healy and Braithwaite, 2006; Nielsen 
and Parker, 2009) to the lower levels of the pyramid and repeat the action if the 
mechanism undertaken at the level above fails to coerce the offender to comply.  
Responsive regulation also requires regulators to acquire “excellent 
communication and relational skills in order to convey a complex set of messages 
about the threat of regulatory enforcement and the possibility of cooperation in a 
contextually sensitive way” (Nielsen and Parker, 2009, p.394). The skills are 
necessary so that regulatees and the public will be aware of the repercussions of 
violating the law and at the same time are persuaded to comply with the 
regulation. As the theory of responsive regulation promotes education, persuasion, 
negotiation and cooperation, such strategies could only be carried out successfully 
if regulators acquire excellent communication and relational skills to 
communicate the objective of regulatory enforcement.  
There are also many references in the literature about the application of 
responsive regulation theory in tax administration (Braithwaite, 2003; 
Braithwaite, 2007; Burton, 2007; EC, 2006; OECD, 1988; Kirchler et al., 2008). 
The core business of tax administration is to ensure compliance so that revenue 
can be collected for the government to develop the country and provide services 
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to the public (Brautigam, 2008). To secure compliance is a major challenge to any 
tax administration because taxation is complex (Braithwaite, 2007; OECD, 2001; 
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998; Frey and Feld, 2002) and, as noted by Alm 
et al. (1992) people naturally find it hard to part with their hard-earned income 
and will therefore try to evade paying tax. To procure compliance, manage non-
compliance risk and improve service delivery to taxpayers, Braithwaite (2007), 
Leviner (2009), Kirchler et al. (2008) and Feld and Frey (2005) recommend 
responsive regulation as the most suitable approach to guide a tax authority in its 
enforcement practice. The regulatory pyramid proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992) can be referred to as a guideline to the responsive regulatory approach to 
foster and maintain compliance, while the ATO compliance model has been 
adapted by a number of tax administrations.  
3.5.7 Responsive regulation for developing countries 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, p.26) imply that “persuasion is cheap and 
punishment is expensive”. This is supported by Welsh (2009) who states that if 
the first choice of action, i.e. punishment, is at the peak of the pyramid, then the 
strategy would be ”unaffordable, unworkable, and counterproductive”. In 
promoting compliance, the enforcement mechanisms undertaken should start from 
the base of the pyramid, with persuasion or education (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992; Welsh, 2009; Braithwaite, 2007). As most of the regulatees are categorised 
as willing to cooperate, they are located at the base of the pyramid, and only a 
small portion of the offences are grouped at the peak of the pyramid (Braithwaite, 
2003). Only when persuasion fails to gain cooperation as desired, the next strategy 
is to move up to the next level of the pyramid. In addition, Wood et al. (2010, 
p.37) discusses the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) of New Zealand 
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commenting that enforcement strategies that comply with responsive regulation 
result in a “cost-effective, timely and efficient regulatory regime”.  
As addressed in Section 1.4, regulators in developing countries encounter various 
constraints, such as human resources, financial resources, information technology 
systems and expertise in technical knowledge, causing inefficiency in their 
administration. Regulatory agencies in developing countries also appear to be 
weak in their enforcement capabilities (Braithwaite, 2006) due to these 
constraints. These arguments indicate that the responsive regulation concept may 
be the most appropriate strategy to be adopted by regulatory agencies, particularly 
in developing countries (Braithwaite, 2006).  
Responsive regulation theory allows regulators to prioritise their enforcement 
strategies on high risk cases (Braithwaite, 2007, Baldwin and Black, 2007). This 
approach may reduce enforcement cost for regulatory agencies because resources 
will be allocated appropriately to areas of highest concern to meet overall 
objectives where the result may produce higher returns. To overcome the 
problems faced by developing countries, Braithwaite (2006, p. 884) advises 
developing countries adopt responsive regulation as they have “less regulatory 
capacity than developed countries”. By shifting to responsive regulation, the 
authorities would have more discretion to prevent corruption and to improve their 
operations. 
3.5.8 Responsive regulation for tax administration 
Leviner points out that “responsive regulation may constitute a superior method 
for regulating tax compliance” (2009, p.381). For a tax administration to make a 
successful response, four major components should be taken into account, 
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namely, the public, the tax personnel, the decision-makers of tax administrations 
and finally the government (OECD, 1988). These components are inter-related 
and are dependent on each other in order to operate efficiently. The government 
needs the tax administration to provide services to the public so that revenue can 
be collected from the public. On the other hand, the public requires responsive 
services from tax officials in order for them to understand their responsibility to 
declare their income and pay taxes. Tax administrations should reform their 
enforcement strategy from the command-and-control approach (Braithwaite, 
2007) to a responsive regulatory regime. As OECD has asserted: 
“… it is neither effective nor efficient for tax offices to place too much emphasis on 
enforcement to the exclusion of service when collecting taxes, as this will alienate 
the public rather than involve them. Similarly, the extent to which taxpayers accept 
their responsibility of providing accurate information to the authorities impacts on 
attitudes within tax administrations.” (OECD, 1988, p.20) 
 
As a result of responsive regulation in taxation
13
, compliance can be fostered by 
way of education, encouragement and assistance, rather than through punishment 
for non-compliance. Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that a regulatory agency 
should be able to provide diverse enforcement approaches according to the nature 
of compliance. This should be illustrated through an enforcement pyramid which 
contains a different mechanism for enforcement at each level of the pyramid. The 
idea of responsive regulation is not to punish the offenders but rather to gain their 
cooperation to prevent the offences from recurring (Nielsen and Parker, 2009).  
 
                                                          
13 Responsive regulation in taxation means “influencing the community's commitment to pay tax 
through respectful treatment, through attending to resistance and reforming faulty processes, 
through fairly directed and fully explained disapproval of non-compliant behaviour, through 
preparedness to administer sanctions, and capacity to follow through to escalate regulatory 
intervention in the face of continuing non-compliance” (Braithwaite, 2007, p. 3). 
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3.6 Compliance Pyramid 
The principle of responsive regulation is an appropriate strategy that can be 
adopted by the tax administration as a regulatory body to enforce compliance on 
tax return forms submission and payment of taxes. The ATO is the pioneer among 
tax administrations in implementing a responsive regulation approach in its 
compliance strategies, working with Valerie Braithwaite to develop the well-
known Compliance Pyramid, which has served as an important reference for other 
tax administrations in order to formulate compliance strategies within their 
organisation. Other tax administrations which have followed suit in adopting this 
responsive regulation-based compliance pyramid are the HMRC, the New 
Zealand Inland Revenue and The East Timor Revenue, while the European Union 
has adapted the pyramid model to become a risk-based compliance model 
implemented by the Customs Agency.  
According to Braithwaite (2007), responsive regulation is an effective approach 
that assists tax administrations in fostering institutional integrity and developing 
an amiable relationship with the public. OECD (1988) discusses administrative 
responsiveness when addressing the need for tax administration (the regulators) to 
deliver services to taxpayers efficiently and effectively to satisfy their clients’ 
needs.  
3.6.1 The ATO Compliance Pyramid Model  
There is a wide range of literature pertaining to the ATO compliance model 
(Braithwaite, 2003; Braithwaite, 2007; Murphy, 2004; Job et al., 2007; Hobson, 
2003). The ATO has applied responsive regulation theory through their 
Compliance Pyramid model (Figure 7) to illustrate the key aspects of the 
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regulations. The triangular setup of the model with its wide base illustrates that 
most people are generally complying with the tax regulations, thus indicating self-
regulation through voluntary compliance, persuasion and education. However, the 
narrow apex of the pyramid implies that only a small number of people are 
involved in non-compliance, hence the need for “the big stick” enforcement 
approach (Leviner, 2009, p.423). 
Figure 7: The ATO Compliance Pyramid 
             
        
Source: Cooperative Compliance: Working with Large Business in the New Tax System (ATO, 
2000) 
 
In 1998 the ATO Compliance Model was created by the Cash Economy Task 
Force to investigate tax non-compliance cases that were the result of cash 
economy activities.  BISEP was used as a tool to study and understand taxpayers’ 
behaviour towards tax compliance, which was later adopted and adapted by other 
tax jurisdictions in the UK, New Zealand, Timor Leste, Indonesia, and 
Pennsylvania within the U.S. (Braithwaite, 2007, p.2).  The Compliance Model is 
“a key instrument in the ATO’s approach to risk management” (D’Ascenzo, 
2008). 
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The theory of responsive regulation is enforced in this model whereby different 
strategies are implemented depending on the responses of the taxpayers.  At the 
base of the pyramid, tax authorities work on strategies to educate and encourage 
taxpayers toward voluntary compliance and self-regulation. At the middle level, 
tax officials provide assistance to persuade taxpayers for self-regulation. 
Eventually, if deterrence is required, the command-and-control approach is 
actively enforced by the authorities, as shown at the peak of the pyramid. For the 
responsive regime to be accepted and appreciated by ATO staff, responsive 
regulation principles were incorporated into the ATO’s training  programmes, 
corporate plans and daily operations (Job et al., 2007).  
3.6.2 ATO Compliance Model and Risk Management Framework 
 
From the pyramid model which originated from the Cash Economy Task Force 
proposal, the ATO has further improved the compliance model by incorporating 
BISEP as part of the compliance model. The pyramid model is also enhanced with 
additional factors such as taxpayer attitude to compliance and regulator strategies 
to enforce compliance. BISEP illustrates factors, i.e. business, industry, sociology, 
economy and psychology, which may influence taxpayer behaviour; while the 
compliance model shows a continuum of taxpayer attitude towards compliance 
and regulators’ compliance strategies to respond to their attitude. 
Figure 8 below shows the link between BISEP and the compliance strategy 
whereby the regulator will ‘make it easy’ when taxpayers are 'willing to do the 
right thing' (ATO, 2009). If taxpayers have the desire to comply but seldom 
succeed, then regulators will help them to comply. Finally, for taxpayers who 
have decided not to comply, then the regulator will use sanctions to enforce the 
law, as depicted at the top of the pyramid (ATO, 2009). In order to collect revenue 
127 
 
and encourage voluntary compliance, the compliance model and risk management 
framework present the idea that a range of mechanisms could be adopted by tax 
regulators depending on taxpayers’ attitude to compliance. 
 
Figure 8: ATO Compliance Model and Risk Management Framework 
 
Source: ATO Compliance Programme 2008-2009 (ATO, 2009) 
 
Application of responsive regulation and Compliance Model by the ATO 
The ATO has been known to have a deterrent effect on taxpayers (Devos, 2009; 
Murphy, 2004). Eventually, with the application of responsive regulation in its 
administration, the ATO has managed to increase voluntary compliance by 
Australian taxpayers (Murphy, 2004; Hobson, 2003; Job and Honaker, 2003). The 
Compliance Model not only focuses on the taxpayers’ perspective but also 
provides understanding and enables ATO officials to respond to taxpayers 
(Hobson, 2003; Job and Honaker, 2003). ATO’s compliance strategies have 
become best practice and are referred to by many tax administrations.  
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A few studies have been conducted by researchers to explore the effectiveness of 
responsive regulation application by ATO and to elicit the views of ATO staff on 
the implementation of the responsive enforcement approach. Murphy (2004) 
presents a study by the Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI), undertaken two 
and a half years after ATO started to apply the Compliance Model. In-depth 
interviews with twenty-five senior officials of ATO were conducted to elicit their 
perception and their degree of acceptance of the new model. The study found that 
ATO “has made a good policy decision” (Murphy, 2004, p.22) when it moved 
from the enforcement approaches of threat and sanctions to compliance strategies 
by adopting various responsive approaches, as depicted in the Compliance Model. 
  
Moreover, Hobson (2003) examines the champions of the ATO Compliance 
Models in order to understand their motivation and desire to promote the 
Compliance Model to ATO staff members. According to Hobson, the CTSI 
selected interviewees from ATO officials by using a ‘snow-balling’ method, 
whereby interviewees were asked to recommend other staff for the interviews 
(Hobson, 2003, p.135). One-to-one semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with twenty-two participants to obtain information about their experience during 
the implementation of the model, as well as their perceptions of other staff 
members and suggestions for improvement. 
 
From the investigation, Hobson finds that the Compliance Model champions 
appeared to symbolise and embrace the principle of the model which involves 
behavioural change on the part of taxpayers, thus conveying their perception of 
how the change brought by the model could help to shape the ATO. The 
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champions also provided lip service in promoting the concepts of the model to 
other ATO staff members (Hobson, 2003).  
 
Another important finding by Hobson is that the champions agreed that the 
Compliance Model allowed them to respond to taxpayers and that public appeared 
to be content with the services provided by ATO. Furthermore, Job and Honaker 
(2003) seek to gain insight into the perception of ATO staff of their early 
experiences when responsive regulation was first introduced to ATO.  A number 
of staff who had completed the Compliance Model course had undergone semi-
structured telephone interviews in which their attitude, perceptions and acceptance 
of the Compliance Model were explored (Job and Honaker, 2003). Job and 
Honaker report mixed results from these interviews. Some members of staff were 
willing to accept the new idea and were eager to share their experiences using the 
model. On the other hand, there were members of staff who were dissatisfied and 
reluctant to change the way they performed their job.  
 
The study also finds that the ATO staff did not have the necessary skills to work 
with the model. Job and Honaker therefore recommend that “ATO staff need to be 
given the time and encouragement to practice the skills of responsive regulation, 
using story-telling, problem-solving and the design of new methodological tools” 
(2003, p.127).  
 
These three studies provide insights into ATO’s experiences when the 
Compliance Model and responsive regulation were implemented in Australia. 
Such experience contributes to the knowledge of responsive regulation practice 
conducted by ATO and may provide a platform for other tax administrations to 
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understand the issues which may arise during the early stages of implementing the 
Compliance Model in their administration. The HMRC has also adopted the 
Compliance Model in its administration. The next section presents HMRC’s 
experiences and efforts in applying a risk-based approach to manage compliance 
risks in the UK. 
3.6.3 The HMRC Compliance Model 
Based on the ATO compliance pyramid, the HMRC has developed its compliance 
model (Figure 9) expanding it into a three-dimensional pyramid and adding 
features such as Customer Behaviour, Revenue Response and Secure Customer 
Relationship. 
 
Figure 9: The HMRC Compliance Model 
      
   
Source: HMRC approach to compliance risk management for large businesses (HMRC, 2007) 
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The purpose of implementing this risk-based approach is to manage compliance 
risk for large business taxpayers. On the left side of the pyramid, various types of 
customer behaviour toward tax compliance are depicted. The behaviours are 
divided into five levels:  the base represents the taxpayers’ willingness to 
cooperate; the second level denotes taxpayers resigned to comply with the law; 
this is followed by uninformed taxpayers who need to be educated in order to 
comply; the top two levels indicate resistance to comply and refusal to participate 
with the authority (HMRC, 2007).  
 
The right side of the pyramid illustrates the HMRC’s responsiveness depending 
on the taxpayers’ behaviour, demonstrating how HMRC has applied the concept 
of responsive regulation by undertaking different strategies to overcome the 
diversity of circumstances posed by taxpayers. Starting from encouragement at 
the base of the pyramid in response to those who are willing to cooperate, tax 
enforcers move up to the next level to educate those who are resigned to comply. 
For those uninformed taxpayers, the regulatory strategy is to provide education to 
inform taxpayers of their responsibility to legal requirements. Another step 
forward is to persuade those who resist compliance. Finally, the command-and-
control approach is undertaken to enforce punishment to those who refuse to 
participate with the regulation. The success of this approach depends both on the 
cooperation of the taxpayer and on encouragement as well as education from the 
revenue authorities (HMRC, 2007).  
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3.6.3.1 HMRC’s risk-based approach  
In its effort to improve management of risk in its administration, HMRC has 
introduced a risk-based approach with an objective to manage risks from money 
laundering
14
 and terrorist financing
15
. A guideline of the approach was published 
in 2010 by HMRC in a document entitled ‘Anti-Money Laundering Guidance for 
Money Service Business’, which provides guidance to businesses16 supervised by 
HMRC “on implementing the legal requirements for measures designed to deter, 
detect and disrupt money laundering and terrorist financing” (HMRC, 2010, p.1). 
Unlike the compliance risk management models suggested by OECD (2004) and 
EC (2010), which are intended to be applied by tax administrations, the risk-based 
approach is developed for implementation by businesses in managing the money 
laundering and terrorist financing risks they face. The approach consists of a 
number of steps (HMRC, 2010, p.10):  
•  Identify the money laundering and terrorist financing risks that are relevant 
to the business; categorise level of risk, i.e. high, medium or low; and 
allocate customers and products to risk categories. 
• Assess the risks presented by the particular types and behaviours of 
customers, products and services; by delivery channels, e.g. cash over the 
counter, electronic or wire transfer, or cheque; and by geographical areas of 
operation, e.g. location of business premises, source or destination of 
customers’ funds. 
•  Design and implement controls to manage and mitigate these assessed risks. 
•  Monitor and improve the effective operation of these controls. 
•  Record appropriately what has been done, and why. 
                                                          
14
 Money laundering is “the process by which criminally obtained money and other assets 
(criminal property) are exchanged for clean money or other assets with no obvious link to their 
criminal origins” (HMRC, 2010, p.3) 
15
 Terrorist financing is “all dealings with funds or property which are likely to be used for the 
purposes of terrorism, even if the funds are clean in origin” (HMRC, 2010, p.3) 
16
 Businesses supervised by HMRC such as “proprietors, directors, managers, employees and 
Nominated Officers of Money Service Business” (HMRC, 2010, p.1) 
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Nevertheless, HMRC (2010) encourages businesses to decide for themselves how 
to implement the risk-based approach, depending on the nature of their business, 
the type of their products and the categories of their customers. By adopting these 
strategies, a business may be able to manage money laundering and terrorist 
financing risks more cost-effectively (HMRC, 2010). 
HMRC also plays a supervisory role to ensure that businesses comply with anti-
money laundering and terrorist financing regulation, and has therefore adopted 
“the principles of good regulation in the Regulators Compliance Code” (HMRC, 
2012, p.1) which outlines the following: 
 Regulators should allow or encourage economic progress and only interfere 
when protection is necessary. 
 Comprehensive risk assessment should be used by regulators so that 
resources can be allocated more efficiently. 
 Regulators should “provide authoritative, accessible advice easily and 
cheaply” (HMRC, 2012, p.1). 
 Regulators should not carry out any inspection if there is no reason to do so. 
 Regulators should not request businesses for information if they have 
previously provided the same information, nor should they ask for 
unnecessary information. 
 Non-complying businesses should be identified quickly and sanctions 
imposed on them.  
 Regulators “should be accountable for the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their activities, while remaining independent in the decisions” (HMRC, 
2012, p.1). 
HMRC has formulated a wise risk management strategy by issuing guidelines for 
businesses to adopt, and at the same time carry out supervisory action to ensure 
that compliance of the law is achieved. 
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3.6.3.2 HMRC’s deterrence approach to non-compliance  
In addition to the risk-based approach to manage the money laundering challenge, 
HMRC has also adopted a command-and-control strategy to enforce non-
compliance. In February, 2011, it launched a new programme to manage tax 
evaders in its effort to reduce tax non-compliance. The programme, entitled 
‘Managing Deliberate Defaulters’ (MDD), ”placed individual taxpayers and 
businesses which have been caught attempting to evade tax liabilities of GBP 25 
000 or more, under greater scrutiny of HMRC authorities for a period of five 
years” (MDD, 2011). HMRC sends out letters to approximately nine hundred 
taxpayers with a warning that they are now in the MDD programme:  
“Taxpayers chosen for the programme will face much stricter and more intrusive 
compliance requirements, including unannounced inspection visits with checks of 
their financial records, extra information requirements in their tax returns, and higher 
levels of cross checking between the taxpayer’s business activities.” (MDD, 2011) 
 
The deterrent programme seeks to improve tax compliance behaviour across the 
UK, and to “deter known tax evaders from repeated offenses, dissuading potential 
future tax defaulters, and to provide assurance to compliant taxpayers that the 
HMRC is willing to take action against non-compliance” (MDD, 2011). 
 
It appears that HMRC has adapted the concept of responsive regulation to manage 
compliance risk in its administration. The risk-based approach is applied to 
manage money laundering and terrorist financing risks, while the stick approach is 
adopted to manage high-risk tax defaulters. The next section addresses the 
implementation by the New Zealand tax administration of strategies to increase 
compliance by understanding factors influencing taxpayer’s behaviour and their 
decision to comply. 
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3.6.4 The NZIR Compliance Model 
The New Zealand Inland Revenue (NZIR) initiated the introduction of responsive 
regulation in their administration in 2001 through its strategic document entitled 
“The Way Forward”. The aim is to simplify work processes, promote compliance, 
enhance staff capabilities and improve its administration (Job et al., 2007; Morris 
and Lonsdale, 2005). The responsive regulation theory is further illustrated by the 
construction of a compliance model adapted from the ATO compliance model, the 
purpose being to change the enforcement culture of NZIR from the traditional 
punishment approach to one based on responsive regulation (Job et al., 2007).  
 
Figure 10: The NZIR Compliance Model 
 
 
 
Source: Helping you get it right: Inland Revenue’s compliance focus 2012-13. Inland Revenue Te 
Tari Taake. IR 504. August 2012. (NZIR, 2012) 
 
To understand factors influencing both taxpayer behaviour and responsive 
strategies to manage this behaviour, NZIR adopts ATO’s compliance model, as 
illustrated in Figure 10 above. The triangle represents the attitude of the taxpayers 
and the compliance strategy enforced by NZIR, while the circle, which uses 
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BISEP, illustrates factors that influence taxpayers’ decisions and behaviour. The 
model was developed to understand factors that influence taxpayers’ decision-
making in compliance and to determine appropriate strategies to secure long-term 
compliance (Morris and Lonsdale, 2005; NZIR, 2012). It displays Economic, 
Sociological, Industry, Psychological and Business factors that influence 
taxpayers’ behaviour and decisions, namely, do the right thing, try to do the right 
thing, not want to comply or decide not to comply at all. By understanding the 
factors and the attitude of the taxpayers to comply, the tax authority’s compliance 
strategies may vary, depending on the taxpayers’ attitude, whether to make it easy 
to comply, to provide assistance, to deter by detection or to use full force of law.  
3.6.5 ETRS Responsive Regulation System 
Under the UN administration, the administration of East Timor has been reformed 
to overcome administrative issues such as corruption, inflation, and breakdown in 
civil society (Job et al., 2007). During the implementation of the new 
administration, responsive regulation was introduced and incorporated. To further 
enforce this concept, a compliance model based on the ATO model was adopted 
by the East Timor Revenue Service (ETRS). As observed by Job et al. (2007, 
p.91), ”the responsive regulation and restorative justice principles built into the 
ATO compliance model seemed to fit with the culture of the indigenous East 
Timorese employees from the ETRS”. Nevertheless, the regulatory strategies 
undertaken by ETRS were implemented according to the local culture. Job et al. 
have concluded that the new regulatory approach succeeded in changing the 
organisational culture of ETRS to reduce corruption, and, as a result, the 
relationship between ETRS and the local community has improved. 
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3.6.6 The EC risk-based compliance model 
This model is used by the European Commission (EC) as part of their risk 
management guide. The compliance model in Figure 11 below illustrates a two-
dimensional pyramid which displays risk reduction strategies on the compliance 
continuum side and compliance behaviour on the taxpayer population side. 
 
Figure 11: The EC Risk-based Compliance Pyramid 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission- Risk Management Guide for Tax Administrations (EC, 2006)  
 
 
As depicted by the pyramid model, there are various types of taxpayer behaviour, 
such as voluntary compliance, compliance, triers, new businesses, failures, 
chancers, avoidance, deliberate evasion and finally non-compliance. Triers are 
those who always make an attempt to comply with the law; ‘new businesses’ 
indicates lack of knowledge in the tax system; while chancers are those who like 
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to take opportunities and try their luck in avoiding the law (EC, 2006). These 
behaviours are further grouped in four categories whereby voluntary compliance 
and compliance are ‘compliant’ , triers and new businesses ‘attempt to comply but 
fail’, failures and chancers are ‘general non-compliant’ and deliberate and non-
compliance are considered as ‘deliberate fraud’.  
Responsive regulation theory assists the authority in making the decision to 
formulate strategies to treat taxpayers according to these categories. The 
responsive regulatory regime is an appropriate approach because, due to limited 
resources and manpower, tax authorities should take measures to reduce existing 
risks and prevent future risk from occurring through a risk reduction approach, in 
which specific measures are taken to manage specific categories of taxpayers. 
Marketing the tax system is the best approach to be implemented to inform 
taxpayers who always comply. Education and advice are suitable strategies for 
assisting taxpayers who make an attempt to comply but normally fail to do so 
because of insufficient knowledge or lack of motivation to abide the rules.  
Generally non-complying taxpayers should be audited to review their level of 
non-compliance and at the same time to alert them of the repercussions of failure 
to comply. Finally, for the deliberate fraud category, enforcement is the most 
appropriate command-and-control action to punish this group of taxpayers for 
deliberately refusing to comply with the law. The EC introduced a Compliance 
Risk Management (CRM) guide in 2010 to improve the risk management process 
and to assist member countries to plan, develop and manage compliance risk in 
their administrations. The EC CRM guide is addressed in Section 3.4.2.  
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3.7 The gaps in responsive regulation 
Despite the advantages of regulatory agencies adopting responsive regulation 
theory to enhance compliance and manage risk, as noted by much of the literature 
on the subject, there has been some criticism of it. For instance, Healy and 
Braithwaite (2006) comment on the lack of published reports to benchmark the 
performance of responsive regulation implemented by regulatory agencies. 
Reports would enable other agencies to learn from the application of a responsive 
regime and to develop their own regulatory practice. Similarly, Baldwin and 
Black (2007) are rather sceptical that responsive regulation is able to assist 
regulatory agencies to address challenges in practice, while Baldwin and Black 
(2007) disagree with the step-by-step approach of the enforcement pyramid. They 
argue that, when faced with a specific risk, it would be more appropriate to 
undertake an immediate action to overcome that risk, perhaps by jumping to the 
peak of the pyramid, rather than adopt the step-by-step approach suggested by 
responsive regulation. Another matter of concern is the waste of resources when 
enforcement is conducted on the basis of responsive regulation because some 
offenders will comply effectively when threatened with sanctions [ibid].  
Welsh (2009) supports Baldwin and Black’s argument, noting an assertion by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) that a step-by-step 
approach may be inappropriate in enforcing the law. She suggests that, in the case 
of ASIC, regulators may prefer to adopt criminal sanctions rather than civil 
penalties in order to prosecute criminals. Furthermore, Welsh claims that 
responsive regulation “does not adequately address the influence that such 
external pressures have on the strategies adopted by a regulator” (2009, p.17). 
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This is due to external bureaucratic pressures such as political, social and public 
intervention, which may influence regulatory decisions.  
In addition, Fuhr and Bizer (2007) argue that “there is a need for greater 
incentives to support the self-responsibility regulative approach”. With reference 
to the reward and punishment theory, it appears that regulators may need to 
reward regulatees when they cooperate in order to motivate them towards 
compliance in the longer term. In her study of the application of responsive 
regulation in a civil penalty regime, Welsh (2009, p.88) reports some 
commentators’ arguments that “responsive regulation assumes that the regulated 
community is made up of rational decision-makers who are in on-going 
relationships with the regulator.”  
Baldwin and Black (2007) agree that responsive regulation simply takes a 
responsive relationship between regulators and regulatees for granted, and 
assumes that each party understands the other’s roles and responsibilities and 
complies with them. Further, Daly (2003) criticises Braithwaite’s assumption 
(2002) that there is some “goodness” in everyone. Daly (2003) and Welsh (2009) 
posit that the theory of responsive regulation may not be seen as straightforward 
in practice as it appears in Ayres and Braithwaite’s regulatory pyramid. 
Nevertheless, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, p.25) also agree that the limitation of 
the persuasion model is that the theory assumes that “people are basically good, 
thus they are motivated to abide by the law”.  
3.8 Summary 
This chapter presents a review of three strands of literature: tax compliance, risk 
management and responsive regulation. Literatures suggest that tax 
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administrations in developing countries should understand the motivational 
factors that result in higher compliance in the developed countries, and therefore 
become aware of the push factors that result in non-compliance in their own 
countries. By understanding taxpayers’ behaviour and attitudes, developing 
countries may implement risk-based responsive strategies to encourage voluntary 
compliance and self-regulation and thus improve their tax administration.  
This research focuses on an exploration of the types of internal and external risks 
faced by tax administrations of developing countries in general and of IRBM in 
particular. Furthermore, the EC and OECD have proposed a Compliance Risk 
Management framework as a guideline for tax administrations to manage risk. 
Various literatures have reported on the application of the concept of responsive 
regulation in tax administrations in developed countries, particularly in Australia, 
and the adoption of the compliance pyramid model, from which Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s responsive regulation theory was first generated.  
However, there is a need to address a gap in the adaption of the responsive 
regulation theory by tax administrations in developing countries. The 
implementation of a responsive approach in regulatory services by the ATO, 
HMRC, IRS, NZIR and the EC can be considered as best practice for developing 
countries to follow. The major aspects of tax compliance, risk management and 
responsive regulation, which involve taxpayer behaviour and attitude and the 
responsive approaches of tax regulators, are drawn upon to construct a conceptual 
framework for the present study. Further, the methodology of this research is 
discussed in Chapter 4 which follows.    
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has addressed the existing literature relating to the key 
themes of the research, which are tax compliance, taxpayer compliance behaviour, 
risk management and responsive regulation. This following chapter provides an 
overview of the methodology adopted for this research. As a qualitative research 
methodology is being adopted, the chapter begins with a discussion of this subject 
in Section 4.2, explaining the reasons for adopting this methodology. In Section 
4.3, a justification of the research design and the case study approach is provided. 
Furthermore, Section 4.4 presents the research method for the study. There are 
two methods of data gathering: face-to-face interview and secondary data 
collection. This section also highlights the interview process and explains how 
participants are selected for the interviews.  
Next, the data analysis process is described in Section 4.5. In this section, the 
processes such as interview transcription, document content analysis, along with 
the identification and the coding of themes are looked at in detail. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a summary of the methodology in Section 4.6.  
4.2 Qualitative research 
As this research explores participants’ points of view, beliefs and experiences 
pertaining to risk management in Malaysia and because data is collected through 
interviews to gain insight into IRBM practices in managing risks, a qualitative 
approach is a methodology well suited to the study. “The word qualitative implies 
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an emphasis on the quality of entities and processes and meanings that are not 
experimentally examined or measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or 
frequency” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.10).  
While quantitative research stresses measurement and investigates the causal 
relationship between variables, qualitative research places the emphasis on 
seeking answers to questions which focus on how experience is “created and 
given meaning” [ibid].  Silverman (2000) considers that the methods used by 
qualitative researchers provide a greater in-depth understanding of social 
phenomena than that produced by a quantitative approach. Furthermore, 
according to Kalof et al. (2008), qualitative researchers argue that the use of 
statistics or numbers alone is insufficient to develop an in-depth understanding of 
people’s thoughts, feelings and behaviour. Furthermore, according to Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005, p.29), “qualitative researchers report on their own observations of 
the social world, including reports his/her experiences and experiences of others 
through interviews and life story, personal experience, and case study 
documents”.  
In qualitative research, data can be collected by various methods, including 
interviews, observation, case study, document analysis and ethnography 
(Silverman, 2000; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Kalof et. al., 2008; McKerchar, 
2008).  Using such data collection methods, a qualitative approach attempts to 
obtain answers to research questions without attempting to prove any hypothesis 
or analyse the data using Likert scales (McKerchar, 2008). In summary, 
McKerchar (2008) notes that the researcher’s creativity and insights into the 
investigation may determine the success of a qualitative research study. 
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Previous research supports the view that a qualitative approach is suitable for this 
study. Data collection from interviews and IRBM documents enables in-depth 
information to be obtained to address the research questions. In this study, the 
author’s experience of working at the IRBM, and prior knowledge of some 
interviewees are discussed and presented as a contribution to an understanding of 
the risk management strategies used by the Malaysian tax administration. The 
next section presents the research design for the qualitative methodology used in 
this study. 
4.3 Research Design 
The research design for this study comprises a case study in which the unit of 
analysis is an organisation, the IRBM. The IRBM background and compliance 
issues faced by the IRBM authority have been addressed in Chapter 2. This 
section discusses literature on case study and rational for IRBM to be selected as a 
case study.  
4.3.1 Case Study 
In order to perform data collection activities, a researcher should be able to 
identify the method (s) to be used so that the data collected can be optimized and 
valuable findings derived from the study. To determine the methods to be used, a 
researcher should understand the functions and purpose of each method so that the 
best results could be obtained from the data collected. A researcher can use 
various methods, such as surveys, experiments, observations, interviews and case 
studies to collect data.  A case study is a well-established method used in 
qualitative research (Stake, 2005; Silverman, 2000; Yin, 2003). According to Yin 
(2003), the case study has been a common research strategy in psychology, 
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sociology, political science, social work, business, community planning and even 
economics. Yin (2003) and Stake (2005) define it as a process of inquiry about a 
case and then reporting on it. It is a qualitative method which requires the 
researcher to focus on a single case or multiple cases in order to study and 
understand the phenomena of interest. This method may be suitable for a 
researcher to adopt, depending on the research design and research questions (Yin, 
2003). However, according to Yin, some researchers have argued that case studies 
have been conducted with “insufficient precision, objectivity and rigor”. This is 
because they feel that a case study is appropriate only for “the exploratory phase 
of an investigation”. They also believe that case studies are “only a preliminary 
strategy and cannot be used to describe or test propositions” (Yin, 2003, p.3). 
However, despite these misgivings, case studies have been used extensively in 
social science research (Yin, 2003).  
 
As this study aims to gain understanding and insights from tax officials and tax 
practitioners who have experience of non-compliance issues, a case study 
approach is chosen as a method to collect data for this investigation.  Many of the 
case studies in tax research have been carried out by Richard Bird in his quest for 
information on reforms in tax administration in developing countries (Bird, 2004, 
2008). Other studies have been conducted by the OECD and the IMF to 
understand the issues and problems faced by some tax administrations in 
developing countries (OECD, 2004; Silvani and Baer, 1997). There are also 
researchers who have selected some tax administrations, such as the ATO, as a 
case study to learn about their compliance model and to share this knowledge with 
other tax administrations. As noted by Stake (2005), a case study method is 
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chosen ‘to optimize understanding the case rather than to generalize beyond it’. 
Hence, by gathering information about practices in the IRBM, the knowledge 
gained from this study about compliance strategies, education programmes and 
the challenges faced by them can be shared with   other tax administrations. 
  
4.3.2 Case Selection: Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
As suggested by Stake (2005), a researcher should choose a case that offers the 
most to be learned from the study. Furthermore, Stake adds that most researchers 
would take a case that is accessible, with good opportunities to obtain information 
(p.451). Even though this research comprises a single-case study, the data 
obtained has the potential  to inform the practices of other revenue agencies since 
all revenue authorities have similar goals and practices when it comes to tax 
administrations, as noted by the OECD (2001, p.11). Any findings or conclusions 
from this research would provide meaningful knowledge not only to the IRBM, 
but also to other tax administrations with a similar background or environment.  
As the research question is examining how management of risk is conducted in 
the IRBM, a case study approach appears to be a suitable approach (Rogers and 
Oats, 2012).  
 
I have been working with the IRBM for almost 17 years, during which time I have 
been attached to various departments in the organisation. Being an insider is an 
advantage to this research in the sense that I can have easy access to data and the 
organisation. An inside researcher is a person who belongs to the community 
under study (Bishop, 2005, p.110-113). Merriam et al. (2001) cited by Bishop 
(2005, p.411) note some assumptions, including the view that an insider is unable 
to be objective, tends to be biased and is too close to the culture to ask critical 
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questions. However, Merriam et al. (2001) cited by Bishop (2005, p.411) also 
argue that the inside researcher is “more sensitive and responsive” to the culture 
of the organisation. Besides having easy access to the people and the organisation, 
I also have the ability to ask meaningful questions about the practices and 
strategies formulated and to probe for further explanations to the answers given.  
Having worked for the IRBM for such a long time and understanding the culture 
and the values surrounding Malaysian tax administration, I believe that this 
research enables me to search for in-depth answers to my research questions. My 
rapport, personally or professionally with the officials would make interactions 
and access to the organisation easier and faster. As noted by Stake (2005), a case 
research study is “not to represent the world, but to represent the case”. Hence, by 
having the IRBM as a case for this study and investigating the activities pertaining 
to compliance, tax education and administration of the organisation, I have been 
able to obtain relevant information and knowledge, to analyse the data and to 
provide answers to the research questions.  
4.4 Data Collection 
As mentioned earlier, data was collected through semi-structured interviews and 
secondary data from the IRBM. My previous experience has enabled me to 
understand the problems and helped me to identify pre-conceived themes and 
questions to ask in the interviews. The participants’ willingness to disclose some 
confidential and sensitive information to me, even though they said that the 
information was ‘off-the-record’, shows that they were comfortable with me as an 
insider. Furthermore, my request for some internal documents, such as memos and 
audit reports, was granted without much difficulty; from my working experience, 
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such documents would not have been passed on to outside researchers. Even 
though the IRBM participants treated me as an insider, I placed myself in the 
position of an outsider during the interview process. As a researcher, I have 
conducted the interviews in an objective manner and disallowed my sentiment as 
an IRBM official to interfere with my judgement during data analysis and in 
concluding the thesis. 
The study investigates the perception and understanding of risk by those involved 
in the policy and decision making in the IRBM and examines how decisions, 
policies and strategies are formulated. Two main research methods have been 
employed to collect these data, which are document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. The use of multiple data sources is called triangulation (Kalof et al., 
2008; Stewart, 1998; Hammersley, 1992; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).  
Kalof et al. (2008, p.136) point out that the advantage of triangulation of data 
sources is that it “can help offset the limitation of any one approach”. 
Furthermore, by having multiple modes of data collection, the information 
gathered and analysed can be used effectively to support the conclusions of the 
research (O’Reilly, 2005; Stewart, 1998; Hammersley, 1992; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). As noted by Rist (1984) cited in Hammersley (1992, p.125), the 
use of multiple sources of evidence will overcome the issue of “relying on a 
single, possibly biased, source”. 
4.4.1 Document Analysis 
One of the methods used for this study is document analysis. This method is 
another data gathering source to enrich data collection (O’Reilly, 2005; Stewart, 
1998; Hammersley, 1992) by learning about the processes, rules and procedures 
related to the research questions. Silverman argues that, even though some 
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quantitative researchers appear to have little confidence in textual analysis, 
analysed texts represent “official or common-sense versions of social phenomena” 
(2011, p.230), which adds to the richness of the data. As documents provide texts 
in a naturally occurring setting, the data could influence the ways in which readers 
see the world and act in it (Silverman, 2011; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
Also, the availability of documents may ease the data collection process and 
enable researchers to start the analysis process earlier (Silverman, 2011).  
For this study, documents are used as secondary data to support the findings from 
the interviews and they may enhance the conclusions of the study. Thus, a range 
of published and unpublished printed materials prepared by the IRBM has been 
collected, including reports, minutes of meetings, circulars, directives and 
statistics. The information contained in the documents, as well as the subjective 
meanings and perceptions generated by those documents, are noted and analysed. 
The main documents analysed in the study are as follows. 
 IRBM annual reports  
The reports contain useful information on the IRBM activities, including the 
results and performance of those activities in respective years. Also, to highlight 
compliance issues faced by the IRBM, some statistical records are extracted from 
the annual report, such as audit activities, prosecution cases and other 
enforcement activities.   
 Internal memos  
An internal memo notes compliance problems from one of the IRBM branches.  
 Minutes of Dialogue between IRBM and Associations of Accountants and 
Tax Practitioners (AATP) 
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Notes of meetings between the IRBM senior officials with the members of the 
AATP provide insights into operational and technical issues brought out by the 
AATP.  
 Tax Audit framework (TAF, 2009) 
A policy paper or framework issued by the IRBM which outlines the rights and 
responsibilities of audit officers, taxpayers and tax agents in respect of a tax audit.  
 Tax Investigation Framework (TIF, 2007) 
A policy paper or framework issued by the IRBM which outlines the rights and 
responsibilities of an investigation officer, the taxpayer and the tax 
agent/representative in respect of a tax investigation. 
 IRBM Integrity Plan.  
A comprehensive, policy book issued by the IRBM designed to strengthen IRBM 
ethics and the integrity of IRBM staff. 
 IRBM Strategic Planning 2009-2013 
A book published by the IRBM which informs about its direction and future 
planning for the year 2009 to 2013 to improve its performance internally and 
externally. 
 
The documents were analysed using the document analysis methodology, 
whereby the contents of textual data were interpreted and the themes identified. 
The themes were informed by the extensive literature review required to address 
the research questions. Unlike the interview data, where it was planned for taped 
conversation to be translated and transcribed in their entirety, the document 
contents were not translated and transcribed in their entirety. Only important data 
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and texts which provided input to the study and relevant to potential themes were 
gathered. The themes were then coded and stored in NVivo for further analysis.  
4.4.2 Interview 
It is not enough to collect data through documentary analysis alone. In order to 
obtain rich data and information, interviews were conducted on selected 
participants. Researchers such as Silverman (2001), Kvale (2007) and Fontana 
and Frey (2005) agree that the interview is one of the best, most powerful and 
most popular methods to gather qualitative research data. Interviews are a far 
more personal form of research than questionnaires as the interviewer will have 
direct and interactive communication with the respondents. Researchers have the 
opportunity to obtain details and stories about the topics of interest by 
interviewing people who have experience of or who are connected to the subjects 
(Valenzuela and Shrivastava, 2007).  O’Reilly (2005) also agrees that interviews 
allow for in-depth information around the topic to be pursued and for respondents 
to be probed for more answers and clarification about how, what or why they did 
certain activities.  
 
An individual, face-to-face question and answer session was used as a research 
method as it was a suitable  way of seeking  the opinions or views  of participants 
and it has been shown to be  an effective way of ascertaining their  impressions of 
the questions being asked (Silverman, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Fontana 
and Frey, 2005). The type of interview conducted was a semi-structured, 
conversational interview in which pre-determined questions were used as a guide. 
The open-ended approach allowed free responses from the respondents and it also 
allowed me to probe more deeply into the answers given (Berg, 1998).  
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During the interviews, interviewees were asked to clarify the meaning of specific 
terms used by them. Questions asked during the interviews were open-ended. One 
of the advantages of an open-ended question is that, during the interview, a 
researcher might explore other questions that had not been considered at the 
planning stage with the result that new, valuable insights are discovered and rich 
information obtained.  
 
According to Silverman (2006, p.114), open-ended questions used during an 
interview are the most effective way to understand people’s experiences, attitudes 
and values, which could not be established through a formal questionnaire. From 
the interviews, the interviewees’ opinions, feelings, thoughts, beliefs and 
experiences can be recorded and analysed. As pointed out by Yin (2003), the 
advantage of using interviews for data collection is that a researcher could focus 
directly on the topic of interest by asking specific questions directly related to the 
research topic. Furthermore, unlike mail surveys, the interviews provided the 
opportunity to probe for further clarification, ask follow up questions and request 
that interviewees elaborate on their explanation. Another advantage of interviews 
is that they can support the conclusions of the study as the researcher is able to use 
the participants’ quotes “to enhance the validity of the results” (Adler and Adler, 
1998).  
 
Considering that the aim is to conduct an in-depth exploration of the perceptions 
of the tax administration system in Malaysia, the semi-structured interview 
appears to be the most suitable interview type for this research. Thus, the semi-
structured interview was selected as the method for data gathering in this 
investigation. A conversational type of interview was adopted, with pre-
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determined questions used as a guide. This allowed interviewees the opportunity 
to talk openly and gave them freedom to give their perceptions of the topics of 
interest (Berg, 1998).  
 
The open-ended questions could be adapted to suit each interviewee’s nature and 
experience, following a sequence from general to specific questions. However, to 
ensure that the conversation was running smoothly, during the interview, I “went 
with the flow” as suggested by Valenzuala and Shrivastaza (2007). The open-
ended approach allowed free responses from the respondents and also allowed me 
to probe more deeply into the answers given. Throughout the interviews, the 
interviewees were asked to clarify the meaning of specific terms (language) used 
by them. The interactive nature of the semi-structured interview enabled me to 
develop a good rapport with the participants. This situation encouraged the 
interviewees to feel comfortable in sharing their stories, experiences and 
challenges.  
 
Being an insider was indeed an advantage as it was easy to understand the 
terminology and jargon used by the interviewees (Mulligan, 2012). Most of the 
time they uttered ‘You know’ or ‘You know how it works…’ because they knew 
that I understood the subjects they were talking about. Nevertheless, I always 
asked for confirmation to ascertain that their explanation was consistent with my 
understanding of their responses. This is the advantage of qualitative research, 
whereby researchers are free to ask for clarification and probe for further 
explanation of the subjects with follow-up questions such as “What do you mean 
by…?”, “Could you please elaborate further…?” or “Why do you think…?” 
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(Sandberg, 2005; Silverman, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Consequently, 
researchers may obtain richer information about the phenomenon under study.  
 
4.4.3 Respondent selection 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted on two groups of people:  inside 
participants from the IRBM and outsiders, who are tax practitioners working in 
tax consulting firms in Malaysia. The reason for including tax practitioners in the 
interviews was to obtain richer information from people outside the IRBM who 
have direct links with the taxation system and also direct interaction with 
taxpayers. Thus, I believed that the tax practitioners would be able to provide 
valuable information and alternative perspectives of tax administration in 
Malaysia.  
Internal participants 
Having received the letter from the CEO/Director General of IRBM consenting to 
the interviews, I e-mailed 30 top and middle level executives involved in the 
policy and decision making in the operations and administrations of the IRBM, 
inviting them to be interviewed. These employees are top level executives, state 
directors, department directors, branch directors, desk/field auditors and 
department officials. They were selected based on the departments to which they 
were attached. The functions of these departments were related to the risk 
management practices investigated in this study. From the 30 officials who agreed 
to be interviewed, two were unable to attend the interview due to other urgent 
commitments. However, they agreed to answer my questions in writing. 
Therefore, I sent the guided questions via e-mail to them and they returned the 
questionnaires with the answers. Of officials I interviewed, 12 were female 
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officials while the rest were male officials. The managerial scope of the 
interviewees ranged from the most senior levels to IRBM scale Grade 41 (junior 
middle management). However, the majority were from the ranks of top middle 
management and senior management.  
From 14 states in Malaysia, I visited five to meet the officials for interviews; out 
of 36 branches of the IRBM, seven branches were selected for inclusion. These 
seven were chosen because they are the branches with the biggest number of 
individual and sole-proprietors taxpayers (the central region), whilst the northern 
and southern regions also have their respective branches in those regions. The 
state and branch directors implement the decisions made at the headquarters and, 
at the same time, they also have some authority and decision making power within 
their jurisdiction. To determine that sufficient information could be gathered from 
the respondents selected and to avoid saturation, a sufficient range and number of 
respondents was chosen to provide information relevant to the research questions. 
Analysis of interview transcripts also indicates relatively similar responses to the 
questions by participants from the different branches. The reason being that, as 
stated earlier, branches implement policies formulated and directed by the HQ; 
thus, it is the responsibility of each branch to adhere to the policies and report 
their achievements regularly to HQ. 
External participants 
To get another, possibly contrasting, view or perspective, interviews were 
conducted with non-IRBM officials. Bird (2008, p.20) suggests that, for the 
revenue authorities to “develop good ideas and to implement them effectively,… 
good tax policy planning should also involve taxpayers, tax practitioners, and tax 
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agents”. Furthermore, Salter and Oats (2011, p.2) note HMRC’s recognition of 
“the positive impact that good tax agents may have on tax compliance by 
represented taxpayers”. Thus, improvements in working relationships with tax 
agents may increase compliance by taxpayers represented by the tax agents (Salter 
and Oats, 2011; OECD, 2008a).  
In order to elicit more ideas, suggestions and recommendations on risk 
management, another series of semi-structured interviews was conducted with six 
tax practitioners working in tax and accounting firms in Malaysia. Two of the tax 
practitioners were from the Big-Four accounting companies, whilst the rest were 
partners of tax consulting companies. Initially, invitations to interview were e-
mailed to six selected tax practitioners. However, only three people replied and 
agreed to participate in the interview sessions. I was informed that the rest were 
reluctant to be interviewed because they did not wish to be seen to criticize any 
government agencies. Even though they were assured that their identity would 
remain anonymous and the answers given would be used for the purpose of this 
research only and treated as strictly confidential, they were still unconvinced and 
refused to be interviewed. Hence, the remaining three tax practitioners were 
invited for interview. However, one of them was willing to provide written 
answers only and would not be interviewed face-to-face, whilst two of them 
agreed to be interviewed with the tape on. I managed to persuade three more tax 
practitioners to participate in the interview where two participants agreed to 
written answers and one agreed for a face-to-face interview but without using the 
tape recorder.  
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A list of internal and external participants interviewed is displayed in Appendix 3.  
4.4.4 Interview Instrument 
An interview question guide was designed on the basis of the research objectives, 
the research questions and also from the literature. There were two types of 
interview guide: one was designed for the IRBM officials and the other was for 
the tax practitioners. The guides were structured in three parts. The first part 
consists of preparation before the interview, which includes choosing the place for 
the interviews, explaining the purpose and format of the interview and allowing 
the interviewees to clarify any doubts about the process.  
The second part of the guide contains the interview questions, starting with 
general questions about the interviewees and followed by more specific questions. 
The main topics of the questions were about the challenges faced by the 
interviewees in their work-related activities, the taxpayers’ education, compliance 
issues and strategies, implementation of the self-assessment system in Malaysia, 
and self-regulation of tax administration in Malaysia. Also, other general topics 
being discussed included tax administration in developing countries and 
compliance models. Lastly, the final section of the guide summarizes the 
interview. The interview guide is attached as Appendix 4 for IRBM officials and 
Appendix 5 for tax practitioners. 
4.4.5 Interview process 
The interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ offices in the IRBM  premises 
in Malaysia, for privacy as well as for the respondents’ comfort. All interviews 
took place on a one-to-one basis except for one case in which three participants 
were present at one session. To overcome the interviewees’ reluctance to share 
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information freely, they were all assured that the information obtained would not 
be distributed to any third parties and their identity would not be revealed. 
Interview scripts were prepared as a guide to the questions. The questions were 
open-ended to obtain information about the interviewees’ views, experiences and 
the organisation’s practices in relation to the topic.  
A digital tape recorder was used to tape the interviews. Silverman highlights a few 
advantages of using a tape recorder during interviews: it captures data better than 
field notes; it can be replayed, hence transcription can be improved and it 
preserves the sequence of the conversation (2011, p.278).  However, from 36 
interviewees, 16 agreed to the interview being taped, five preferred to answer in 
writing; the rest preferred not to have the interview taped, by which they implied 
that they might say something sensitive or confidential. To conduct the interview 
without recording it on tape was a very challenging process because several 
activities needed to be done simultaneously, such as asking questions, listening, 
and jotting down the answers whilst trying to comprehend what was being said by 
the interviewees. Being unable to capture all the words uttered by the respondents 
was quite frustrating because some important data conveyed by the interviewees 
might be missed. However, to ensure that I remembered the answers given, 
immediately after the interviews were over, the full answers were written to the 
guided questions. At that time, I would still be able to capture in writing the most 
important points   raised during the interviews.  
The average time taken for each interview was two hours, even though the initial 
plan had been to spend about one hour on each interview. However, four of the 
interviews took three hours to complete. Even though the questions set were in 
English language, most of the interviewees were comfortable to speak in the 
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Malaysian national language, which is called the Malay language. Therefore, 
during transcription process, the conversation was translated from Malay to 
English and later transcribed into text. The process of translation and transcription 
took between eight hours and three days, depending on the length of the 
interview. The interview sessions were in two parts:  the first part was about 
challenges (risk) for the IRBM, non-compliance issues and managing the 
challenges, whilst the second part of the session was about risk-based compliance 
models.  
All interviewees had given full cooperation and responded positively to all 
questions posed to them. Most interviewees managed to provide answers about 
the global picture of the IRBM current practices and future planning. However, 
there were a few participants who were unable to provide feedback on certain 
queries, such as the pyramid compliance model, as they were unaware of the 
existence of the model.  
A face-to-face interview is an interesting research method to adopt; during the 
interview, a researcher is able to observe the participants’ reactions. Most of the 
participants, especially those who knew me personally, appeared to be 
comfortable and relaxed throughout the interview process. Those who had no 
previous professional dealings with me appeared somewhat rigid, officious and 
uncomfortable. They answered the questions directly without trying to elaborate, 
unless encouraged by me.  Nevertheless, the interview sessions achieved the 
objective of obtaining rich data and answers to the research questions. The 
responses from the interviews also facilitated the emergence of themes, pre-
determined and newly emerged, which can be related to the conceptual framework 
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discussed in Section 8.8. Data gathered from documents and interviews were then 
analysed for findings and these are presented in the following section. 
4.5 Data Analysis 
In this study, the interview data and documents collected were processed for 
further analysis. The process involved transcribing, discovering themes, the 
analysis of documents and coding. This data analysis process had the aim of 
interpreting the meanings of the qualitative data collected and understanding the 
phenomena being investigated. The analysis process has been a continuous and 
iterative activity. During this process, there was on-going correspondence, via e-
mail, with the interviewees to obtain further explanation and clarification of their 
replies from the first interview.  
4.5.1 Interview and Document Transcription  
 The transcription of interview data and document content is necessary to develop 
textual data that can be analysed effectively (Bailey, 2008; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). Interview data needs to be listened to repeatedly so that the 
transcription of the interview can be prepared (Silverman, 2011).  Although the 
questions set for this investigation were in English, most of the interviewees were 
more comfortable speaking in Malay. Therefore, during the transcription process, 
the conversation was translated from Malay to English. On-line Malay-English 
translation software was used to ensure the quality of the translation. The 
translated texts were then fully transcribed into English. Even though a one-hour 
interview would take, on average, four to six hours to transcribe an average of 
three days were taken to transcribe a two to three hours interview on account of 
the two processes of translating and transcribing needing to be done. Furthermore, 
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data from the interviews were interpreted and major themes identified and 
categorised.  
For document analysis, documents such as internal memos and the Integrity Plan, 
written in Malay, were translated and transcribed for ease of analysis; other 
documents, such as annual reports, audit report, minutes of meetings and other 
internal documents were not translated. As in the case of the interview data, 
document content also requires repeated reading to comprehend and interpret the 
meanings presented in the text (Silverman, 2011; Welsh, 2002). Subsequently, the 
contents were analysed and coded. To assist in data management and facilitate 
data analysis, pre-defined themes and newly emerged themes were coded and 
stored in a qualitative software tool called QSR NVivo for further analysis and 
future reference. 
4.5.2 Identification of Themes 
Prior to embarking on this study, some pre-conceived ideas or themes, such as 
Tax Compliance, Risk, Taxpayer Education and Challenges had emerged, which 
require answers from this research (Basit, 2003). When the research started, more 
themes were discovered from the literature. The discovery of themes is one of the 
main tasks in qualitative data analysis (McKerchar, 2010; Silverman, 2011; Ryan 
and Bernard, 2003).  When I started the investigation, more themes emerged from 
the literature, such as Self-regulation, Taxpayers’ Behaviour, Organisational 
Cultures and others. Sub-themes were also identified, which developed to make 
the analysis more detailed and more focused. In addition, from the interview data, 
I gained a better understanding of the context of the themes and subsequently 
developed additional sub-themes, such as Financial Resources, Insufficient 
Information, Integrity and others. As the process continued, the themes and sub-
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themes were refined and re-categorised so that they were grouped into the right 
codes and categories (McKerchar, 2010). The list of the themes induced before, 
during and after the data collection process, is shown in the table in Appendix 6.   
4.5.3 Coding 
According to McKerchar (2010, p.227) “coding is usually undertaken as a 
precursor to data analysis”. As noted by Bryman (2008, cited in McKerchar, 2010 , 
p.228) “coding is not analysis, it is just the first step in taking meaning from the 
data and reducing it to a more manageable size for the purpose of analysis”. Thus, 
the purpose of coding is to organise data into categories based on themes or 
concepts to ease data analysis (McKerchar, 2012). The transcripts were read line 
by line to identify the important and meaningful segments relating to the research 
questions (Oats, 2012). In the process, segments were marked and coded with 
appropriate themes. To get a more detailed coding, some of the texts were further 
segmented to create 1
st
 level sub-themes and 2
nd
 level sub-themes. This process 
continued until all transcripts were fully coded and the themes were refined to be 
more relevant to the research.  
NVivo 8, a qualitative data analysis software package was used to ease 
management of the data during the coding process. Sub-themes generated during 
reading were further revised by referring to the number of times the segments 
were uttered by participants. The segments or issues with high word counts were 
then determined as sub-themes. Furthermore, to answer the research questions in 
the empirical chapters, appropriate quotations were extracted from the coding and 
later discussed as part of the findings of this study. The coding process was run 
iteratively to refine the themes and the meanings of the data, hence to provide 
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credibility to the findings, which may convince readers of the merits of this 
research (McKerchar, 2012).  
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the research methodology adopted in 
the study. The section began with a discussion of the qualitative research 
methodology adopted for the study. Research design using a case study approach 
has been addressed, whereby the IRBM was selected as a case study for the 
investigation. Then, two research methods of data gathering, namely face-to-face 
interview and secondary data collection, were presented. Some participants 
refused to be interviewed and opted for providing written answers to the interview 
guide.  
This section also described the interview process and the selection of participants, 
the IRBM officials and Malaysian tax practitioners, for the interviews.  It also 
identified and described the key data analysis processes, such as interview 
transcription, document analysis, theme identification and coding of themes. In 
order to produce a transcription of an interview, the conversations stored in the 
tape recorder were translated into English and transcribed. Some documents were 
translated, and data supporting the research questions were extracted from the 
documents. Written answers were also translated and transcribed. In the next step, 
NVivo was used for coding and theme identification. Finally, this chapter 
concludes with a summary of the methodology. The next four chapters present 
and address the findings of the research. 
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Chapter 5 
Internal risk factors in Malaysian tax administration and 
strategies to manage them 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the methodology adopted in this research, and the 
three major themes - Tax Compliance, Risk Management and Responsive 
Regulation - that emerged during the analysis were used to develop the conceptual 
framework for this study. The study has attempted to link these themes by 
analysing the strategies adopted by IRBM to manage the risk it faced. The present 
chapter analyses and presents the findings in relation to the research: “What are 
the internal risks faced by the IRBM?” In order to answer the question, first, the 
thesis discusses internal risks and external risks faced by IRBM. Internal risks are 
presented in this chapter, whilst external risks in Chapter 6. In order to explore 
internal risks faced by IRBM, participants were asked relevant questions 
pertaining to the challenges and risks faced by IRBM. The participants’ views of 
the internal risks in IRBM are analysed and discussed in Section 5.2. Findings 
from the study reveal various types of internal risks encountered by IRBM.  
Finally, Section 5.3 summarizes this chapter. 
5.2 Internal risk 
As stated in Chapter 4, reference has been made to IRBM internal documents as 
secondary data, and interviews conducted with participants in order to obtain 
information related to internal risks faced by the Board. Both these sources have 
revealed internal risks such as financial constraints and a lack of professionalism, 
technical knowledge and integrity among the staff, as well as a shortage of human 
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resources and information technology systems. Gill (2003, p.5) posits that “lack of 
adequate resources may impose serious constraints on the revenue administration 
in managing voluntary compliance and countering tax evasion. It may also limit 
its ability to upgrade its operations to improve performance.” 
5.2.1 Financial constraint 
As presented in Section 1.4.1, one of the common constraints of any organisation, 
including tax agencies, especially from developing countries, is an insufficient 
budget to improve infrastructure and expand capacity. IRBM faced a similar 
predicament when its operational budget for 2010 was reduced by the Ministry of 
Finance due to global financial crises in 2008-2009. RL2 and RL8 commented: 
“And as it is with this year’s cut in budget, it is a challenging year for me this year, 
what’s more, that the award that we got, we have to prove, to justify that award. And 
of course the government also recognises me by giving me this title, so I have to also 
keep justified, meeting the government’s expectation, so this is a challenging year.” 
(Interview: RL2) 
“We are very short of funds this year, badly affected by the 15% cut. Therefore we 
don’t do much advertising this year, but what we did was, we managed to get 
cooperation from radio station, Sinar FM.” (Interview: RL2) 
“We have a budget constraint. Because of the budget constraint we have to curb our 
projects. Also for education, even the Ministry cannot participate and collaborate on 
programmes like speech competition, so it has to be shelved off because they don’t 
have the budget. But a lot more can be done if the budget is there. We have lined up 
various projects but one thing is budget wise; the other is bureaucracy. That one 
[bureaucracy] is a bit slow; because we have to go through Ministry of Education 
and the Ministry of Education has their departmental regulation before they can 
come over to us and allow us to proceed with the plan.” (Interview: RL8) 
 
As with other tax administrations, IRBM was also confronted with financial 
budget constraints which would impede its desire to improve performance 
(Hasseldine, 2012; Gill, 2003).  As a result, projects such as advertising and the 
introduction of educational activities were kept on hold. Insufficient funds also 
gave rise to other problems, including an inability to increase the number of staff 
for compliance activities such as street surveys, desk audits and field audits, and a 
failure to upgrade technology systems in order to improve internal processes 
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(Hasseldine, 2012). These complications are further discussed in Sections 5.2.5 
and 5.2.6. As IRBM relied on the Treasury Department in the Ministry of Finance 
to provide a budget allocation, the Board could do little when its allocated budget 
was reduced. However, as suggested by Hasseldine (2012), the senior 
management of IRBM should have provided a strategic plan to guide the future 
direction of the organisation and maximise the usage of limited resources to 
achieve better results. Consistent with Hasseldine’s suggestion, IRBM has 
established the IRBM Strategic Planning which has listed strategies to improve 
performance in terms of human resources, revenue collection and service delivery 
for the year 2009-2013. 
5.2.2 Professionalism 
The minutes of the dialogue between tax professionals, their dialogue partners and 
IRBM (TD, 2006, p.1) state that there appears to be “lack of transparency and 
consistency in the IRBM's approach to tax audits.” This is due to the varying 
treatment given by different tax officials to similar tax issues (TD, 2006). Further, 
it has been reported that IRBM officials demonstrated unprofessional conduct, 
whereby they seemed to have “a preconceived mind-set that the taxpayers are 
already guilty and their visit is more to confirm the offence” (TD, 2006, p.1).  The 
dialogue partners’ points of view are in line with Kirchler et al (2008) where tax 
regulators are known of adopting a ‘cop-and-robber’ approach. This approach 
indicates regulators perception that taxpayers always have the intention to evade 
the law.     
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Meanwhile, RT2 noted that IRBM officials were not customer-friendly: 
“The IRB should be more taxpayer-friendly and tax agent-friendly. Sometimes it is 
an issue of who is more capable of interpreting the tax law; the IRB will feel 
challenged when some technical issues are interpreted, treated and argued differently 
by tax agents, but some hold water. As the IRB officials normally feel they are right, 
then the relationship will turn ‘not so nice’ between them in future cases.” 
(Interview: RT2) 
As well as adopting an unfriendly attitude, IRBM was also accused of being 
unprofessional and inconsiderate, as stated by RT5: 
“Very often, when there is a technical issue, the taxpayers present their case in detail 
supported by case laws, and when the revenue authority rejects the appeal with a 
single sentence the appeal is rejected without giving reasons.” (Interview: RT5) 
“The attitude of some officials is that they are not willing to listen when taxpayers 
present their case; their inefficiency has caused much dissatisfaction amongst 
taxpayers. For example, threatening taxpayers that if their proposals are not accepted, 
the best judgment assessments would be issued without discussing the issues raised.” 
(Interview: RT5) 
The tax practitioners gave an assurance that taxpayers would show increased 
cooperation and compliance if IRBM officials were more professional, friendly 
and consistent in their conduct during tax audits. Further, RT6 hoped for 
“consistently fair and reasonable action on the part of IRBM officials”. From his 
experience in daily operations, RL3 also admitted that there were a small number 
of officials who demonstrated unprofessional conduct and who simply refused to 
entertain taxpayers’ requests or appeals. However, he believed that the majority of 
IRBM officials did offer a professional service to the taxpayers. RT3 told of his 
experience when dealing with tax officials with a ‘bad’ attitude, quoting a 
challenge made by an officer: ‘If you don’t like it, take it to court’. Nevertheless, 
although RT3 was unhappy with this unprofessional and disrespectful attitude, he 
agreed with RL3 that the overall administration of IRBM was commendable.   
Statements from the dialogue and responses from the participants both reflected 
unprofessional attitudes displayed by some of the IRBM officials during their 
conduct with taxpayers and tax agents. Although the interviewees agreed that the 
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majority of the officials treated taxpayers professionally, a small number of ‘bad 
attitude officials’ or ‘bad apples’ might become a risk factor with the potential to 
tarnish the good image of IRBM. This was consistent with findings by the EC 
(2006), OECD (2001) and Thompson (2008) that internal factors such as staff 
professionalism might have an impact on IRBM’s objective to foster voluntary 
compliance. Furthermore, as suggested by Murphy (2008a, p.127) the 
unreasonable behaviour of IRBM officials “can generate resistance to compliance 
and disrespect for authority”.  
5.2.3 Technical knowledge 
A few tax practitioners stated that during meetings with IRBM officials, some of 
the officials are unable to provide satisfactory answers to their technical queries. 
In their opinion, this was due to lack of technical knowledge on the part of the 
officials:  
“Knowledge – there is apparently a lower level of technical competence and lack of 
practical experience.” (Interview: RT4) 
“The openness in discussion and explanation that existed in the Revenue Authority 
before is lacking. This probably is due to the lack of technical expertise.” (Interview: 
RT5) 
 
Meanwhile, RT6 noted that IRBM officials were lacking of knowledge in industry 
which led to inability to make just and reasonable decisions. RT6 observation 
concurred with Minutes of the dialogue between IRBM and tax practitioners, 
which indicated that there were IRBM officials with inadequate knowledge in 
book-keeping transactions and accounting principles. This is due to a lack of 
understanding of certain industries, especially those that are newly-established: 
“There are also instances where some of the IRBM officials tend to treat different 
companies in the same manner notwithstanding the different nature of the business 
and the industry/commercial environment in which the taxpayers are involved.” 
(Document: Technical Dialogue (TD, 2006))  
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RT1, RT3 and RT6 agreed that technical training of IRBM officials was not well 
tuned in to actual practice, thus the need for improved training. It was observed by 
RT3 during meetings with IRBM officials that their technical knowledge was 
poor and that they lacked understanding of business practices:  
 “They need to enhance their technical ability. Of course you can ask IRBM and they 
would say that their officials are fine. I’ve been in discussion with them, and I’m 
quite amazed that I found the officials are quite narrow-minded and not willing to see 
the reality, and just going by the book; actually they should go by the spirit of the 
law.” (Interview: RT3) 
RT3’s observation was consistent with investigations by Lai and Choong (2009) 
of tax practitioners’ perceptions of SAS compliance complexities in Malaysia. 
Their study finds that IRBM’s staff “lack technical knowledge on complex 
business matters and that tax advice is not sufficiently accessible” (Lai and 
Choong, 2009, p.1). 
RL1 agreed that IRBM officials should be more professional and change their 
mind-set with a new focus on customer service, as well as their core function as 
revenue collector. She felt that the officials should be multifunctional, performing 
multiple tasks such as customer service, auditing and assessment, in order to 
resolve taxpayers’ tax matters speedily, even though the problems involved other 
departments. RL1 also believed that IRBM should continue to instil amongst its 
staff a high standard of professionalism, efficiency, knowledge and discipline: 
“Sometimes when taxpayers come to our office, they were not so conversant in 
conveying their needs or their problems. …. the taxpayer does not need to come 
many times to address a few issues just because it involves other units or department. 
That kind of approach we need to instil in our staff. That means that they have to be 
multifunctional. … to be knowledgeable in all aspects and to go the extra mile to 
help the taxpayers. ….. We must ensure that this visit is enough for us to settle, they 
don’t need to come again. And on our part, if it involves another unit, we get in touch 
with the other unit to explain to them and then give them a result in a short time.” 
(Interview: RL1) 
On the other hand, in an effort to enhance professionalism, technical knowledge 
and skills in tax audits, it was also stated that officials had received a very 
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systematic training - they were required to attend preliminary and advanced 
taxation courses, for example, as well as undergo training in field audit and 
specialization in industries, as highlighted by RL20:  
“Taxpayers are getting smarter and more knowledgeable. Our officials have to be 
smarter to tackle non-compliant taxpayers. New industries are emerging and IRBM 
officials have to learn and become knowledgeable about these industries.” 
(Interview: RL20) 
RL4 not only agreed that officials’ knowledge of industries was inadequate, but 
also admitted that, having considered the statistics
17
, most branches were not yet 
well acquainted with field audit. She therefore felt that the Tax Academy and 
Audit Training Centre should provide both academic and on the job training to 
enhance the officials’ knowledge, but especially on-going desk training. It was 
explained by RL1 that IRBM also sent officials to other more developed countries 
to learn from them. Further, RL4 highlighted that, with recent changes in the 
financial reporting standards and the introduction of new packages in the 
accounting system, IRBM officials had to acquire the necessary knowledge in the 
relevant area in order to attain the new levels required. She added that IRBM as a 
whole should therefore raise its own standards in that direction. As noted by RL9:  
“In auditing, every business is different; therefore officials are required to have 
sufficient knowledge about the business and the industries for them to work 
efficiently.” (Interview: RL9) 
RL5, however, asserted that, while not all staff had achieved a good level of 
expertise, there was a pool of industry specialists in every area of IRBM. As 
stated by RL9, if this was the case, then taxpayers would respect their authority 
and the compliance rate might increase (RL9).  
 
                                                          
17
 Field audit statistics were prepared monthly by IRBM branches in order to report their audit 
performance to the HQ. However, the statistics were considered confidential and were unavailable 
to the researcher. 
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Findings from the interviews and secondary data therefore suggested that a lack of 
technical knowledge among IRBM officials presented another internal risk faced 
by IRBM which might result in taxpayers losing respect and confidence in its 
ability to advise wisely on tax matters. As noted by Alm et al. (2010), Kornhauser 
(2007) and Rothengatter (2005), when taxpayers receive quality services and 
supportive participation from the authorities, this may foster a feeling of respect 
and trust and may encourage voluntary compliance.  
5.2.4 Integrity 
To gain public trust in the tax authorities, the tax administration requires 
personnel with high integrity to enforce the tax law (Kornhauser, 2007; Alm and 
Torgler, 2004; Wenzel, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2003), and  IRBM faces the same 
issues as other tax administrations in developing countries (addressed in Chapter 
1). Corruption is an important challenge to be met by any tax administration, 
although the interviews with IRBM officials and tax practitioners indicated that 
corruption in the company was relatively low and under control compared with 
other public sectors in Malaysia:  
“And as for corruption, I have heard of it but it was just hearsay. I don’t know if there is 
any member of staff who was prosecuted for it.” (Interview: RL17) 
“Officially IRBM is never in the top 100. I think this issue is very much under control. 
Those taken to task with evidence from the ACA (Anti-Corruption Agency), I think the 
most were one or two (cases). Integrity-wise we are still very good. Even though we are 
also an enforcement organisation, like the police, we don’t hear of any here (corruption 
cases). Maybe there are some black horses but it’s very isolated. But our level of 
integrity is very good.” (Interview: RL4) 
“So far there’s no case for field audit. We heard people talking about it, but there is no 
proof. We have the Integrity Plan to follow. According to the transparency index, IRBM 
is ranked second after the judiciary.” (Interview: RL15) 
Indeed, RL1 related enthusiastically her feelings about fewer cases of corruption 
in IRBM:  
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“I’m very proud that IRBM has so far not even a hint of corruption that we hear of. If 
it is at the lower level, it’s more of, not so much of corruption in that sense, but rather 
misappropriation; there are instances of that. We do hear of isolated cases of some, at 
some stamp offices and a member of staff who misappropriated, yes. Maybe some 
lower rank staff who probably fell to temptation because of financial difficulty. But 
if we are talking about all levels of IRBM, I am confident it’s not (happening). If it 
happened at the lower level, maybe it’s for a little bit of pocket money here and there 
to provide faster services probably, but in fact there is no necessity (to bribe). We 
invite criticism and suggestions from the public and access (to our office) is very 
easy. Our service in most instances is very fast and if taxpayers are not happy they 
can complain to the PRO. So because of that the public can get service quite easily 
from us. There is no barrier such that they have to pay their way up. Probably we 
have to look out because our officials who go out to do audits outside, they may be 
exposed to offerings. Not that they asked for it, but it’s the other way round. Because 
there are some taxpayers who have the perception that if they pay their way, the path 
will be easier for them. That I do hear; the public, the businessmen who have tried to 
offer. But as far as I know our officials had turned down (the offers) and corrected 
them and said that this is something which is not tolerated by IRBM.” (Interview: 
RL1)  
From RL1 observation, it appears that IRBM is not only faced with possibility of 
its officials involved in misappropriation, but the officials are also exposed to 
offers by taxpayers to influence the officials’ decision during audit activities.     
Another interesting observation about the public perceptions of corruption among 
IRBM officials was made by RL3: 
“I would like to relate one of my experiences when I accompanied my sister to rent 
an apartment for her. I asked the estate agent whether the house was purchased with 
cash or mortgage. He didn’t know that I’m a tax man. He said, ‘Of course, through 
mortgage; if by cash the IRBM will catch me’. Then I asked him, ‘Why are you 
scared of the IRBM?’ and he said, ‘Sir, I can handle the police, I can handle the 
Customs, I can handle the road transport (people) but never with the income tax 
people, never’. So it seems that our integrity is high and they respect us. Compliance 
can be improved if taxpayers respect and trust our system.” (Interview: RL3) 
It was asserted that tax practitioners were in a dilemma about disclosing details of 
corruption for fear of being subjected to serious consequences from IRBM 
officials in the future: 
“The biggest challenge in the case of corruption is the fact that the tax practitioners 
are not willing to come out with details due to fear of repercussions. (Therefore), 
IRBM has to monitor the audit cases and the audit officials closely to ensure that this 
is kept under control.” (Interview: RT5) 
Because information about corruption was not always disclosed, it would be 
difficult for IRBM to take action against it, as stated by RL2, RL3 and RL5: 
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“I won’t say there’s none, but the fact that it doesn’t come to me, there is none. But I 
think there are down there, but how many (cases)? To what extent? We need 
feedback. So far the feedback was from outside. They said that it’s our officials; we 
receive letters; even tax agents said it. I said (to them) if you give me names then I 
would investigate. They won’t give names because it will affect their livelihood.” 
(Interview: RL2) 
“As for corruption, I dare not say there isn’t any. But it’s under control. We don’t 
really know, we don’t have any proof yet but we did hear people talking about it. It’s 
just that people don’t want to report. Maybe people are scared to report to the 
authorities. It is quite disappointing not knowing or else we could take action on 
those involved. They can just complain but don’t want to make any report on the so-
called corruption. We are disappointed about this because we want to know if our 
staffs are involved and we want to take action against these people. There are cases 
where outside people disguise themselves as a tax officer and demand money. This 
will tarnish our image.” (Interview: RL3) 
“To say we don’t have any at all would be too simplistic. To say we have that as a 
problem, it’s overstating it. But suffice to say the element is there, always happening 
from time to time, it’s there. We heard stories about it. But no one dares even to 
prove it. Many times I offered people to come up with evidence so that we can take 
action but many times they refused to do so. It is just that they want to say that it 
happened, or is it because they are afraid of cooperating?” (Interview: RL5) 
Some interviewees stated that, according to a report by the Malaysia Transparency 
Index, IRBM was ranked in second place in 2010 as the public sector with most 
integrity, one step behind the Judiciary Department
18
. Nevertheless, all 
interviewees agreed that IRBM should take tough measures to prevent its officials 
from being involved in corruption. According to them, there had been some 
reforms, such as the introduction of more secure computer systems for the 
approval of refunds, appeals and other processes; the establishment of an audit 
team of three officials for field audit; the implementation of the IRBM Integrity 
Plan (IIP, 2009); and an increase in the salary of IRBM officials. RL9 noted: 
“Corruption is something about perception. To eradicate it is quite hard. It happens 
when someone has a low salary, like the police. In IRBM, we are paid quite well; I 
haven’t heard of any [corruption case]. There used to be, a long time ago. But [those 
were] isolated cases. Now we have been successful in our image. From the 
management point of view, in terms of their education, income, their life-style, their 
car, where they live, their houses. In Malaysia, people are committed at an early age.  
That’s not a good sign for corruption. Easy to get credit cards, they spend more than 
their earnings. That one we have to monitor. If that is ok, then everything would be 
ok, but we have to monitor it.” (Interview: RL9) 
                                                          
18
 The interviewer had requested some printed evidence of the IRBM rank in the transparency 
index. However, the interviewees reported that they recalled reading it only in a newspaper and 
had not kept any printed evidence. Data from research through public domain was also 
unavailable. 
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The increase in the salaries of personnel was consistent with suggestions by Gill 
(2003), USAID (2007) and Abdullah (2008) that such an increase will motivate 
staff to work harder and may thus prevent corruption. Although it can be argued 
that a higher salary may not guarantee that corruption could be averted, an 
increase in wages is one of the anti-corruption strategies help to improve the 
living standard of workers and be an incentive to work honestly and avoid 
corruption, as noted by Gill, USAID and Abdullah.     
Nevertheless, RL2 expressed a wish that IRBM would one day be able to 
inculcate high morals and trustworthiness among its officials to perform their 
duty honestly: 
“So that’s why when we sent our officials to the ground, we sent more than one, 
normally three in a team, to avoid allegations against our officials. If one officer 
goes it’s easy to allege. But if it’s three, you’ll need three to collaborate your story. 
And normally we change the team to avoid it. Not that we don’t trust our officials, 
we want to make sure that we don’t have unnecessary allegations. Therefore we 
need to have two or three officials. I hope our officials understand that. Integrity risk 
is number one risk in our department. Not just audit officers but officials from the 
other departments as well. Down the level we really don’t know … It’s not our 
officials alone, but the public. The public complain about corruption, but they are 
the ones who condone it. Probably, they are paying for it. That’s why they know.” 
(Interview: RL2) 
In its effort to promote and strengthen integrity within its administration, IRBM 
adopted the following practical approaches, as stated by the Board in the 
CATA
19
 (2006) meeting: 
 Formulation and implementation of code of ethics in IRBM; 
 Formulation of clients’ charter and system or work procedures; 
 Restructuring of organisation to enhance and monitor internal controls; 
                                                          
19
 The Commonwealth Association of Tax Administration (CATA) is a Commonwealth 
organisation for tax administrators. It helps member countries through training programmes, 
technical conferences and knowledge-sharing to develop effective tax administrations that promote 
sustainable development and good governance over the long-term. CATA, with forty-eight 
member countries, is presently the largest organisation of tax administrators in the world (CATA, 
2006). 
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 Monitoring of activities by various departments such as the Compliance 
Department to monitor audit activities;  
 Establishing the Investigation Department to monitor investigation activities 
and the Inspectorate; and 
 Establishing the Internal Audit Department which monitors quality assurance 
and ensures strict observance of the principles of ethics and integrity outlined. 
RL7 explained: 
“To me, the issue of corruption is under control. We have officials who, I would say, 
have a very high integrity level. They don’t commit a specific crime to commit 
corruption. Because I think they are highly trained and our internal control is very 
high. Our system control is where you can’t simply do something as you like. The 
system will control all the IDs. Then internally we have checkers - approver I, 
approver II. So it is not easy to have corrupt practice in IRBM.” (Interview: RL7) 
 
It therefore appeared from the interviews that corruption might not be one of the 
major risks to be addressed by IRBM. However, as noted by the interviewees, a 
continuous effort was made by the Board to ensure that its officials maintained a 
high level of integrity with the introduction of many initiatives, as highlighted 
earlier. Such initiatives were in line with suggestions by Hasseldine (2012) that 
strong internal controls are required, and by Bird and Zolt (2008), Gill (2003) and 
OECD (2010e) that technology is important to improve a system’s procedures and 
security in order to increase the integrity of the people and the process.      
5.2.5 Shortage of human resources 
As the number of taxpayers grew every year, so did the responsibilities of IRBM 
to manage the taxpayers. In order to be efficient and to provide faster services, 
IRBM required a sufficient number of personnel to perform the tasks of customer 
services, recovery, auditing, investigation and others to meet the increased 
demands from customers. The following responses were given during the 
interviews:  
176 
 
“When we started with Audit, they said our audit [system] was quite good. Nigeria 
came to learn [auditing] from us. They asked how many people you have, I said 
three. Do you know how many they have? Three hundred! And they have just 
started! We don’t have the luxury of having [many] people.” (Interview: RL4) 
Because of this issue, IRBM was unable to perform certain tasks, and as a result 
failed to achieve its objective to provide faster services to taxpayers: 
“So although initially there was a  lot of apprehension from our staff, because, first of 
all we have to process almost 500,000 refunds, almost 600,000 because of the 
backlog, the number of staff is still the same, we have constraints of staff.” 
(Interview: RL2) 
“Our intention is to let taxpayers know that we are after them, sooner or later we’ll 
catch up with them; then that will deter those evaders. Compliance-wise, I think at 
the moment we are having problems because of lack of staff. Maybe if we have more 
staff, then our field audit can go out more often. And they can solve the cases fast so 
that things don’t drag.” (Interviews: RL8) 
“… because we actually don’t know who is not caught within the tax bracket. What 
we have is who comes to us and who we may go after during one of our rounds. Like 
those times when we used to go for street surveys, but because of lack of staff and 
lack of funds, we stopped the street survey.” (Interview: RL8) 
 
However, it was not easy to recruit new IRBM personnel to overcome this issue. 
As stated by RL7, it was impossible to increase the number of personnel 
frequently to meet the demands and expectations from the growing number of 
taxpayers. New staff recruitment cannot be based simply on the total number of 
registered taxpayers, because IRBM has to undergo various processes to apply for 
new staff, whereby application should be submitted to the Public Service 
Department (PSD) for approval: 
 The PSD may take a few months, or sometimes years, to go through the 
application in considering budget allocation by the government.  
 Once approved by the PSD, IRBM needs to advertise the post in the 
country’s major newspapers.  
 Then the process of short listing and interviewing has to be conducted 
before the new members of staff are recruited.  
 While waiting for additional positions and employees, the existing branch 
officials are remobilised according to job priority and urgency.  
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RL7 described the short term strategies undertaken by IRBM in its operation 
which was implemented annually. From January to June, officials from the 
Recovery Unit were deployed to assist the Revenue Refund Unit, while from July 
to December staff members from the Refund Unit were instructed to work at the 
Recovery Unit.  
RL4 voiced her opinion that staff shortages might be due to misallocation of staff 
within the wrong departments:  
“The manpower in some departments is not enough. Not enough people to handle 
operations in the branches. So they are supposed to take the action requested by the 
branch. I’m still waiting for my proposal to be approved. Things are not moving as we 
wish it to be. I see there are a lot of officials in Customer Service Department. But they 
are not doing the things that we wish them to do. They have twenty over G7
20
 and 
twenty over G9. With that number we can do a ‘PCB’ audit21 and go to court. To me, 
with this number of people, you can do education very well. But in the Operation 
Department, to me, people to take care of certain areas are not there, there are so many 
things to handle. So, to me, they should have more people to get it moving faster.” 
(Interview: RL4) 
This suggestion was supported by RL10: 
“We have to know how to maximise our resources. Even though we don’t have 
enough staff, it’s a common problem. There is a lot of redundancy in the job 
functions among government agencies. If we co-operate with other agencies, we will 
be more efficient. If we have a proper system, we would be able to be excellent. Why 
do the Japanese and the Australians go to field audit alone? We are still doubtful 
about our staff. Maybe in a few years’ time, we will be able to trust them.” 
(Interview: RL10) 
As a temporary measure to manage the risk of insufficient numbers of staff, there 
were plans made by some state directors: 
“When we do the restructuring study, we don’t have enough officials for revenue 
collection activities and civil suit activities. In terms of audit, this was new, about 
nine years ago. So we can’t recruit audit officials at the same time. It’s just that, in 
terms of collection, we don’t need in-depth training; previously IRBM was not 
focussed enough on the collection activities, except for the last few years we started 
to allocate more resources to the collection unit to monitor tax payment and to collect 
tax. Now we have improved a lot. Even the companies file in KL (Kuala Lumpur), 
the branch files are still in KL. We can’t decentralize yet because we don’t have 
enough collection staff.” (Interview: RL6) 
“…which means we have to know how to prioritize our resources. We give more 
                                                          
20
 Grade 7 official (G7) is a junior level manager position; Grade 9 is a junior executive position. 
21
 ‘PCB’ or Monthly Tax Deduction (MTD) Audit is an audit practice on employers who fail to comply with 
the MTD obligation.  
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priority to compliance, such as desk audit and field audit. Only during the filing 
season, we allocate more staff for customer service and assist taxpayers on how to 
use the e-Filing system. The staff need to be multi-tasking so that they can be 
assigned to various tasks should the need arise.” (Interview: RL14) 
“Now the focus is on auditing. Due to shortage of staff, they have to be multi-
tasking.” (Interview: RL15) 
 
RL9 also agreed with RL14 and RL15 that the internal issues might be solved by 
developing a multi-skilled workforce and by building a culture of working as a 
team. Multi-skilling was very valuable as officials were capable of performing 
various duties which might help to overcome the shortage of manpower in the 
branches. RL19 also emphasised the importance of team work: each branch had 
set a specific target for their revenue collections every year; if a single unit in the 
branch therefore exceeded this target but other units did not reach the target, the 
whole branch would be considered as having failed to achieve the goal. Thus 
RL19 felt that there existed a sense of belonging among IRBM personnel in each 
branch and that there was a spirit of mutual assistance for the realization of targets 
set for each branch. Such an esprit de corps among staff was encouraged, not only 
to improve the performance of both branch and organisation, but also to promote 
an excellent working culture at the same time.  
IRBM may have referred to HMRC’s strategy to overcome shortage of staff due 
to down-sizing and decentralisation, with the introduction of New Public 
Management (Currie and Procter, 2003). With the formation of teamwork, the 
organisation and management of HMRC staff and work processes are changed. 
Currie and Procter (2003) refer to team working as a combination of team 
members’ allocation so that the team works collectively from allocations which 
are grouped together. Currie and Procter (2003) note that the team working 
approach resulted in improvements in work processes in HMRC’s administration.  
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RL14 admitted that it was very difficult to provide an objective assessment of 
how adequately all the strategies were implemented. However, he felt that the 
compliance model was an effective strategy that could be applied to address the 
problem of taxpayer non-compliance. On the whole, he suggested certain actions 
should be considered in the process of practising good risk management: to 
coordinate and collaborate with partners and stakeholders for productive results; 
to conduct research on taxpayer behaviour towards non-compliance; to update tax 
databases; and to strengthen the organisational structure of IRBM. 
From these responses, it appeared that IRBM encountered shortages of staff due 
to increased workload, length of time to process new recruitment, the 
misallocation of staff, and redundancy in performing jobs in certain departments. 
As a result of these risks, many compliance activities such as street surveys, field 
audits and overpayment refunds were put on hold or were conducted less 
frequently than previously. Initiating teamwork and remobilising staff were a 
temporary solution in order to handle current and urgent matters. However, in the 
long run, as suggested by many researchers, efficient and effective technology or 
computer systems may provide a better solution to manage a heavy workload and 
overcome the issue of insufficient staff (Gill, 2003; Bird and Zolt, 2008; Olken 
and Pande, 2011). 
5.2.6 Lack of efficient computer system  
As discussed in Section 1.4.1, another internal risk faced by public sectors, 
particularly those in developing economies, is that presented by inadequate 
computer systems or a lack of efficient information technology (IT) to run the 
operation. The importance of IT in IRBM is acknowledged by RL6: 
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“The challenge to ensure that organisations such as IRBM are more efficient and 
effective, especially in Malaysia, is first the change in technology or ICT. Because 
the technological change will affect how we do business and also how we do our 
work. Because we are able to see now that with the rapid technology changes we 
found that many business or business models have also changed. Whereby we 
ourselves come to a stage that we are not very sure whether the business model, the 
way they obtain the income, and the way they pay the tax, whether they can cater for 
the law now….. But if IRBM does not give the focus on these technology changes, 
there will be a chance that we will be left behind compared to the way the taxpayers 
do their business. Even the government of Malaysia will be left behind in amending 
the law to cater for the technology change. The current generation or future 
generation have to be prepared to look into it.” (Interview: RL6) 
RL7 pointed out that there were a number of computer systems being developed 
for various purposes for different departments and divisions to help expedite the 
work of officials and branches. However, for him, the most challenging aspect of 
adopting a technology was if the system that was expected to support the work, 
fails to support. This concern is also expressed by RL15: 
“It’s not helping much with our work. We have given a lot of feedback to them [the 
IT department].” (Interview: RL15)  
RL14 further added his complaint about the system: 
“Now we have e-Filing, SAS system, audit system. But as with any new system, it’s 
not stable yet. So we have problems like slow response time. There are times we 
have to do the work manually because the system is so slow.” (Interview:  RL14) 
Moreover, six interviewees found that the absence of system integration 
complicated daily operations in terms of review of information or data between 
systems. Nevertheless, the absence of integration was likely to be temporary 
because from time to time the Head Office would take action to overcome this 
problem. It was suggested that the delay in the implementation might be due to a 
lack of financial provision. With enough budget allocation, IRBM would be able 
to enhance system integration among the departments. It was stated by RL8 that 
the integration system for IRBM would be developed under the 10th Malaysian 
Plan - a research paper pertaining to this plan was presented in 2010.  
A further issue relating to how IT staff could keep up with technological change 
within the organisation was raised by RL1, RL6 and RL8:  
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“The other challenge as an agency is to get staff to be in our transformation process, 
to be in tune to changes that come along, the technological changes, e.g., the new 
technology used in the office, to be comfortable in using the technology. The 
younger ones are not grumbling, but those in their late 40s and 50s, they may not be 
so adapt in using the computer. They have to change that, to be willing in learning. 
Learning is a continuous process.” (Interview: RL1) 
“The challenge is to have the senior officials to be efficient doing work through the 
system. But to the young ones, they know how to do it; they will copy, paste, and 
create in other files. It’s not that easy to the seniors, but it is faster doing it through 
the system. They just key-in the figure; the system will do the computation. The 
problem is we have reached the maximum capacity of the system, so sometimes the 
response time is quite slow. We have requested additional budget from the 
government, but we have to wait.” (Interview: RL6)  
“The latest challenge for us to achieve the paradigm shift of taxpayers’ mind-set 
from manual to automation, technological change. Also to the staff from manual 
(work) and now on SAS, comes e-Filing and all the technological changes. So it’s 
more of keeping up with the changes and time so that whatever service we give 
follows what the people want.” (Interview: RL8)  
From the interviews, it can be concluded that IRBM faces issues related to IT:  
lack of system integration, slow system response time, technological change 
management and the training of computer illiterates were all identified. In order to 
enhance the performance of the technology, a vast amount of financial resources is 
required. Section 5.2.1 addresses the insufficiency of funds as a further barrier 
restricting the growth of development in IRBM, while Section 1.4 explains that the 
lack of financial resources is a common limitation in developing countries which 
hinders an organisation “to upgrade its operation to improve performance” (Gill, 
2003, p.5).  
The interviews indicated that weaknesses of technology systems in IRBM seem to 
be relevant only to its internal computer systems, prompting remarks from the 
interviewees about “lack of integration between division and units”. Even though 
IRBM has invested a huge sum of money for development of e-Services to 
improve service delivery to the public, its senior managers should not forget that 
members of staff are also customers (internal) of the organisation, thus they should 
respond to their complaints. Productivity may be increased if the infrastructure 
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within the organisation and staff well-being is taken care of (Hasseldine, 2012; 
Gill, 2003; OECD, 2011). 
It is interesting to note the comment made by RL14 that, even though the pyramid 
model was originally developed as a strategy to address the problem of taxpayer 
compliance, it could also be applied to manage internal risk within an 
organisation. He provided an example whereby a discipline problem among staff 
could be perceived as one of non-compliance. For IRBM staff who deliberately 
breached office regulations, a deterrence mechanism could be applied. On the 
other hand, IRBM could provide incentives to motivate other personnel who were 
always compliant with the rules and also to encourage future compliance. Risk-
based responsive regulation can thus be used as a tool, not only to implement 
effective risk management on taxpayer compliance (Black and Baldwin, 2010), 
but also to manage internal risk within an organisation (RL14). RL14’s remark 
about the internal enforcement strategy can be illustrated by adapting Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid (1992), as presented in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Enforcement Pyramid for IRBM Disciplinary Board  
 
Source: Adapted from Ayres and Braithwaite Enforcement Pyramid (1992) 
Encouragement, persuasion, training: By 
Department or Branch Managers and 
Directors to deliver knowledge and 
encouragement to comply with the rules 
and regulations. 
Discussion, verbal warning: By Department or 
Branch Director to discuss about the offences 
and to warn the accused of the repercussion if 
found guilty of the misconduct. 
Show-caused letter: Issued by the Human Resource 
Department to elicit answers and reasons of the 
misconduct and justifications to appeal. 
Disciplinary action: Taken by the disciplinary board. Action 
taken would be demotion or salary reduction or no salary 
increment or suspension from work or termination from work. 
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From literature, it appears that a risk-based responsive regulation approach fits 
well with the current IRBM risk management framework. Findings also suggest 
that responsive regulation could be applied by IRBM to enforce compliance of 
organisation rules. In this context, the senior management would represent the 
regulators while the personnel would be the regulatees. By applying the theory of 
responsive regulation and the enforcement pyramid, senior managers may begin 
to encourage compliance from the bottom of the pyramid. The ATO has set a 
good example of complying with responsive regulation, whereby the managers 
supported and encouraged the staff members in accepting the change during the 
introduction of the compliance pyramid in their administration (Job and Honaker, 
2003). Based on Ayres and Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid, a regulatory 
pyramid was drawn to illustrate the internal responsive regulatory mechanism 
adopted by IRBM to manage internal risk in its organisation. 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter has addressed findings which identified internal risks of IRBM as 
financial constraint, lack of staff professionalism, technical knowledge, integrity, 
a shortage of human resource and the lack of an efficient computer system. To 
manage the internal risks, IRBM has established short-term and long-term 
solutions which include conducting seminars and courses to enhance staff 
professionalism and technical knowledge; publishing an Integrity Plan to avert 
integrity issues; remobilising staff in order to overcome staff shortages; planning 
upgrades of internal IT systems to improve performance; and producing a 
Strategic Planning book to provide information about IRBM’s strategic direction 
for the next five years (2009-2013). Further, this chapter demonstrates application 
of Ayres and Braithwaite’s Enforcement Pyramid Model in the disciplinary 
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procedure by IRBM. While this chapter establishes internal risks encountered by 
IRBM, next chapter presents external risks to be managed by IRBM.   
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Chapter 6 
External risk factors in Malaysian tax administration 
and strategies to manage them 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous chapter addressed internal risks which affects effectiveness in 
administration of IRBM. To answer the research question, “What are the external 
risks faced by the IRBM?” this chapter discusses external risks faced by IRBM. 
During the interviews, participants were asked about external challenges that they 
faced in their daily routine. Many were of the opinion that shadow economy and 
taxpayers’ behaviour were the main external risks faced by the company. By 
understanding the external challenges, IRBM and other tax administrations would 
be prepared to meet the changing demands of the external environment and 
provide strategic measures to manage those challenges. This chapter begins with 
Section 6.2 which presents reports on the problem of shadow economy in 
Malaysia and interviewees perception of this issue. This is followed by Section 
6.3, which addresses the research question on the perceptions of IRBM officials of 
Malaysian taxpayers’ behaviour. Further, tax practitioners’ perceptions of 
behaviour of Malaysian taxpayers are elicited and discussed in Section 6.4. 
Finally, Section 6.5 summarizes this chapter. 
6.2 Shadow economy 
One of the greatest challenges for IRBM is how to tackle shadow economy 
activities. Shadow economy is not a threat to revenue agencies alone, but also as a 
national threat because some of the activities may involve criminal activities such 
as smuggling, illegal trading, and immoral practices. According to Schneider 
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(2006), the size of shadow economy in Malaysia in 2002/2003 was 32.2% of 
GDP. Hence, this activity had resulted in fewer revenue collections not only to 
IRBM, but also to other public agencies namely the Customs, Registrar of 
Business, or the business license authority.   
RL4 described her interesting observation of underground activities in her area of 
jurisdiction.  
“… we had not put into effort to really attack this area, the underground economy. 
Especially in [the name of the branch], it is more. Because here we have smugglers, 
Along (illegal money lenders), 4 ekor haram (illegal lottery), TOTO, all the illegal 
businesses. Because I think the biggest Chinese taiko (great leader) is here. The 
godfather of all is here. The Indian one is in [name of a place in the branch area]. So 
we do encounter a lot of taxpayers where their business is very small but the ins and 
outs of their bank statements are millions [Ringgit Malaysia]. For audit they won’t 
disclose, as we are dealing with investigation so we cannot seize all their documents.  
It’s very difficult. They do not wish to inform us, we can only guess here and there 
because there are a lot of missing links here and there. And as their business is 
illegal, they won’t disclose. And then you can even observe it with your own eyes at 
certain areas suddenly there are a few businesses up, but actually they are not having 
business at all. It was just money laundering. Because out of the blue suddenly we 
have a mini market, they hardly have any customers, but this actually is an eye-wash 
money laundering. Especially my [branch] area is so huge that we have to visit 
deeper site of the plantation. We find there are robust kinds of business going on 
inside there; a lot of these.” (Interview: RL4) 
Further, RL4 added her predicament in handling underground economy cases due 
to procedural issues between audit division and investigation department. 
“One thing is we are at the disadvantage because if they say they are a company, we 
can’t touch.  It’s a company file. So unless it’s a sole proprietor, then ok we can take 
care. A lot of cases we have to see it and let go. This is not only peculiar to my 
branch. I think somebody has to look into this. If not, I doubt our compliance will go 
up.” (Interview: RL4) 
From RL4’s comments it appears that underground economy could be major 
illegal activities that could continue to operate without being detected by the 
authority. There also appears to be some misunderstandings between audit 
division and investigation department when it comes to handling corporate cases. 
Hence, this matter needs to be discussed among relevant parties so that a clear 
guideline could be issued to ensure such cases are conducted efficiently. The 
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bottom line is IRBM to prevent tax evasion through underground economy. 
Therefore, either the branch or other department of IRBM need to be responsible 
in handling shadow economy so that compliance can be secured and revenue can 
be collected from these activities. 
Further, RL12 reported that in order to ensure those involved would not escape 
the law, IRBM had established collaboration with various public agencies such as 
the Malaysian Central Bank and the Royal Malaysian Police to prevent money 
laundering, claims for refugee status and tax evasion. Inter-agency cooperation 
also involved the Malaysian Security Commission, the Immigration Department, 
the Customs Department and other enforcement agencies. In addition, RL12 
suggested that an integrated mechanism in the exchange of information between 
these agencies enabled tracking of shadow economy activities to be implemented 
more effectively.  
A few of the interviewees, namely RL4, RL16, RL20 and RL29 admitted that 
managing hidden economy presented a major challenge to IRBM due to a lack of 
information on the underground activities and the shortage of staff to investigate 
them. They also agreed that the lack of system integration and information-
sharing among public sectors added to the problems. Desk and field auditors 
(RL22, RL23, RL24, RL25 and RL26) commented that the Street Survey 
activities conducted by IRBM branches, where IRBM officials visited street 
vendors and traders, need to be improved so that more underground businesses 
could be detected. It was noted by both RT3 and RT4 that shadow economy issues 
were relatively new in the Malaysian tax administration; as a result, it was 
necessary to conduct further studies to explore and understand this issue so that 
IRBM could manage it effectively.  
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With advance technology in this era, many businesses are operated through online 
transaction. This business activity is known as e-commerce and has become major 
issues for all tax administrations to detect the activities and ensure compliance 
with the law. According to RL27, the Tax Compliance Department of IRBM has 
recently established an e-Commerce Unit to detect businesses operated through 
online transaction. It is an effort to get this group of potential taxpayers in the tax 
system and ascertain that they register, file tax return and pay their tax liabilities.  
The shadow economy is a major challenge faced not only by IRBM but also by 
tax administrations all over the world. This concern should be managed 
effectively as it implies non-compliance of tax law and would result in inadequate 
tax collection (Frey and Togler, 2006; Katsios, 2006; Trasberg, 2004). The lamp-
shade model presented by the Risk-based Responsive Compliance Model in 
Section 8.8, illustrates the shadow economy as a major issue to be addressed by 
tax administrations especially in developing countries. Although the shadow 
economy is stated by the interviewees to be a long-running activity, it is 
considered a new external risk to be addressed by IRBM. They therefore 
suggested that further research should be undertaken by IRBM in order to gain 
understanding of this aspect. IRBM may need to set-up a unit to specifically 
handle the shadow economy issues. The shadow economy relates to taxpayer 
irresponsible behaviour to evade paying tax in order to maximise their profit. 
There was general consensus that one of the most effective approaches to manage 
the problem of non-compliance was through understanding taxpayer behaviour. 
Next section describes taxpayer behaviour as perceived by IRBM officials and tax 
practitioners.  
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6.3 Taxpayer Behaviour 
Naturally people do not like to part from their money especially if they perceive 
that they do not receive any benefit or privilege in return for their contribution. 
Under SAS, voluntary compliance by taxpayer is important to ensure the success 
of this scheme, which does not require taxpayers to enclose any financial 
documents to prove their claims made in their return forms. However, Malaysian 
tax administration practice requires taxpayers to keep relevant documents for 
seven years since it may be necessary for IRBM to refer to these should there be 
any doubts on the tax declaration submitted by the taxpayer (TAF, 2009).  
IRBM faces several risks of non-compliance: incorrect reporting of tax obligation, 
late or non-submission of the return form and non-payment of tax due. These non-
compliance risks arise from attitudes of taxpayers towards their tax obligation, 
which is addressed in Section 3.3. Further, the EC (2010) and OECD (2009) 
suggest that an effective and efficient compliance risk management strategy may 
prevent non-compliance and encourage voluntary compliance and self-regulation.  
During the interview, RL9 provided an interesting analogy between self-
regulation and playing golf:  
“Compliance should be self-enforced. Everybody should enforce the law themselves. 
We must give the message to the public to enforce the law themselves. Like the 
game of golf. Golf is a game based on sincerity. Golf is the game where there is 
handicapping and sincerity.  The law is very stringent, very strict. But enforcement is 
based on you yourself without being supervised. It is also about integrity.” 
(Interview: RL9) 
Responsive regulation theory fosters a good relationship between the regulators 
and regulatees by encouraging mutual respect on the part of both parties 
(Braithwaite, 2003; Job et al., 2007; Welsh, 2009). Through the reciprocal 
relationship, taxpayers may be encouraged to express their problems and 
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grievances concerning the services provided and at the same time the authority is 
respectful of the taxpayers and attentive to their complaints. From this dynamic 
partnership between tax authority and taxpayers, taxpayers may respond 
positively over their tax obligation and self-regulate to comply with the law, while 
the tax authority could respond respectfully and yet firmly when dealing with 
taxpayers. However, as argued by Burton (2007), it is difficult to form 
partnerships to achieve tax compliance because regulators and regulatees may 
have a different interpretation of the tax laws and disagreement on mutual goals of 
compliance. Burton’s argument is supported by most of the officials interviewed, 
the majority of IRBM officials and tax practitioners stating that Malaysians are 
not ready to be self-regulated:  
“I don’t think Malaysian taxpayers are ready to be self-regulated. For instance, as it 
is now with SAS we can see that they are not telling the truth, so how are they going 
to be self-regulated? … I think they are not ready to be self-regulated themselves, we 
need to monitor, we have to have sufficient numbers in this organisation to do a 
constant audit. Then we can move to self-regulation.”   (Interview: RL2) 
“Malaysians are not ready yet. If they comply it is because they are afraid of the 
enforcement, not because they voluntarily want to comply.” (Interview: RL20) 
“(Self-regulation) is still quite low. They need to be reminded about their tax 
obligation. Maybe in five years’ time (it will improve) if our education programme is 
getting better.” (Interview: RL19) 
“We need another five years for them to be ready for self-regulation.” (Interview: 
RL11)  
“It seems very slow, even though there are some who really comply voluntarily - the 
majority, even though they comply, they may not comply 100%. Some may still 
understate or overstate. That is very common as we see from the desk audit 
programme.” (Interview: RL7) 
 
“The (tax responsibility) awareness is not low, sometimes it’s quite high. But to be 
proud of the nation, we should be proud of paying tax. So we will voluntarily come 
forward. But now what we see is they are proud of evading paying tax. But we need 
time to educate them. It means that we have to make them know that taxation is 
important for their own good.” (Interview: RL10) 
 
“It is still premature for self-regulation in Malaysia. They are not ready. It could take 
another generation through tax education to change the mind-set of taxpayers.” 
(Interview: RT5) 
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These remarks, made from the perspective of IRBM officials and tax 
practitioners, make it clear that Malaysian taxpayers were still unprepared to be 
self-regulated towards their tax obligation. As stated by RT6 humorously, 
“Malaysian taxpayers will be ready for self-regulation only when they are all 
saints!” To encourage self-regulation, RL27 suggested IRBM to award taxpayers 
who have shown great track records in voluntary compliance, with letter of 
appreciation. Many interviewees suggested that tax education was required to 
motivate taxpayers to comply voluntarily and self-regulate on taxation matters. 
In an effort to inform taxpayers, IRBM has offered various educational activities 
to members of the public, one of which is to create a Business Support Unit 
(BSU) in every branch of IRBM. The purpose of the BSU is to provide a Business 
Support Service (BSS) as a formal training and support to business-income 
taxpayers, especially those operating small businesses that cannot afford to hire a 
tax practitioner to manage their tax account. Educating traders and business-
income taxpayers may therefore extend their knowledge and increase compliance. 
The BSS, a free-of-charge training is beneficial for business taxpayers who have 
no basic knowledge of managing their tax obligation, such as the type of records 
to be kept and the type of documents to furnish when confronted by tax audit. 
However, even though IRBM has sent out invitations to attend the training, the 
very low attendance indicates that taxpayers have no interest in participating, as 
the comments below illustrate:  
“They are not on that mentality level to accept that we are doing this for them. It is 
not that we don’t want to do it (training the public for about tax), it is just that 
taxpayers don’t want to learn to do it.” (Interview: RL4) 
“Those parties who we try to reach never came back to us. Sometimes we conducted 
(seminars) for the chamber of commerce but which are also very specific to small 
businesses….but do they bother to learn about it? No.”  (Interview: RL5) 
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Responses from the interviews indicated that IRBM officials encountered 
problems in attempting to educate the taxpayers. The issue was not that members 
of the public found it difficult to learn and understand about taxation, but rather 
they were unwilling to do so and to commit towards their tax responsibility. The 
following responses highlight this challenge:   
“Malaysians, most of them are highly educated….but the challenge to educate is not 
because they are not smart, but they simply don’t want to learn. They don’t want to 
accept.” (Interview: RL6) 
“They are aware of tax, but they are playing hide and seek, catch me if you can, 
trying with their luck; those who are caught, they’ll try other means. So it’s the 
attitude that they still do not see tax as something important for the country.” 
(Interview RL2) 
“They expect a simple system for them to pay without having to do any computation. 
That’s why they don’t like SAS. They don’t want to know about taxation so that they 
don’t have to comply.”  (Interview: RL3) 
Moreover, RL5 explained that there were a number of people who remained 
ignorant of the requirement and also those who have a wrong perception of tax 
law obligation. For example, some taxpayers believed that, because they had 
already made their payment each month through Monthly Tax Deduction (MTD) 
for employees, they had fulfilled their obligation and shown compliance; they 
failed to see the necessity of submitting return forms to declare their income, i.e. 
they failed to realize that payment of tax and filing a tax return were two different 
obligations. For RL5, ignorance on the part of the taxpayer resulted in non-
compliance. IRBM was thus responsible for informing these people of their duty 
not only to pay tax but also to report their income accurately to the authorities. As 
RL10 commented, IRBM also should educate taxpayers as to their obligation as 
responsible citizens:  
“At the lower level (of taxpayers), the awareness is low. Look at when we go to the 
hospital. We need to pay only MYR1.00 (about £0.21). And yet we get to see a 
specialist doctor and take home a handful of medications. If we go to the private 
hospital we need to spend hundreds of Ringgit. But at a government hospital, we can 
get the medication with a very minimum amount. So where does the money come 
from? They need to think. If we don’t give the explanation, they don’t see. To them 
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it's a burden to pay tax. They should be proud to contribute to the nation.”              
(Interview: RL10) 
The majority of IRBM officials who were interviewed expressed disappointment 
over the attitude of some taxpayers, especially the business-income taxpayers who 
refused to cooperate with IRBM to be educated on taxation matters. As suggested 
by Jackson and Milliron (1986), Eriksen and Fallan (1996) and Torgler (2003), 
taxpayers with a higher level of tax knowledge tend to show a more positive 
attitude towards their tax obligations. Lack of interest in acquiring sufficient tax 
knowledge may therefore lead to negative attitudes towards tax compliance which 
may in turn result in non-compliance. Understanding the importance of educating 
the public about their obligations, IRBM has designed a variety of educational 
activities to encourage tax compliance.  
The reasons for non-compliance offered by interviewees were mainly based on 
taxpayers’ behaviour, which demonstrated: 
 Ignorance of the law;  
 Refusal to take responsibility for submitting their return form or reporting 
correct income or paying the taxable amount due;  
 Lack of trust in the tax system and in the government as a whole;  
 Unwilling to incur additional cost to the business. 
However, some participants viewed IRBM officials’ presumption that all 
taxpayers tend to cheat in their reporting as defeating the spirit of SAS. They were 
of the opinion that IRBM should trust the information provided by taxpayers, a 
point of view that is consistent with responsive regulation theory that “rests upon 
mutual trust but can provide an appropriate background for a relationship of trust” 
(Freedman, 2011, p.3). The mutual trust would eventually develop into a 
reciprocal relationship between IRBM and taxpayers which may lead to a better 
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perception of IRBM and which has the potential to increase voluntary compliance 
(Kornhauser, 2007; Alm and Torgler, 2004; Feld and Frey, 2005; Wenzel, 2002; 
Kirchler et al., 2003).  
Meanwhile, according to Choong and Wong (2011, p.885), 39% of their 
respondents admitted that they have sought assistance from IRBM officers to fill 
up the return form. Majority of them were quite satisfied with the services 
provided by IRBM. However, only 33% of their respondent is willing to attend to 
IRBM seminars on taxation whilst 67% is not interested to attend. According to 
Choong and Wong (2011), most tax agents charged about MYR500-1200 (£100-
240) for preparing tax return form. In their study Choong and Wong (2011, p.885) 
find that only 9.3% willing to pay MYR301-500 (£60-100) and less than 1% 
willing to pay more than MYR1000 (£200). As the traders’ annual turnover is 
quite low, they are unwilling to spend more on tax assistance. From Choong and 
Wong’s observation, it appears that willingness to comply and compliance cost 
are other factors that may influence taxpayers to comply. Choong and Wong’s 
study affirms IRBM officials’ point of view that taxpayers, especially the self-
employed ones, were unlikely to attend to any education programmes provided by 
IRBM to enhance their taxation knowledge and at the same time refuse to ensure 
correct reporting by hiring tax agents due to high compliance cost. 
Another concern arises from the interviews were taxpayers’ perception towards 
government may influence their payment for Zakat (tithe). Zakat is “a specific 
obligation of giving a portion of an individual's wealth and possessions for 
primarily charitable purposes” (Wahid and Abdul Kader, 2010, p.462). Paying 
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Zakat by Muslims is the third pillar
22
 in Islamic teaching. In Malaysia, Zakat 
collection is administered by Islamic agencies of State Government. The funds 
collected from Zakat are then distributed to the poor or the needy Muslims to 
improve their livelihood. Malaysia tax law allows a rebate to be granted for any 
payment of which is obligatory namely Zakat or any other Islamic religious dues 
in order to release Zakat/tax payers from the burden of “double taxation” on the 
same income (The Star, April 15, 2012). Zakat payers are required by tax law to 
keep Zakat payment proofs such as receipts or payment statement issued by the 
Zakat authorities, should it be required for audit purpose.  
With regards to tax compliance, RL10 stated his observation,  
“Another thing is Zakat; no doubt it is mandatory in Islam. But in Islam, Zakat to be 
paid is only 2.5% from your income, so the balance should be paid to the rulers. But 
they [taxpayers] pay all to the Zakat authority. We need to have a dialogue with the 
Islamic scholars about this. The taxpayers said that they don’t want their money to 
go to the government because the government is corrupt. But the government still 
needs the money for development. Maybe we need to have another Act on that. But 
of course there will be protest on this matter.” (Interview: RL10) 
 
Comments by RL10 suggested that even though they are required to pay only 
2.5% of their income, a large number of Malaysian Muslim taxpayers pay the 
amount equivalent to tax charged, hence they obtain full rebate which resulted in 
nil tax payable. As noted by RL10, some Zakat payers contributed more than 
2.5% so that they will obtain rebate and therefore they need not pay to the 
government, whom they perceived as corrupt. Comments by RL10 are consistent 
with findings by Abu Bakar and Abdul Rashid (2010, p. 81) who indicated that 
“...what matters more to them is that they would get tax rebate out of the Zakat on 
                                                          
22 Five pillars of Islam are the foundation of Muslim life: Belief the oneness of Allah (the God) 
and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah; Pray five times a day facing the direction of the Kaaba 
in Mecca; Pay 2.5% of earning for Zakat; Fast in the Islamic month of Ramadhan; and Perform 
Haj, pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime (to those who are financially and physically 
able). 
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income paid.” Further, RL9 agreed with RL10 that even though they have 
contributed to Zakat, at the same time they should also pay tax to the government:  
“Of course you have to pay Zakat because it’s an obligation, but at the same time 
you also pay what is due to you for the public” (RL9). Both RL9 and RL10 views 
suggested that responsible taxpayers  may need to fulfil their obligations toward 
religious commitment as well as national commitment as funds collected from 
both obligation is necessary for building better life for the people. 
From the interviews, it appears that religiosity is another factor which may 
influence tax compliance in Malaysia. It may be difficult to determine if the 
motivation for paying Zakat is related to a person’s high level of piety, or to their 
perceptions of the government, or for other reasons only known to them. As noted 
by Pope and Mohdali (2010, p.386) “Taxpayers may well react to the benefit of 
tax deductions by contributing more religious giving because the real cost of this 
is lower and not because they have high religious beliefs.” However, according to 
Loo et al. (2010a), a subject of their study refused to claim Zakat rebate on the tax 
return form because “the payment of Zakat was regarded as moral and religious 
obligation” (p.19). Both literatures (Pope and Mohdali, 2010; Loo et al., 2010a) 
indicated contradictory findings on the motivation of tax payers to pay Zakat, 
which could be either for the tax rebate or for reasons of religiosity. 
Apart from paying Zakat as ibadah (an act of worship), trust in the government is 
another determinant factor of non-compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008; Feld and 
Frey, 2005; Wenzel, 2002). Some participants commented that taxpayers may 
choose not to pay income tax as they refuse to contribute revenue to the 
government due to their perception that the government is misusing the funds for 
political and personal agendas. These comments are consistent with a study by 
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McGee et al. (2012) which indicates that taxpayers tend to evade tax “if a 
significant portion of the money collected winds up in the pockets of corrupt 
politicians or their families and friends” (p.5). In this regard, the author has 
observed similar perceptions from relatives and close friends. The study observes 
that many participants suggested that the Malaysian public needs to be instilled 
with the awareness that tax revenue is essential to develop the nation and thereby 
be of benefit to the people. The public would thus realize their responsibility to 
pay tax while paying Zakat, regardless of their political views or their sentiments 
towards the government. While Zakat is a religious obligation, income tax is a 
national requirement; hence, both are important for improving the quality of living 
and should not be perceived as a burden to Muslims as a payment of double tax. 
Nevertheless, this finding implies that to gain trust from taxpayers, the 
government could be fair and transparent in its administration, adopt good 
corporate governance and manage public funds wisely. 
The above sections have addressed perceptions of IRBM officials that relate to the 
shadow economy as well as taxpayers’ attitudes to compliance in Malaysia. Most 
interviewees agreed that Malaysian taxpayers, especially the business-income 
taxpayers, were unprepared to voluntarily comply with their tax obligations. For 
them, as income from business is more important, they are unwilling to spend 
time attending tax education session prepared by IRBM. Being unconcerned on 
their tax responsibility have resulted in their refusal to obtain tax agent advisory 
service to ensure tax returns are completed correctly. The study also finds that a 
lack of trust in the government also resulted in some Muslim taxpayers resorted to 
pay more towards Zakat which enables them to be exempted from paying income 
tax. The next section gives an account of interviews conducted with tax 
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practitioners to obtain opinions from outside parties and to elicit their perceptions 
of taxpayers’ behaviour. 
6.4 Perceptions of tax practitioners on taxpayer behaviour in 
Malaysia  
To strengthen findings for this study, tax practitioners in Malaysia were also 
interviewed to obtain insights from a different perspective of the phenomena 
under study. All tax practitioners agreed that among the challenges that they had 
to confront when representing their clients were ignorance of the law and poor 
record-keeping of business transactions. As reported by RT2, “taxpayers do not 
keep proper records and ask us to simply estimate their tax payables”. RT5 agreed 
that the taxpayer’s ignorance of tax laws and poor record-keeping were some of 
the complexities faced by tax practitioners. He also observed that, “generally, 
those who encountered problems in business tended to neglect their tax 
responsibilities as they needed first to address their bread and butter issues”. 
Further, according to RT5, based on his experience as a tax practitioner, small 
businessmen had the tendency not to comply due to ignorance of the law. This 
finding seems to be consistent with the observation made by the IRBM officials 
which found that small business-income taxpayers were those in the non-
compliance group who refused to comply due to lack of knowledge about the tax 
law.  
These perceptions of both tax practitioners and IRBM officials are consistent with 
literature that suggests small business–income taxpayers have a tendency to non-
compliance due to lack of taxation knowledge (Hasseldine et al., 2007; 
Rothengatter, 2005; OECD, 2010c; Niemirowski et al., 2003; Choong and Wong, 
2011). This group also cannot afford to hire tax professionals to manage their tax 
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matters because of high compliance costs (Hasseldine et al., 2007; Rothengatter, 
2005; OECD, 2010c; Choong and Wong, 2011). To further exacerbate the 
situation, they refused to attend free training conducted by IRBM to assist them in 
understanding their duties as taxpayers.  
RT1 was also disappointed with the attitude of taxpayers who were less interested 
in the tax education programme organised by IRBM. According to him, normally 
those who attended the programme were tax practitioner staff. Similarly, RT4 
commented on the attitude of small-business taxpayers: 
“Well, number 1 is we are Asian countries, we are not actually developed. Unless 
you give assistance to every taxpayer, I don’t think everybody knows what the law 
looks like. Our businessmen, some actually are illiterate. So before IRBM enforce, 
they must come up with all sorts of rulings. As there are very few rulings, until then, 
possibly, politically, you cannot do this. Because these people, they come and say we 
can comply but the IRBM is not giving us the assistance. It will take a while. Even 
developed nations like the US and others; they have a very long history. We (taxation 
in Malaysia) are just about thirty to forty years, very short, very young.” (Interview: 
RT4)  
The attitude of taxpayers described by the interviewees confirms the idea that 
some taxpayers are reluctant to learn more about taxation matters and rely on tax 
practitioners to handle their tax affairs. RT4’s statement that some self-employed 
taxpayers are illiterate is consistent with Choong and Wong (2011, p.885) 
findings that 14.5% of petty traders surveyed indicated they were unable to 
understand the Malay language as the form is written in the national language. 
The tax practitioner’s comment concurred with IRBM desk and field auditors 
(RL21, Rl22, RL23, RL24, RL25 and RL26) who agreed that a high percentage – 
between 75% to 90% of taxpayers audited are of Chinese ethnicity. According to 
the auditors, most Chinese traders claimed that they do not understand the 
instruction written in Malay or English as they only speak and understand 
Chinese. This is confirmed by RL25 who noted a taxpayer’s remark during an 
audit session; “I’m only a China man, I don’t understand anything about tax”. 
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It appears that the language barrier is one of the reasons for non-compliance 
among Chinese self-employed taxpayers. However, due to the government’s 
policy in using the Malay language for official business, it may not be possible for 
the Board to provide return forms in Chinese
23
 and it may therefore need to devise 
other approaches to educate this group of taxpayers. For instance, IRBM may take 
the initiative to publish translations of return forms in Chinese on its website, as 
well as providing continuous tax education in the Chinese language newspapers to 
enable taxpayers to learn aspects of taxation.  
With reference to the list of tax agents published on the IRBM website, a large 
number of tax practitioners are of Chinese ethnicity, and thus facilitate 
dissemination of information about tax obligation by tax practitioners to 
taxpayers. However, as discussed in Section 6.3, although the majority of tax 
agents are Chinese, this does not help greatly since most self-employers or small 
traders refuse to engage tax agents to handle their tax matters due to the additional 
operational cost to their business. Even though IRBM provides facilities by 
conducting BSS, due to time-constraints and a non-committal attitude, these 
taxpayers refuse to attend the tax education seminars. IRBM officials may 
therefore consider adopting an educational tactic, whereby instead of waiting for 
the taxpayers to approach IRBM, Chinese-speaking officials could visit them at 
their work location. Face-to-face interaction may be helpful to educate these 
taxpayers of their tax responsibilities. 
IRBM officials may need to understand other factors underlying non-compliance 
behaviour. Social norms, for example, may be an influence, because if people 
with whom they come into contact do not comply, then self-employers may 
                                                          
23
 Return forms in English are provided for non-Malay speaking taxpayers, especially expatriates. 
201 
 
follow suit (Yong, 2011, Rothengatter, 2005). Moreover, it would be interesting to 
find out if culture also plays a role in determining tax compliance. In Malaysia, 
Chinese are known as business-oriented people who work hard. One may 
speculate if their culture would thus encourage them to understand their obligation 
to support the government in developing the country by abiding the tax law.  
There also appears to be a gap in the system for teaching the Malay language. 
This study has found that many Malaysian citizens, other than the indigenous 
Malays, are less conversant with the national language. For long-term acquisition 
of the Malay language, the government of Malaysia may need to examine the 
education system to ensure that all Malaysian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, 
acquire a good command of the Malay language, in both oral and written forms. 
The vernacular education system
24
 in Malaysia could be studied as it may affect 
fluency in Malay among students at school. For example, for a Chinese child 
studying in a Chinese national school and living in a Chinese-dominated 
community, it would not be surprising if that child is less fluent in the Malay 
language, since, during most of his or her life, Chinese is spoken in school, at 
home and within the surrounding area. 
Findings indicate that non-compliance within this group of taxpayers is the result 
of a lack of knowledge, the language barrier, attitudes towards complying with the 
law and unwillingness to hire tax practitioners to manage their accounts due to the 
high cost. Other factors which may influence their decision to comply include 
differences in social and cultural norms and the extent to which taxpayers trust the 
                                                          
24
 In Malaysia, there are three types of public school: the national school (the medium of 
instruction is the Malay language), the Chinese national school (the medium of instruction is the 
Chinese language) and the Tamil national school (the medium of instruction is the Tamil 
language) (Jamil and Raman, 2012). 
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government. These factors are consistent with arguments presented in Section 3.3 
which highlight factors that determine taxpayers’ decisions in compliance. Further 
studies may therefore be required in order to understand why other ethnicities in 
Malaysia fail to comply. The findings from this study will help to inform both 
IRBM and the tax practitioners of the measures to be taken to assist, regulate and 
encourage compliance amongst these groups. In addition, the Ministry of 
Education could investigate strategies for improving the Malay language 
education system in the Malaysian education syllabus. 
Pressure exerted by clients to cheat on reporting their tax liabilities presents yet 
another challenge to tax practitioners. RT3 related that sometimes tax 
practitioners were threatened by clients who warned, “Look, if you don’t do this, 
then I won’t give you the job”. According to RT3, this created difficulties, 
especially for small-scale tax practitioners who needed the business to make a 
living, yet at the same time had to handle ethical issues:  
“So sometimes you get this push and pull factor. So my guess is that there are 
people who were affected by that, clients pressure you, and you generally say, 
let’s try that and let’s wait for an audit.” (Interview: RT3)  
It is unfortunate to discover that some of the taxpayers are not only being 
dishonest with the authority, but are also trying to gain the cooperation of the tax 
practitioners to help them to cheat the tax system. However, RT3 asserted that all 
tax practitioners were bound by ethical rules governed by guidelines for 
professional bodies. Nevertheless, RT6 agreed the possibility of unregistered tax 
agents resorted to unethical conduct to reduce their clients’ tax liability. RT6’s 
opinion is consistent with RL25’s experience when auditing taxpayers where a few 
of them admitted to work together with their tax agents to reduce tax to be paid. 
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From the scenarios revealed by the tax practitioners during the interviews, it can 
be suggested that taxpayers will seek opportunities to cheat the system and to be 
dishonest not only with tax authorities but also with tax practitioners. This 
scenario is similar to the UK taxpayers represented by tax practitioners, as 
reported by HMRC based on their analysis of SAS return forms (Salter and Oats, 
2011). Responses from the interviewees reflect the challenge faced by tax 
practitioners to play an advisory role in order to educate taxpayers about their tax 
responsibilities rather than focussing solely on the aspects of business. However, it 
is a responsibility of tax practitioners to display professional and ethical conduct 
and at the same time remain unaffected by pressure from their clients (OECD, 
2006). Tax practitioners play an important role as representatives of taxpayers to 
ensure compliance of the law (OECD, 2008a; Marshall, Armstrong and Smith, 
2006).  
Even though IRBM and tax practitioners have to handle ignorant and unethical 
behaviour on the part of taxpayers, both parties “need to coordinate with each 
other” (Hasseldine, 2012, p.363) to educate taxpayers. The data suggests that 
IRBM “increase collaborative relationships” (Niemirowski et al., 2003, p.162) 
with tax practitioners to work together in order to understand the source of the 
compliance problem and to arrive at suitable solutions to address these issues. The 
collaboration may ensure the success of SAS and eventually may improve 
compliance (OECD, 2008a; Thomson, 2008; Niemirowski et al., 2003). IRBM and 
tax practitioners could take the opportunity during their annual meetings to discuss 
these matters, to look for weaknesses in tax compliance programme and seek ways 
of improving compliance in Malaysia.  
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter presents findings with regard to external risks where the most 
challenging external risks faced by IRBM are shadow economy and taxpayer 
behaviour. As shadow economy has only recently gained the attention of the 
Board, participants have suggested that this subject needs further investigation. As 
for the behaviour of Malaysian taxpayers, the study noted, consistent with 
literature, that non-compliance risks in Malaysia are instigated by language 
barrier; lack of taxation knowledge; an unwillingness to learn; distrust of the tax 
system, IRBM and the government; and simply ignoring the law and risking the 
chance of getting caught.  
To obtain responses from other perspectives, tax practitioners’ viewpoints were 
elicited. Challenges they faced when dealing with taxpayers were ignorance of the 
tax law; poor record-keeping; dishonesty in reporting income; and threatening tax 
practitioners to cheat on reporting to IRBM. Nevertheless, both parties - IRBM 
and tax practitioners - agreed that collaboration between them might enhance 
compliance and ensure the success of SAS. The next chapter presents IRBM 
officials’ perceptions of the Board efforts in managing both internal and external 
risks as discussed in this chapter and Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 7 
Discussions of IRBM internal documents and perceptions 
of IRBM officials of current risk management practice  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters presented internal and external risks faced by IRBM. 
This chapter analyses and presents findings from IRBM internal documents and 
also to answer the research questions on perceptions of IRBM officials of the 
current risk management practices. During the interviews, the IRBM officials 
were shown the EC compliance pyramid model (see Figure 11). Therefore, 
Section 7.2 addresses the participants’ views of the risk-based responsive model 
and how it can be applied in the current enforcement strategies by IRBM. In this 
chapter, the IRBM Integrity Plan is presented in Section 7.3, whilst the IRBM 
Strategic Plan is highlighted in Section 7.4. This is followed by discussion of the 
electronic services provided by IRBM to facilitate taxpayer compliance in Section 
7.5. The establishment of a Risk Management Department is delivered in Section 
7.6. This is then followed by discussion of adopting a risk-based compliance 
model for IRBM in Section 7.7. Finally, in Section 7.8 this chapter concludes with 
summary conclusions that may be useful for both IRBM and other revenue 
agencies contemplating a shift to risk management regime.  
7.2 Risk-based Compliance Model 
When questioned on the pyramid model, 26 IRBM officials acknowledged their 
awareness of the ATO compliance pyramid, while four officials admitted they had 
not previously seen any compliance model. The officials from RMD agreed that 
the model would be beneficial and would assist them in formulating strategies for 
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their department; another interviewee stated that the model was already used to 
guide compliance strategies in IRBM. The interviewees also agreed that the model 
exhibited a systematic strategy in administering non-compliance, and was able to 
assist IRBM to increase tax compliance among members of the public. The 
compliance model assists regulators to identify categories of taxpayer through 
their compliance responses and to formulate enforcement strategies to treat these 
taxpayers.  
Due to limited resources and manpower, explained in Section 5.2, and also 
suggested by the EC (2006), IRBM could take measures to manage and reduce 
existing and future risk from occurring by adopting a risk-based approach. The 
concept of a compliance model may assist IRBM in planning and implementing 
its strategies. All interviewees agreed that a well-designed training programme 
was required to equip IRBM officials with the required skills and knowledge in 
order to perform a variety of actions for different compliance categories of 
taxpayers, as depicted by the model. They therefore suggested that the Malaysian 
Tax Academy and other training centres of IRBM should take the necessary 
measures to ensure that knowledge and skills, tailored to their particular needs, 
were incorporated in the training syllabus and programme. 
There was consensus among RL1, RL2, RL7 and RL19 that the compliance model 
could be adopted by the IRBM, with some adjustments (if necessary) to 
complement scenarios in the Malaysian tax administration as well as the 
requirement for Malaysian taxpayers. They also agreed that the greatest risk to 
any tax authority was that of revenue, due to compliance risk (Andreoni et al, 
1998; Walpole, 2009; OECD, 2010d). RL8 and RL19 added that, in terms of 
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legislation and regulations, rulings were issued from time to time to reduce 
ambiguity and confusion and to provide a detailed explanation of the new 
legislation. IRBM also took steps to simplify tax law so that the public would find 
it easy to understand and follow. It would assist them in complying with tax rules 
and in trusting the system.  
The interviewees also asserted that habitual defaulters, deliberate tax avoiders and 
tax evaders must be dealt with punitively to reflect the perceived fairness in the 
tax system to law-abiding citizens. Their opinions are consistent with suggestions 
from Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Scholz (1984) and Franzoni (1998) that 
sanction is likely to be a more effective enforcement mechanism to enhance 
compliance.  
The participants, such as RL1, RL2, RL7, RL8, RL12 and RL19, believed that 
trust in the tax system and procedural justice might increase if fair treatment was 
exercised by IRBM and tax evaders were punished appropriately (Kirchler et al., 
2008; Franzoni, 1998). In this respect, RL7, RL12 and RL19 praised IRBM for its 
remarkable efforts in promoting compliance. To promote integrity and 
transparency and steer towards excellent achievement in the future, IRBM has 
taken the initiative to introduce two key plans to be applied by its officials - the 
IRBM Integrity Plan and IRBM Strategic Planning 2009-2013. The integrity plan 
and strategic planning can be applied to the compliance model to encourage the 
public to trust the integrity of IRBM officials as well as confident in the Board’s 
effort to determine future direction for revenue collection is planned strategically. 
The next section presents the integrity plan while section 7.4 highlights the 
strategic planning.  
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7.3 IRBM Integrity Plan 
In 2009 IRBM introduced the IRBM Integrity Plan (IIP) to be continuous with the 
government’s National Integrity Plan25. An IIP book was published in December 
2009, to deliver an integrity message to strengthen ethics and integrity among 
IRBM staff. This study refers to the IIP book as a secondary data to obtain 
additional information on IRBM strategies in managing risks. The book outlines 
comprehensive IRBM programmes and activities with regard to integrity and 
emphasises core values of trust, truth, wisdom, fairness, transparency and 
gratitude, values that it is desirable to inculcate in each member of IRBM. The IIP 
also discusses strategies to be implemented by IRBM officials in order to manage 
the risk involved in its administration. Six of these strategies, listed below, aim to 
form a strong community which features a high standard of morality and ethics, 
requiring that members adhere to religious and spiritual values and are anchored 
by a noble character: 
1) Enhance the effectiveness of good governance 
The first strategy is to enhance the effectiveness of good governance, which 
comprises of revisions and reinforcement of the vision, mission and objectives of 
IRBM; the development and re-evaluation of the KPI; and the formulation and 
update of policies of administration and taxation, the Work Procedures Manual & 
Desk-Work procedures and the Client Charter. Strategy 1 also emphasises the 
update of ethical codes; the preparation and exhibition of the work flow chart for 
general information; the expansion and enhancement of the use of ICT; the 
                                                          
25 National Integrity Plan (NIP) was formulated by incorporating the spirit and principles of the 
Constitution, based on the fact that the lives of Malaysians of various races and religions are a gift 
and present advantages to be utilized. The NIP also absorbs the philosophy and tenets, namely, 
building a united, just, democratic, liberal and progressive organisation, as well as adhering to five 
principles, or state pillars. The NIP is also guided by the philosophy of Vision 2020 to create a 
developed nation in its own mould by 2020. As a birth plan in line with the aspirations of the 
people and implemented for their welfare, the NIP reflects the specific features of society and the 
nation of Malaysia. In addition, the NIP takes into account international developments, the 
experience of other countries, and the impact of globalization. In short, the NIP is a continuation 
and translation philosophy, with principles and goals to be achieved in the Federal Constitution, 
while taking into account various new developments and challenges (National Integrity Institute, 
2009). 
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improvement of the internal control system; and the enhancement of the 
effectiveness of management of integrity. 
 
2) Enhance the effectiveness of service delivery 
Strategy 2 of the IIP enhances the effectiveness of service delivery systems, by 
improving the quality of services, expanding facilities and increasing awareness 
and education, especially for taxpayers. 
 
3) Strengthen the awareness programme to prevent corruption, malpractices and abuse 
of power 
Strategy 3 seeks to strengthen awareness programmes to combat the crimes of 
corruption, malpractices and abuse of power. 
 
4) Strengthen the administration of justice system  
Strategy 4 aims to strengthen the administration of the justice system by improving 
the enforcement of laws against non-compliant taxpayers to provide fairness to all 
taxpayers. 
 
5) Strengthen the management of human resources 
The fifth strategy creates a more comfortable work environment conducive to 
strengthening the management of human resources. To the same end, it seeks to 
strengthen the screening system in the appointment of officers; to improve 
placements and staff exchanges; to enhance the effective implementation of job 
rotation; to enrich educational programmes; to improve the management system for 
officers’ career development; to upgrade  management remuneration and benefits 
for staff; to develop the performance appraisal system; to promote bilateral 
relations between management and officials at various levels; and to conduct 
meetings between management and the employees’ union. 
6) Strengthen the integrity of the General Approach 
The final strategy enhances integrity through a number of components, including 
the family institution, the community, civil society and socio-cultural, religious and 
economic institutions. 
RL19 supported the idea of IIP and commented:  
“IRBM should be more transparent so that the public would not question our 
integrity; hence they would trust the system and might want to comply.” (RL19)  
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According to RL4, integrity programmes implemented by IRBM focussed on four 
approaches, i.e. education, prevention, strengthening and punishment. RL21 stated 
these approaches were in line with enforcement strategies in the compliance 
model where education is delivered to the category of taxpayer at the base of the 
pyramid. Through education, non-compliance could be prevented and compliance 
strengthened; these two approaches could thus be used to handle taxpayers in 
levels two and three of the pyramid.  
For the category of taxpayers at the top level, RL21 felt that sanction was the most 
appropriate action to be taken to deal with recalcitrant taxpayers. RL21’s 
statement is consistent with Andreoni et al. (2003) and Leviner (2009) that those 
who refuse to comply should be punished.  RL21 also believed the IIP could be 
related to the pyramid model, where three of the six strategies could be 
implemented and used for risk reduction.  
RL8 supported RL21’s opinion that the pyramid model could be applied to IRBM 
with adjustments in order to tailor it to the Malaysian tax environment. 
Furthermore, RL8 felt that IRBM needed to deliver specific aspects in terms of 
education and coaching advice to clients and potential taxpayers to raise 
awareness of their tax responsibilities. With the implementation of IIP, the 
management of IRBM wishes that its staff will become employees of high 
integrity who able to avoid corruption, improve their standard of work and 
provide quality customer services to taxpayers (IRBM, 2009). These values are 
required to ensure the success of the IRBM strategic plan, as presented in the next 
section.  
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7.4 The IRBM Strategic Plan 2009-2013 
The IRBM Strategic Plan 2009-2013 (ISP) was developed as a guide to IRBM’s 
role, functions and responsibilities that translated into essential actions for the 
future. As reported by IRBM (2009), it identifies areas of focus and perspective 
for comprehensive planning for the next five years, and determines the direction 
and vision of IRBM.  This approach will contribute to the more efficient control 
and allocation of limited resources that is consistent with the need to implement 
programmes and activities involving the revenue and productivity of each core 
function. The ISP consists of five strategies focusing on customers, finance, 
internal process, learning and expansion (IRBM, 2009), as outlined below: 
 Collect the correct amount of tax in a fair and equitable manner 
 Instil public confidence in the fairness and efficiency of tax administration 
 Broaden the tax base 
 Modernize systems and procedures in line with current needs 
 Produce human capital that is competent, professional, committed and of 
high integrity 
Based on the ISP, IRBM’s responsibilities in tax administration will become more 
tactical as it focuses on strategic networks and factors that determine the success 
of the organisation. These factors contribute to IRBM’s responsive approach to 
improve the quality of high-impact services to its users. As noted by the CEO/DG 
of IRBM,  
“The Strategic Plan acts as a vehicle, towards achieving our desired future state. 
Under these main thrusts, I believe that IRBM, will be able to quantum leap itself, 
into becoming the leader in tax administration alongside the nation, as it achieves a 
high income and developed nation status, in the year 2020. In other word, the 
Strategic Plan ensures that, IRBM is moving on its right track, in accordance with 
the transformation’s framework, laid down by the government.” (IRBM CEO, 
2012)
26
  
                                                          
26
 Opening Address at the National Tax Conference 2012, Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre, 17 
July 2012.  
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IRBM’s initiative in developing the ISP indicates its commitment to steer the 
Board and staff towards future direction of the organisation. The study finds that 
the ISP spells out strategies to achieve objectives of the Board which are to 
increase revenue collection, to widen the tax base and improve service delivery as 
well as enhancing human resource development within the organisation. 
Consistent with the responsive regulation approach, the ISP encourages the staff 
to regulate responsively in their enforcement approach to develop confident and 
trust of the public on IRBM ability to administer tax affairs in Malaysia.  
During the interviews, when discussing of future strategies, 24 participants 
referred to the ISP as a guidance which has led them to future path to ascertain 
achievement of organisation desired aim. It appears that the aim of ISP to 
motivate the staff has achieved its objective when in 2011, IRBM has successfully 
exceeded the target set by the government whereby the revenue collected reached 
a three-digit figure: RM109billion, a record in the history of tax collection in 
Malaysia. In his appreciation letter to IRBM, the Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister agreed that IRBM’s strategic planning has resulted in achievement not 
only to the revenue collection aspect but also on efficient administration of tax 
system in the country. 
“This excellent achievement of highest tax collection ever recorded (in the history of 
Malaysia) is the result of solid planning, effective management, and implementation 
of effective strategies as well as collaboration between IRBM staff, which is 
nurtured by integrated work culture with the spirit of 1Malaysia.” (Deputy Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, March 2012) 
Analysis of the content of the ISP indicates the document also is formulated to 
manage future risks and uncertainties and to provide high quality and integrity 
services to taxpayers working towards increasing voluntary compliance. 
Technology-assisted systems had been developed by IRBM to improve services to 
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the public, such as e-Services – these include e-Filing, which won a National 
Award for Best System in 2010. Electronic services provided by IRBM are further 
addressed in the next section. 
7.5 e-Services 
Findings by Alm et al. (2010) on laboratory experiments to test the effectiveness 
of taxpayer service programmes in enhancing tax compliance suggest that an 
enforcement strategy should not be the only method to increase compliance. 
Instead, other administrative policies such as services could be provided as a tool 
to deliver better service to customers as a strategy to improve compliance.  
Similarly, the OECD (2011) encourages tax agencies to provide efficient and 
user-friendly e-Services to facilitate taxpayers so that compliance may increase if 
they are satisfied. IRBM has taken a large number of initiatives to keep up-to-date 
with technological change, at the same time enhancing its e-Services.  
This section highlights some of the e-Services it has implemented, such as e-
Filing, e-Payments, e-Stamps, e-Daftar, PCB Kalkulator, e-SPC and MySMS. The 
function of each service is outlined below: 
 e-Filing: electronic submission of tax return forms for individuals, 
companies and tax agents 
 e-Payments: electronic payment through internet banking with seven local 
and international banks in Malaysia, by individuals, companies and 
employers 
 e-Stamps: electronic  processing of instruments for transfer of property 
 e-Daftar: an online facility that allows new taxpayers to register for a tax 
reference number 
 PCB Kalkulator: an online, computerised system to assist individuals and 
employers to compute the amount of monthly tax deductions  
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 MySMS: a text messaging facility that provides information such as 
address, telephone number and fax number of IRBM Branch and Service 
Centres. 
Empirical studies on e-Filing in Malaysia indicate that it has a number of 
limitations. It was found, for instance, that if taxpayers felt that electronic tax 
submission is risky then their perception on its usefulness will decrease, with the 
result that fewer people will wish to use the system (Ng, 2008). To promote usage 
of e-Filing, Ng (2008) therefore suggests that IRBM should assure taxpayers that 
it is a secure and reliable system, thereby building their trust and confidence. It 
has been further recommended that IRBM authorities should consider ‘the 
intended users’ technological readiness’ (Hansford et al., 2006) to change from 
manual submission to e-Filing. Furthermore, Hansford et al. (2006) also 
recommend that e-Filing system should be “user-friendly, easy to gain access to 
and easy to use”. IRBM also needs to understand both the taxpayers’ perception 
of the usefulness of the system and their behaviour in deciding to adopt e-Filing 
(Kamarulzaman and CheAzmi, 2010; Illias et al., 2009).  
Lai and Choong (2008) have discovered that 21% of those who failed to e-file 
successfully indicated that either IRBM’s server was not responding properly or 
they abandoned their effort before the end of the session. Other reasons given 
were that the system was slow, the network service was unreliable or they were 
unable to sign the tax return form electronically. Overall, Lai and Choong (2008, 
p.342) report that 73.3% of the survey respondents “had no confidence in the 
electronic administrative capability of the IRBM”. Previous literature suggests 
that, in order to promote e-Filing, IRBM could improve and upgrade its e-Filing 
system to meet taxpayers’ expectation of an easy, convenient, fast and secure 
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system of filing. Furthermore, IRBM may need to strengthen and increase its 
awareness programme in order to educate taxpayers, especially those who are new 
and inexperienced, so that they will be encouraged to use the electronic system to 
submit their tax forms.  
IRBM’s provision for e-Services is consistent with OECD (2010a) which states 
that the development of electronic tools is to expedite the business process and to 
ease compliance, so that taxpayers are comfortable with the reformed tax 
administration in Malaysia and may have the desire to contribute to higher tax 
compliance. In an attempt to improve its service delivery system, IRBM is also 
cooperating with other government agencies, including the Companies 
Commission of Malaysia, the Social Security Organisation, the Employee 
Provident Funds and other public sector bodies, to provide such online services as 
Electronic Government (MyEG), Company Registration (MyCoID), and Stamps 
(The Land Office). As well as seeking to improve the delivery system, these 
electronic services are perceived to contribute to higher tax compliance from 
taxpayers who are comfortable using the systems for their fast responses and easy 
usage. It is thus likely that taxpayers should have some confidence in the 
efficiency of the tax administration (Bird, 2010).  
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7.6 Establishment of the Risk Management Department 
Since its inception in 2009, according to RL19, there has been various 
improvement to RMD where the current focus is toward Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM). The aim of ERM is to monitor and advise the Board on 
disaster recovery strategies, protect the organisation from reputation risk and 
monitor compliance of occupational safety and healthy activities by risk owners. 
The risk management process throughout the organisation was thus to be more 
systematic and orderly; and information about the actions, the monitoring and the 
effectiveness of actions would be published for the attention of all risk owners in 
the organisation. Each risk owner would therefore be aware of the risks faced by 
the organisation and could develop strategies to manage, prevent and reduce the 
impact of identified risks (RL19).  
With regard to internal and external factors, RL19 described strategies formulated 
by IRBM to ensure the effective and efficient use of human and financial 
resources to carry out all major activities of the organisation, namely: filing 
returns; taxpayer service and education; compliance; widening tax base and 
revenue collection. According to RL19, priority was given to critical factors that 
might impact on the duties entrusted to IRBM to practise a fair and equitable tax 
system and to ensure that the revenue would be collected in a timely manner.  
In implementing IRBM’s responsibilities, the best practices from the tax bodies in 
this region in particular and the world in general were studied. Human and 
financial resources were allocated according to the priorities and needs of the 
critical areas of operation. RL19 believed that the strategies implemented so far 
could be considered successful, based on: 
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 the achievement of targets laid out by the stakeholders of each year;  
 the government’s recognition of the services provided to customers through 
various awards received by IRBM;  
 the innovation and modernisation of service delivery systems such as e-
Services were well received by the taxpayer; and  
 the increase in number of taxpayers using the new services.  
In the context of IRBM as an organisation that administers taxes, there are risks 
that involve loss of revenue, known as revenue risk. In RL19’s view, the actions 
of the taxpayer, whether the result of ignorance, negligence, weakness, evasion or 
the weakness of tax administration, would lead to revenue risk. Thus the RMD 
has developed a risk management process which is based on established principles 
of risk management (RMD, 2009):   
• to develop follow-up actions to be taken to streamline the regulatory system 
currently in use;  
• to document actions such as a Risk Management Plan (RMP) by divisions 
and departments in IRBM;  
• to determine the implementation of the RMP and the timeframe of the 
implementation successfully conducted; and  
• to monitor the progress of the RMP implementation.  
These principles are in line with the standard risk management process 
implemented by other organisations (Thompson, 2008; IRM, 2002; EC, 2006; 
OECD, 2010a).  
From RL19’s explanation, the RMD in IRBM emphasises ERM in its risk 
management plans which relates to operational risk, reputation risks, strategic 
risks and other organisational related risks. At the time of the study, the 
department has not yet established any plans towards tax compliance risk. As 
IRBM is an enforcement agency that ensures taxpayer compliance, the RMD may 
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need to start looking into identifying tax compliance risks in order to manage 
those risks effectively.  
It appears that IRBM had been innovative in developing strategic plans and 
integrity plans to ensure that its future direction was well-designed in order to 
avoid potential risks, and to ascertain that the ethics and integrity of IRBM 
personnel were secured. These steps were in keeping with the ‘really responsive 
regulation’ proposed by Black and Baldwin (2010, p.182) relating to “a strategy 
of applying a variety of regulatory instruments in a manner that is flexible and 
sensitive to a series of key factors.”  
The responses of interviewees indicated that a responsive regulation approach had 
been adopted by IRBM, whereby the present focus shifted from enforcement to 
education, promoting seminars and dialogue, as well as adopting a persuasive 
approach through customer service. To ensure that responsive regulation works 
efficiently, risk-based regulation could be operated alongside other strategies 
(Black and Baldwin, 2010). Thus, next section presents a possibility of adopting a 
risk-based compliance model for IRBM. 
7.7 A risk-based compliance model for Malaysian tax 
administration 
“We use our compliance model to guide our compliance work and better 
understand why people are not complying.” (ATO, 2006) 
Currently, risk management in the Compliance Department of IRBM is applied to 
a limited extent; in particular, there is a risk analysis process that focuses mainly 
on case selection for tax audits. The EC (2006) has noted that risk management 
approach has evolved and its application has become more structured.  
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RL17 and RL20 agreed that such a model was suitable for use in the current 
practice of their department. They also reported that they were in fact in the 
process of developing a similar model for their department. There was agreement 
among RL2, RL17 and RL20 that IRBM should adopt the model since it would be 
beneficial and would assist IRBM in formulating and guiding its compliance 
strategies. RL20 added that most of the strategies in the model could be applied 
by IRBM. However, it might differ on the degree in implementation, based on the 
percentage of compliance or non-compliance taxpayers in different countries.  
Further, RL17 emphasised that the advantage of this model lay in the strategies it 
proposed to support an increase in tax compliance among members of the public, 
and IRBM would have systematic strategies in administering non-compliance 
issues. RL1 also felt that the model would be helpful to IRBM as the strategies 
would guide its response to taxpayers according to their level of compliance. 
According to RL1, if there were enough promotions, such as education and 
marketing, there were possibilities that IRBM could encourage those at the bottom 
of the pyramid to comply. However, for the determined non-compliers at the top 
of the pyramid, RL1 felt they would still refuse to comply even if sufficient 
education and services were provided. He asserted that IRBM needed to deal 
severely with them. Black and Baldwin (2010, p.1) advise that “risk-based 
regulation prioritizes attention to the highest risks.” Consequently, IRBM could 
prioritize its strategies towards high risk taxpayers at the top of the pyramid.  
RL1, RL3 and RL6 commented that even though IRBM did not use this model, 
the Board nevertheless applied the basic strategies listed in it. According to RL3, 
the percentage of submitted return forms indicated that filing compliance was 
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relatively good. However, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the 
increase in filing compliance is due to IRBM’s responsive enforcement. Further, 
as suggested by literature in Section 3.3, and findings in Section 6.3, there are 
various factors that influence taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. Yet it can be said 
that encouraging compliance through soft approaches does enable voluntary 
compliance and self-regulation, as proven by CETF (1998), Niemirowski et al. 
(2003) and Murphy (2004) in their studies of taxpayer compliance and responsive 
regulation in Australia.   
Furthermore, in an effort to prioritize non-compliance cases, IRBM also 
concentrates on high risk taxpayers and covers areas where risk factors may exist. 
RL3 agreed that all levels in the pyramid should be monitored so that enforcement 
strategies could be enacted to respond to taxpayer compliance behaviour. If focus 
is given only to the highest risk taxpayers at the peak of the pyramid, those at the 
lower or middle level may feel neglected by the regulators, hence the tendency to 
resist compliance (Freedman, 2011; Black and Baldwin, 2010). When this 
incident occurs, taxpayer compliance behaviour may change, which in turn may 
affect the shape of the compliance model (Kirchler et al., 2008).  
As it was undetermined that the pyramid model was based on the number of 
taxpayers or on the amount of tax paid, RL3 suggested that a study should first be 
conducted of the model before a decision could be made about whether or not it 
was suitable for adoption by IRBM. RL1 noticed the lack of such a model in 
IRBM’s administration, and explained that the current services provided by IRBM 
were similar to the activity displayed at the base of the pyramid. While the middle 
level was the existing audit process by IRBM, the top level appears to be the 
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investigation procedure conducted by IRBM:  
 “The only thing now is awareness among the public of our effort; our focus is not 
there. The awareness of the public is not there. Because I think by nature we like to 
work quietly but efficiently. That is our culture. We do our work quietly but 
sometimes we may have to inform the public. That will make the public aware that 
those who have not been a good citizen will face such kinds of consequences.” 
(Interview: RL1)  
In addition, RL6 and RL19 addressed the measures taken by IRBM to manage 
non-compliance issues. According to RL6, even though the model had not been 
used officially by IRBM, unofficially the Board did apply its concepts. It was 
pointed out by RL19 that, in the current practice, taxpayers were identified 
according to services required by taxpayers. There were taxpayers who needed to 
be educated, those who required assistance, those who should be audited and the 
determined non-compliers to be investigated and taken to court. RL6 added that, 
for those taxpayers who should be reminded of their responsibility to make 
payment, the IRBM call centre would remind them of their tax obligation, while 
the investigation team would deal with the hard core offenders. It was evident that 
most interviewees believed that, even though IRBM had not adopted any 
compliance model, the concept was nevertheless applied by the Board in its 
compliance activities.  It was interesting to note RL5’s view of the model:  
“Academically, we have this so-called pyramid in compliance. The vast majority will 
comply. It is at the lower end of the pyramid. As you move higher, of course the 
number will be lesser. But they become more and more stubborn. Not that they don’t 
want to, they were just waiting to be persuaded. Because at the very top of the 
pyramid are those who have decided from the start, they don’t want to comply. No 
matter what we do. There are those somewhere in the middle, who with a bit of 
persuasion will comply. So it’s the human factor. Of course there may be individuals 
who have tax experience, who refuse for whatever reason they may have, whether 
it’s real or perceived. It’s only human to say when you are caught wrong, it’s not my 
mistake, it was someone else’s mistake, so it was human factors.” (Interview: RL5) 
 
Even though the model was relevant to IRBM, RL5 cautioned that its application 
might present a challenge. Identification needed to be carried out at each level of 
the pyramid to categorize types of taxpayers, and then the risks at each level also 
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should be analysed. The higher the level, the greater the risk and therefore more 
attention needed to be given to the taxpayers in the group. Those at the top of the 
pyramid were serious offenders, and so should be sanctioned. Further, RL5 
referred to the necessity for IRBM to create a profile of taxpayers, starting with 
high-profile taxpayers to whom IRBM should give more attention than to other 
groups of taxpayers. By identifying the category of taxpayers, IRBM could devise 
strategies to manage them. RL5 added that, even though at present there were 
high-profile taxpayers in IRBM’s system, it still lacked proper organisation and 
needed to be enhanced.  
RL13 also agreed that application of the model would provide a more systematic 
perspective both for IRBM and for taxpayers in terms of managing non-
compliance. Referring to compliance, RL13 posited that there tended to be those 
who would evade the law. The problem of recalcitrant taxpayers is faced not only 
by IRBM but also by other tax administrations, non-compliance being a universal 
risk confronting all tax authorities (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Andreoni et al., 
1998; Jackson and Milliron, 1986).  RL13 therefore felt that this issue had to be 
dealt with wisely and that IRBM should be able to use its authority judiciously to 
manage compliance risk and to take appropriate action on high-risk taxpayers. 
Otherwise, the shape of the pyramid would change in that the broad base would 
be smaller and the higher levels would widen. The statement by RL13 is 
consistent with ‘slippery slope’ framework proposed by Kirchler et al. (2008) 
which relates to the power of the tax authority and trust in it. A ‘slippery slope’ 
framework suggests that, if the authority’s power is weak and taxpayers’ trust in it 
is low, then the level of compliance is likely to decline.  
Before IRBM makes any decision to adopt the compliance model, it should take 
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heed of Black and Baldwin’s suggestion (2010) that the process should begin “by 
identifying the risks they are seeking to manage, not the rules they have to 
enforce”. Naturally, the authorities always refer to the rules in order to perform 
their duties. However, due to lack of manpower and financial resources, they 
would not be able to enforce these rules on all non-compliant taxpayers. They 
therefore need to be selective in the cases to be handled, and priority given to the 
highest risks. When identification of high-risk actors (Black and Baldwin, 2010) 
was made, the management of IRBM would be able to allocate resources for 
appropriate strategies in managing the risk, as suggested by some interviewees.  
7.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided findings of the perception of IRBM officials of the 
current risk management practice in IRBM. The chapter has also discussed the 
possibility of adopting a risk-based compliance model by the Board. To obtain 
answers to both problems and to explore the feasibility of adapting a risk-based 
compliance model to suit the Malaysian context, empirical data was collected 
through interviews to elicit the interviewees’ perceptions of the EC compliance 
model. Internal documents from IRBM, namely, the IRBM Integrity Plan, the 
IRBM Strategic Plans and the Risk Management Plan of the RMD, were also used 
to obtain supplementary data to support the opinions of interviewees.  
Findings from the interviews and secondary data suggest that the concept of 
responsive regulation has been adopted by IRBM, whereby the present focus has 
changed from the traditonal strategy of enforcement to a softer approach which 
includes education through seminars and dialogue, and assistance and persuasion 
through customer service. IRBM has been innovative in developing strategic 
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plans and integrity plans to ensure that its future direction is well-designed in 
order to avoid potential risks, and to ascertain that the ethics and integrity of 
IRBM  personnel are secured. Understanding the importance of managing tax 
compliance risks efficiently and effectively, IRBM has set up RMD as a 
department responsible for managing risk at IRBM.  
This chapter presents participants views on adopting a risk-based compliance 
model by IRBM. Most participants agreed that the model would be useful and 
could assist IRBM to formulate strategies to manage compliance risks. This 
chapter addressed risk, risk management and the application of responsive 
regulation within the IRBM organisation. The next chapter presents an analysis of 
IRBM’s application of the concept of responsive regulation in managing external 
risk, namely, compliance risk, through various education programmes.   
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Chapter 8 
IRBM’s taxpayer education programmes as responsive 
measures to manage compliance risk 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed IRBM’s strategies to manage internal and external 
risks and the application of responsive regulation within IRBM’s organisation. In 
this chapter, responsive regulation strategies to manage compliance risk by IRBM 
are highlighted, which addresses the research question: “How does the IRBM 
manage internal and external risks including non-compliance risk?” As the 
concept of responsive regulation promotes soft approaches and only resorts to a 
hard approach to encourage voluntary compliance, the chapter addresses 
education programmes conducted by IRBM to inform members of the public of 
their tax obligation. In Chapters Six and Seven, every participant agrees that 
taxpayer education is the most important activity to be taken to encourage 
taxpayers to comply voluntarily with the tax rules. A significant amount of the 
literature also suggests education to enhance compliance. Further, in conforming 
to responsive regulation concept, education is to be the first action to be taken to 
assist and guide taxpayers in relation to tax matters. Hence, this chapter presents 
taxpayer education activities conducted by IRBM as responsive approach to 
promote voluntary compliance.  
Firstly, education programmes conducted by IRBM are discussed in Section 8.2. 
Participants’ viewpoints of issues pertaining to the education programme are 
presented in Section 8.3, while Section 8.4 addresses the instruction of 
compliance obligation, whereby various activities were conducted by branches of 
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IRBM to deliver tax knowledge to taxpayers in order to encourage voluntary 
compliance. Next, early education programmes delivered by IRBM involving 
young students are discussed in Section 8.5, followed by an account of education 
as a sanction to deter non-compliance and prevent future non-compliance in 
Section 8.6.  In this section, the IRBM penalty imposition, IRBM’s difficulty in 
enforcing regulation and taking soft approaches to foster voluntary compliance are 
also addressed. The findings of this chapter that provide a relationship between 
responsive regulations, tax education and compliance risk management by IRBM 
are described in Section 8.7. Following this, Section 8.8 provides a conceptual 
framework designed by the author in this study. The framework, which has been 
derived from three strands underpinned the study, namely tax compliance, risk 
management and responsive regulation, is described. Justification of the chosen 
framework is also discussed in this section. Finally, Section 8.9 summarises these 
findings. 
8.2 IRBM educational activities 
As stated in IRBM’s Annual Report and in the interviews, various educational 
programmes have been implemented by IRBM, including seminars and 
discussions, printed hand-outs, publicity through the mass media, the appointment 
of Tax Relation Officers and IRBM Tele Info. The activities conducted by IRBM 
officials are presented below: 
 Discussions conducted by IRBM on SAS and e-Filing. 
 Education through national television, national radio and exclusive 
interviews on the television. 
 Publishes leaflets and magazines in a simpler and easy-to-understand 
format. These printed hand-outs are distributed to the public through IRBM 
customer service counters at all branches of IRBM.  
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 Members of the public can also obtain information about taxation, and 
perform certain activities on their personal tax matters, through the official 
website of IRBM.  
 The latest initiative introduced by IRBM is the appointment of Tax Relation 
Officers (TRO) representing various public and private sectors. The TRO 
serves as a liaison in providing information that can help workers to 
improve their knowledge of tax to discharge their tax obligations.  
 Another move initiated by IRBM was the launch of IRBM Tele Info in 
2008. The Tele Info line operates twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week to allow taxpayers to obtain tax information at their convenience. 
Thirty lines are provided and are able to receive thirty calls simultaneously 
at any one time (IRBM, 2008).  
The interviews and secondary data suggest that IRBM is committed to educating 
taxpayers through various instructional activities carried out by its officials. As all 
the programmes are provided free-of-charge, taxpayers need to seize the 
opportunity to enhance their knowledge of their responsibilities as taxpayers.  
8.3 Issues in information dissemination  
Despite careful planning, there appear to be concerns about the implementation of 
these educational activities. For instance, RL1, commenting on the issue of 
promoting education through effective channels, related the frustration she 
experienced when she was seeking information on the IRBM website only to find 
that it was unavailable. Even though she found this information in one of the 
pamphlets prepared by IRBM, she felt that all relevant material should be on the 
website since people seeking tax information would refer to it first.  
RL1’s opinion was consistent with the tax practitioners’ view that the IRBM 
website was out-of-date and less user-friendly (TD, 2006). It was also noted 
during a meeting between IRBM officers and tax practitioners that some newly-
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released information - for example, the latest issue of Public Ruling - was not 
updated onto the website (TD, 2006). A further complaint was voiced that 
information which had been administered by IRBM was not found on its own 
website and could only be obtained on that of the Ministry of Finance (TD, 2006).  
Tax practitioners recommended that IRBM should update its website regularly so 
that the latest information was available. In addition, RL1 suggested that IRBM 
should maximise its effort in publishing tax information through its own website 
since this was the cheapest method of advertising, as well as being the most 
effective means of reaching an unlimited number of taxpayers. This suggestion is 
consistent with a recommendation from OECD (2010e) that the tax administration 
should enhance its service delivery to the public through electronic services. 
Section 7.5 highlights IRBM’s initiatives in providing various e-Services to the 
public. RL1 advises that:  
“Taxpayers should also take advantage of free e-Services to learn more about tax 
matters through the website because most of the information that a taxpayer needs to 
know, such as registration and filing requirements, tax payment, audit and 
investigation procedure, as well as other useful information, is published on the 
website.” (Interview: RL1)  
A number of interviewees expressed their concern over the e-Filing promotion in 
2010, which was aired on radio and television only during the last week of the 
submission deadline. RL1 commented: “Indirectly it gives a message for the 
people to do (e-Filing) last minute”. Similarly, RL4 emphasised the importance of 
promoting e-Filing much earlier through the media, especially radio and 
television, in order to alert and encourage taxpayers to also submit their e-file 
earlier. Although IRBM had taken the initiative to implement a number of 
education programmes, RL9, RL17, RL18 and others believed that the Board 
should enhance the education programmes to reach more taxpayers, especially 
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those living in remote areas,  since there remained many who were unaware of 
their responsibilities regarding filing tax returns and paying tax. As suggested by 
Loo et al. (2010, p.21), IRBM could reach out to taxpayers in “all geographical 
locations in Malaysia” to deliver tax knowledge.  
One of the initiatives recommended by responsive regulation is to adopt soft 
approaches in order to minimise operational cost. Comments by the participants 
imply that important information or news could not be distributed to the public in 
time. It is clear, therefore, that  disseminating information through the IRBM 
website is a method by which news can be broadcast more easily, faster and 
effectively, particularly if it is kept up-to-date by an active website team. 
8.4 Education about compliance obligations 
“Tax knowledge is positively related to tax compliance” (Kirchler et al., 2008 , 
p.216). Prior research on tax knowledge and tax compliance in Malaysia 
(Kasipillai, Aripin and Amran, 2003; Ahmad, Mohd Hanefah and Mohd Noor, 
2003; Mohamad, Ahmad and Deris, 2010) indicates that tax knowledge is very 
important for the successful implementation of SAS and has significant influence 
on tax compliance behaviours. All branches of IRBM understand the importance 
of education in fostering compliance and play a significant role in disseminating 
information to the public at district and state level. According to RL7 and RL18, 
the branches carried out educational activities such as Business Support courses to 
educate traders on accurate record-keeping and on customer services during the 
Taxpayer Service Month, and to train Tax Relation Officials (TRO) as agents to 
educate the employees and employers on tax matters.  
A few IRBM branches had taken proactive approaches in educating the taxpayers 
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within their regions. For example, RL10 sent the branch’s Public Relation Officer 
(PRO) to the local radio station to gain a slot on the radio channel. Through the 
radio, information on taxation, including guidance on how to fill in return forms, 
the types of relief which could be claimed and the methods of submitting the 
forms, was easily transmitted to the radio listeners. This method was effective in 
disseminating tax education to a wider range of people. The branch also worked 
closely with District Officers (DOs) and Members of Parliament (MPs) so that 
information could be communicated to the highest level of officers. The DOs and 
MPs would then issue directives to their subordinates to comply with the tax laws. 
Similarly, RL6 reported that his branch also visited the dignitaries, the Chief 
Ministers, the Executive Council and senior government officers at state level.  
During these visits, IRBM officials delivered information on the tax system and 
taxpayers’ responsibilities to the state senior officers. RL6 considered this 
approach to be an effective way of conveying information to the public sectors. 
However, RL4 felt that the educational activities would be more effective if 
implemented by the Customer Service Department (CSD) at headquarters level 
(HQ) so that “the speed of dissemination is faster, rather than we do it ad-hoc, 
because in branches the manpower is very limited.”  
The interviewees’ responses indicated that both the executives at HQ level and 
directors at the branch level held a similar perception of the importance of 
education to increase tax compliance. This is because both parties share the same 
objectives: to disseminate information and knowledge to taxpayers; to encourage 
them to comply with tax law; and at the same time to reduce tax non-compliance. 
The only difference is in the role of the executives at HQ and branch level: HQ 
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level is involved in policy-making and strategy design and delivers instructions to 
branches to be implemented, while the branches have the responsibility of 
carrying out the instructions received from HQ to ensure the desired objectives are 
achieved.  
It is interesting to note from the findings that some interviewees representing the 
branches appeared to be suggesting that certain activities should be executed by 
HQ, i.e. they were implying indirectly that they were incapable of performing as 
expected by HQ due to the limited resources at the branches, as highlighted in 
Chapter 5. They also felt that if education was delivered at national level, 
information could reach more people. On the other hand, members of HQ staff 
held a different view. They considered that, as branches were located closer to 
where the taxpayers lived, it would be much easier for them to approach taxpayers 
and deliver the required information. Nevertheless, from the feedback, officials at 
both levels appeared to have carried out their role successfully, through various 
educational activities, to ensure that education was extended to the desired group 
of taxpayers. Feedback from branch officials indicated that their views were near 
identical, due to the implementation of activities at branch level based on planning 
and decisions from HQ through regular internal orders such as IRBM Operation 
Circulars and Directives and Audit Directives. 
8.5 Early education about taxation obligations 
Recognising the importance of raising tax awareness among school students, 
IRBM has taken the initiative to collaborate with the Ministry of Education to 
organise awareness campaigns at school level, one of which is an Inter-School 
Essay Competition. This competition, which commenced in 2002, invites 
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participation from secondary school students in writing an essay on subjects such 
as taking responsibility for paying taxes and the importance of taxes for national 
development (IRBM, 2002). To further enhance knowledge of taxation and to 
evaluate the students’ understanding of taxation matters, a Revenue Speech 
Competition was introduced in 2003 for Form 6 students who were asked to 
deliver a speech on a given topic (IRBM, 2003). When attending the competition 
in 2007, the author was impressed by the success in which students delivered 
speeches and their basic knowledge of the tax system and tax administration. Both 
the essay writing and the speech competition have become an annual event and 
have received an overwhelming response from schools throughout the country. 
Most of the interviewees agreed that IRBM had successfully achieved its 
objectives to raise awareness and cultivate interest in taxation among the younger 
generation through these events. 
One of the major educational activities conducted by IRBM is within the field of 
early childhood tax education. The importance of early childhood education has 
been highlighted in several studies (Elliot, 2006; Woodhead, 2006; Currie, 2001) 
which indicate that children's brains are able to absorb new information. 
Consistent with findings from these studies, eight interviewees concurred that 
awareness about taxation should be incorporated into the school curriculum for 
younger children. It is important for them to understand the significance of tax 
from an early age, so that they will grow up to be tax-literate adults and realise 
that tax is necessary for the development of the country (Kornhauser, 2007; Elliot, 
2006). RL2, RL5, RL6 and four others believed that taxpayer education should 
begin at primary school as its students were potential taxpayers in the future; 
indeed, IRBM’s latest plan is to educate the younger generation. According to 
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RL8:  
“To create awareness on taxation in Malaysia, the pupils will be introduced to the 
IRBM logo, what it stands for, and why the government needs to collect tax. To 
make the education more interesting and easy to understand, the information will be 
delivered in cartoon format.” (Interview: RL8)  
However, RL8 observed that the impact of childhood tax education would only be 
seen when these students entered employment in fifteen to twenty years’ time.  
Nevertheless, this ‘human capital investment’ (Weisbrod, 1962) is essential to 
develop a future society that is knowledgeable about tax.  
Currently, educational activities are maximised during the ‘Tax Payers Service 
Months’ from April to June every year, which marks the period of return form 
submission by individual taxpayers in the country. As suggested by RL1, RT5, 
RL12 and RL18, tax education should be carried out continuously throughout the 
year and on a nationwide basis, so that it could be accessed by more people. 
Furthermore, since tax was a subject that interested only a few people and was 
difficult to understand, RL5 and RL12 recommended that information be 
conveyed in a layman’s format to encourage engagement.  
“Format of return form needs to be simplified so that it is easier for the taxpayers to 
fill out the form.” (Interview: RL19) 
The interviewees agreed that continuous educational programmes and greater ease 
of filing returns might facilitate tax compliance. Their opinions were consistent 
with Loo et al. (2010), McKerchar (2003) and Choong and Wong (2011) who 
advise that voluntary compliance should be fostered, and that the tax 
administration should simplify not only the format of the return form but also the 
tax system and the tax law to make them easier to understand (Russell, 2010a).  
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8.6 Education about sanctions to act as deterrent 
As an enforcement agency, IRBM has two methods for delivering education: the 
soft (carrot) approach and the hard (stick) approach (Braithwaite, 2002; Andreoni 
et al., 2003). This section discusses hard approaches conducted by IRBM to 
educate those who refuse to abide by the laws. From the interviews, majority of 
the participants agreed that penalties, raids and legal actions are among the 
enforcement strategies to be adopted by IRBM as education to deter non-
compliance. 
 
A few interviewees agreed that IRBM should highlight to the public the 
consequences for failure to comply with the law. RL1 admitted that IRBM had not 
explicitly informed members of the public about the likely punishment if they 
were convicted of tax offences. As there are many penalty regimes under the 1967 
Income Tax Act, RL7 emphasised the importance of creating awareness of the 
penalties imposed on certain offences.  
“(There are) so many penalties. So we have to tell the taxpayers that they must be 
aware of all the enforcement issues. (If) you fail to submit, you would be penalised 
under section 112(3). Not only for failure to submit return, but also to tell them, even 
though you submit your return, but if you don’t report properly, you’ll be penalised 
under section 113(2). If they submit the return but they don’t pay, they’ll be 
penalised under section 103. Apart from that there are other penalties on instalment.”  
(Interview: RL7) 
Similarly, RL13 believed that the public should also be informed about 
imprisonment for failure to make any payment. At present it seemed that a large 
number of taxpayers were still unaware that tax evasion could lead to 
imprisonment. The importance of knowledge about enforcement was emphasised 
by RL20 and others:  
“We should highlight the enforcement activities so that the public is aware that we 
are serious about managing non-compliance. There should be more information on 
enforcement, penalties, punishment. Enough talk, now we have to take action.” 
(Interview: RL20) 
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“Hard approaches such as raiding operations and prosecution might be necessary to 
prevent the tax offenders from committing tax crime again. The purpose is not to 
create fear to the public but to educate them about their responsibility and the 
repercussions if they fail to fulfil their duty.” (Interview: RL19) 
“We have done enough education for the public. We should focus on enforcing the 
law and we need to take harsh action on non-complying taxpayers.” (Interview: 
RL16) 
“IRBM should take tougher and more serious action on those in default by 
implementing a comprehensive enforcement for each segment of taxpayers.” 
(Interview: RL8) 
In their interviews, participants emphasised that enforcement activities such as 
field audit and investigation should be strengthened so that taxpayers who failed 
to provide IRBM with correct information were penalised. These responses 
highlighted that some IRBM officials were still comfortable with the traditional 
approach in enforcing compliance, and resisted change to the responsive 
regulatory approach. This attitude is consistent with the findings by Job and 
Honaker (2003), who reported a complaint from one of their interviewees from 
the ATO about the Compliance Model: 
“The Compliance Model is irrelevant in ninety five per cent of dealings with clients. 
We should start again…go back to audit and refine the way we do audits. We could 
have refined the audit process. [Instead] we just said it wasn’t working.” (Job and  
Honaker, 2003, p.119)  
Job and Honaker (2003) note that staff involved in traditional approaches such as 
long-term investigation have a tendency to be resistant toward accepting new 
enforcement approaches as suggested by the Compliance Model. However, to 
encourage understanding and acceptance of the new responsive approach by this 
group of people, champions should be appointed to promote the concept to their 
colleagues (Hobson, 2003).  
However, as posited by Scholz (1984), Feld and Frey (2005) and Franzoni (1998), 
when taxpayers resist the soft approach, then the hard approach is to be enacted to 
enforce compliance. A range of enforcement activities conducted by IRBM are 
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outlined below (IRBM, 2009): 
 penalty imposition based on offences  
 sanction from leaving the country due to non-payment  
 tax audit (desk audit and field audit)  
 investigation  
 prosecution (civil suit and criminal suit)  
 imprisonment  
Among the enforcement activities, tax audit receives the most complaints from the 
public, especially from tax practitioners. The minutes of the meeting between 
IRBM and tax practitioners indicate that tax practitioners in Malaysia find IRBM 
to be less transparent in its conduct:  
“There is a lack of transparency and consistency in the IRBM's approach to tax 
audits. There are cases where different treatments were adopted on the subject matter 
which is handled by different officials. The professional bodies have also been 
informed that the IRB officials have been known to have reversed their past 
confirmations and verbal promises made during the course of tax audits.” 
(Document: Technical Dialogue (TD, 2006)) 
In the context of tax audit, the purpose of auditing taxpayers’ accounts is to 
educate and assist taxpayers to comply in completing their return forms truthfully 
and in paying their tax obligation on time. Tax practitioners therefore urged 
IRBM officials to give taxpayers the benefit of the doubt in genuine cases, instead 
of adopting a pre-conceived mind-set that taxpayers were under-declaring their 
tax liability. In this regard, Feld and Frey note: 
“Tax evasion can therefore be mitigated if expected fines are sufficiently high to 
deter taxpayers from cheating.” (Feld and Frey, 2005, p.5) 
On the other hand, if a taxpayer made errors, for instance, in the calculation of tax 
liabilities, as suggested by Feld and Frey (2005), the tax authority should refrain 
from imposing harsh penalties and instead make an effort to contact the taxpayer 
for an explanation. This soft approach may encourage taxpayers to reciprocate by 
complying voluntarily (Feld and Frey, 2005; Alm and Torgler, 2004; Wenzel, 
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2002).  
8.6.1 Penalty imposition 
Penalty imposition is one of the traditional approaches practised by IRBM for 
deterring tax evasion. Other enforcement activities imposed on tax defaulters 
include compounds, prosecution and sanctions. Most of the interviewees agreed 
that the penalty rates imposed by IRBM were quite high. As illustrated in 
Appendix 2, a range of penalties are imposed on various types of offences. This 
information can be easily accessed by the public from the IRBM website. As 
noted earlier, enforcement should not be seen as a punitive action but rather for 
the purpose of education and deterrence. RL2 and RL8 hoped the public would 
understand that the threat of a penalty would prevent them from committing the 
offence and would inform others of the repercussions for failing to abide the rules; 
future compliance would thus be fostered (Hasseldine, 2012):  
“That’s why we have the penalty regime to address this. But we don’t want to 
penalise people. The penalty is there to prevent you from doing this; we don’t want 
you to do this. But since you do this, we have no choice but to penalise you. So these 
are the things that we need to address.” (Interview: RL2) 
“Penalty should be seen as deterrence for non-compliance and not as punishment on 
taxpayers. Though it may appear to be a harsh way of educating taxpayers, they need 
to be informed that due to their failure to comply they have to face the 
consequences.” (Interview: RL8) 
The above statements demonstrated fairness in the way in which IRBM enforced 
the law and reflected procedural justice to honest taxpayers. As a result, IRBM 
and the tax system will gain trust and respect from taxpayers. Kirchler et al. 
(2008, p.214) posit that “seeing dishonest taxpayers punished would increase trust 
on behalf of the honest taxpayers”.   
According to RL2 and RL17, due to insufficient personnel and financial 
resources, IRBM was unable to enforce the law effectively, especially when 
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conducting field audit on taxpayers who appeared to have submitted dubious 
reports in their return forms. The main purpose of auditing is to educate taxpayers 
in the correct way to report their income and expenses. Interviewees RL1, RL3, 
RL9 and RL15 all asserted that, because of constraints faced by IRBM, auditing 
could not be conducted on a regular basis and could focus only on clear-cut non-
compliance cases.  
As stated by RL13, “actually our tax law is very strong but the problem is, 
implementation is very weak”. Interview responses indicated that the number of 
penalty rates was considered high for Malaysian society, but due to the weakness 
on the part of IRBM personnel in implementing the enforcement of the rules, non-
compliance could not be curbed effectively. Weak implementation could again be 
attributed to the internal risk presented by the shortage in manpower for 
conducting desk audit and field audit, as stated in Section 5.2. 
The study has identified mixed responses from the interviewees regarding penalty 
rates. Some indicated that the structure of rates should be improved to avoid 
imposing hefty penalties on taxpayers, which may result in a heavy financial 
burden to pay the tax due as well as the penalty amount. For instance, RL8 
cautioned that if the penalty was too high, then IRBM’s intention to promote 
voluntary compliance would be difficult to achieve, while it was  RL8’s 
experience, being involved in the education programmes, that 
“…taxpayers were more concerned about the amount of penalties than submission 
procedures or registering new accounts, hence their reluctance to come forward to 
declare their income.” (Interview: RL8) 
RL8 also foresaw the possibility of taxpayers resorting to ‘under-the-table’ 
transactions with tax officers or tax consultants in order to avoid fines, thus 
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creating an opportunity for corruption. This concern was echoed by RL9, who 
agreed that the penalty rate should not be too high, although high enough for 
unscrupulous taxpayers to ‘feel the pinch’. In contrast, RL25 agreed that penalty 
is high.  He came across a few taxpayers who, when imposed on penalty, uttered 
“Oh! The rate is higher now! I have to make sure I report accurately next year”.  
This shows that enforced compliance may increase compliance, however it may 
create dissatisfaction amongst taxpayer due to having to pay more for tax.  
According to RL4, most penalty rates, fines or compounds in Malaysia were 
imposed on a flat-rate basis. For example, if an employer made less deduction or 
made a late payment for the Monthly Tax Deduction (MTD) payment, such 
offences were treated identically, even though they were different. RT4 and RT5 
suggested that penalty rates should be based on the degree of the offence, whereby 
minor offences would receive a lower penalty rate while serious offences deserved 
higher rates. Taxpayers would appreciate the justice of this approach, and thus 
they would be willing to comply with the law. A further example was offered by 
RT4: 
“… mistakes were made when completing return forms. Some of the mistakes were 
careless mistakes in terms of miscomputation whilst others were obvious mistakes 
that showed taxpayers have the intention to cheat. Hence, penalty rates should be in 
accordance with the seriousness of offences so that fair treatment is rendered to tax 
offenders.” (Interview: RL4) 
However, RT5 believed that the current penalty rates were sufficient. According 
to him, the common complaints from taxpayers were not about the rates but about 
the fact that the penalties were imposed late, sometimes after a few years. RT5 
advised that the penalty imposition process would be more effective if penalties 
were in more timely manner, which in turn might improve compliance. 
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The mixed views expressed by the participants conform to previous research on 
literature which indicates a varied response about the implication of penalty rates 
on compliance behaviour. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Sandmo (2004) 
suggest that a high rate of penalty may increase compliance; in contrast, empirical 
evidence provided by Papp and Takats (2008) find that a lower tax rate increases 
compliance. Furthermore, Kirchler et al. (2008) posit that a degree of trust 
determines the impact of tax rates on compliance: “The impact of the tax rate 
would depend on the degree of trust”.  
When trust is low, a high tax rate results in low compliance; on the other hand, 
when trust is high, the same level of tax rate results in higher compliance. 
However, findings by Palil (2010), Devos (2009) and McKerchar (2003) have 
concluded that the penalty rate has no significant relationship with tax 
compliance. Devos suggests that “penalties should be used in combination with 
other measures such as taxpayer education and services in order to achieve greater 
compliance” (2009, p.36). 
As proposed by RL5 and RL6, there was a need to identify why enforcement was 
easier to implement in tax administrations of developed countries compared with 
those of developing countries. RL5 presumed that developed countries might have 
adopted specific schemes of legal tax avoidance. He also claimed that Malaysian’s 
penalty regime was too lenient, while in the West it was too rigid, hence the 
higher compliance rate. According to RL5, this depended on society and 
circumstances:  
“Not all the West has done was right and applicable to our society.” (Interview: 
RL5). 
RL5 implied that not all aspects of implementation by developed nations can be 
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instigated by developing nations. Regulators in developing countries are 
confronted by various constraints, such as a lack of human and financial 
resources, inferior information technology systems, and a lack of expertise in 
technical knowledge, all of which result in an inefficient administration (OECD, 
2011; Braithwaite, 2006; Gill, 2003). Similar constraints are faced by IRBM 
(discussed in Chapter 5). Moreover, due to these limitations, the regulatory 
agencies in developing countries are incapable of conducting compliance 
enforcement effectively and efficiently (Braithwaite, 2006; Gill, 2003; OECD, 
2011).  
Responsive regulation theory allows regulators to prioritise their enforcement 
strategies on high risk cases (Braithwaite, 2007; Baldwin and Black, 2007). If a 
persuasive approach is first adopted and proves successful, where the cost of a 
regulatory strategy is lower at the base than at a higher level then there will be 
more resources to be used toward fostering compliance (Braithwaite, 2003). This 
approach may reduce the cost of enforcement for tax authorities because resources 
will be allocated appropriately to areas of highest concern in order to meet overall 
objectives where the result may produce higher returns (Braithwaite, 2006; 
Braithwaite, 2003; Baldwin and Black, 2007; Freedman, 2011). To overcome 
enforcement constraints faced by developing countries, Braithwaite (2006, p.884) 
suggests developing countries adopt responsive regulation as they “have less 
regulatory capacity than developed countries”.   
8.6.2 Difficulty in prosecuting delinquent taxpayers 
A few interviewees, including RL2, RL7, RL13 and RL19, claimed that it was not 
easy for IRBM to implement certain rules, such as taking tax offenders to prison, 
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even though the tax law stated that this treatment was allowed. This was due to 
such factors as political interference, court rulings and public perceptions that 
should be considered. According to RL9 and RL13, it was part of Malaysian 
culture to offer sympathy and never use punishment, which was a further strong 
factor affecting success in enforcement. They felt that taxpayers might be alerted 
through taxpayer education to their responsibilities and eventually might change 
their perception to comply with the tax law: 
“It’s not that we (IRBM) are weak, but sometimes we (Malaysians) are sympathetic; 
our culture can’t accept it, so it caused political interference. When we want to 
impose something, want to imprison someone, it’s difficult.” (Interview: RL13) 
With regard to the imprisonment of tax offenders, there was consensus among 
RL2, RL5, RL7, RT1 and RT4 that courts in Malaysia had not imposed the penal 
provision whereby people who were charged for tax evasion were imprisoned:  
“Even though the Malaysian tax law is sufficient to prosecute tax defaulters, IRBM 
has to get cooperation from the court in order to implement the law.” (Interview: 
RT4)  
“It was due to most people’s perception that tax non-compliance is not a serious 
offence such as murder or rape. That may be the reason where even though a 
taxpayer was found guilty by the court of tax fraud, the tax offender will receive a 
very minimum fine.” (Interview: RL2) 
“A long time ago there used to be one or two cases from the Criminal Investigation 
Department where taxpayers were imprisoned, however nowadays there are no cases 
of imprisonment by the court.” (Interview: RL5) 
 
These responses indicated that regulators, especially in developing countries, 
faced another challenge to enforcing regulation due to interference from outside 
parties such as politicians, wealthy individuals and even the court. In this regard, 
Prichard (2010) and Uslaner (2010) posit that in some African countries, and even 
in Russia, regulators have been prevented in enforcing the law because of 
interference from politicians using their influence, and from wealthy individuals 
through such corruption activities as bribery and misappropriation of power. 
However, there is no implication on the part of this study that the court’s decision 
243 
 
not to imprison tax offenders is due to any corruption activities, but rather to 
reasons known only to it. Further investigation could be conducted in order to 
explore the court’s perception of imprisonment for tax offenders. 
8.6.3 Soft approach with big stick 
Literature suggests that enforcement is part of an education which can be 
implemented based on a carrot-and-stick approach. The ‘carrot’ approach is a soft 
educational method to motivate and encourage the public to comply, while the 
‘stick’ approach is a hard method of education which aims to punish those who 
fail to conform with the law (Braithwaite, 2002; Andreoni et al., 2003). RL7 
advocated the carrot-and-stick approach should be adopted by IRBM because it 
may have both a direct and an indirect effect on taxpayers:  
“For example, a taxpayer is investigated due to failure to declare his or her income 
correctly. The direct effect from this enforcement activity will be the taxpayer will 
learn a lesson and may not dare to evade tax again. The reason being penalty for the 
first offence is 45% whilst for subsequent offences, the penalty increases from 10% 
to 100%, or the taxpayer will be charged in court with a criminal offence. As for the 
indirect effect, other taxpayers who are aware of such action against non-compliance 
will not dare to evade tax. Through publicity other taxpayers will be informed of 
IRBM actions on tax offenders; this may spur them to voluntarily declare their tax 
correctly.” (Interview: RL7) 
This opinion concurs with Kirchler et al. (2008) that taxpayers may trust the 
system and procedural justice when they find out authorities take action, such as 
tax audit and court action, on taxpayer who failed to comply. Thus, the trust may 
increase their motivation to comply. In this context, a field audit by IRBM could 
be considered to be a soft approach to provide information of tough enforcement 
to be enacted while wielding the big stick (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). This is 
based on the practice of field audit when visiting ‘suspected’ tax offenders, 
whereby financial documents and other related evidence are requested by IRBM 
auditors for further scrutiny. The visit also serves as a warning that if they are 
caught intentionally misreporting tax liability, then a severe penalty will be 
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imposed. 
 “In Malaysia, the way the people is educated is wrong. We don’t give complete 
information to the taxpayers. We must let the public know that paying tax is their 
liability to the country, not their responsibility. It means that taxpayers owe 
government the tax. Tax is a payment for the product they used in the country. In the 
USA, within ten days of the assessment, payment has to be made immediately. If 
they don’t pay tax, it is considered you owe the government. So while you are 
driving, your car could be confiscated from you immediately. Our authority needs to 
get judgment from the court before we can caveat taxpayers’ assets. The public think 
that the law is harsh.” (Interview: RL13) 
There appears to be a lack of publicity about educating those who contravene the 
law. Both RL1 and RL13 expressed their frustration in that IRBM had not issued 
enough information to the public regarding the impact of non-compliance of tax 
law.  
During the desk audit activities, it appeared that many taxpayers were not 
reporting truthfully on their income or were making false claims. Four 
interviewees believed it might take at least five years for the public to be self-
regulated. In order to encourage self-regulation, all interviewees agreed that 
IRBM should do more to enhance educational programmes, improve tax 
administration and establish an efficient tax system.  
To encourage voluntary compliance from taxpayers, RL3, RL13, RL19 and other 
auditors recommended that IRBM to simplify reporting procedures so that 
taxpayers such as traders, who had no knowledge of preparing business records 
but who could not afford to hire a tax practitioner, were allowed to present a 
simple business report to IRBM.  They also suggested that IRBM to be proactive 
in learning and understanding the nature of the business in order to ascertain how 
the business operated and how profit was derived. If IRBM penalised them 
without understanding the business nature, then the taxpayers would believe that 
they were being treated unfairly, and would therefore be reluctant to comply 
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voluntarily.  
As noted by Alm et al. (2010), even though punishment is one of the important 
tools to fight against non-compliance, a ‘kinder and friendlier’ service for 
taxpayers should be emphasised to encourage them to comply. For responsive 
regulation to work efficiently, tax administrations could adopt a flexible 
mechanism to educate and accommodate different requirements by different type 
of taxpayers (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). By identifying different categories of 
taxpayers and prioritising the highest risk taxpayers, this approach would enable 
IRBM to target educational resources toward the groups of taxpayers who most 
need information about tax.  
A few interviewees referred to the need for IRBM to highlight to the public the 
consequences of failing to comply with the law. RL1 admitted that IRBM had not 
explicitly informed the public of the various types of punishment they could incur 
if convicted of tax offences. She felt that there was a need for the Board to provide 
information about penalties for non-compliance. As there are many penalty 
regimes under the 1967 Income Tax Act, RL7 emphasised the importance of 
creating awareness of the penalties imposed for certain offences. Some 
interviewees, including RL1, RL13, RL17 and RL19 also highlighted the 
importance of informing the public about punishments for failure to comply with 
the law. Their opinions were consistent with Leviner (2009), Feld and Frey (2005) 
and Scholz (1984) in that strict punishment from the authority might influence 
compliance with the law.  
The interviewees believed that the public should be made aware of the penalties 
that could be imposed if they failed to submit or pay on time or to report correctly, 
246 
 
as well as being informed of other offences which might lead to imprisonment. 
However, they suggested that punishment should not be viewed as threatening and 
aggressive on the part of IRBM but rather as educative and as a deterrent to non-
compliance. If other soft approaches failed, the hard approaches might be 
appropriately adopted to manage non-compliance, as suggested by empirical 
evidence that fear of being detected and penalised may induce greater compliance 
by the taxpayers (Feld and Frey, 2005; Braithwaite, 2003; Franzoni, 2009). 
In line with the carrot and stick approach described by Braithwaite (2002) and 
Andreoni et al. (2003), RL9 also spoke of the soft and hard approaches to 
taxpayer education. Most of the educational activities implemented by IRBM, 
such as talks, seminars and training, are perceived as soft. In the context of 
educating non-compliant taxpayers, consistent with responsive regulation theory, 
RL9 suggested that hard approaches such as investigation and prosecution might 
be necessary to prevent tax offenders from re-committing tax crimes. The purpose 
was not to create fear but to educate the public about their tax responsibility and 
the repercussions if they failed to fulfil their duty.  
RL9’s point of view was consistent with Sandmo (2004), Andreoni et al., (1998), 
Slemrod and Yizhaki (2002) and Scholz (1984) who assert that taxpayers should 
be threatened  with a certain type of punishment if they failed to comply with the 
tax laws; this may in turn influence higher compliance. The interviewees proposed 
that field audit should be undertaken more frequently to encourage greater 
awareness among taxpayers of IRBM’s seriousness in tackling non-compliance, 
and that they (the taxpayers) would not be able to escape from the authority if 
they failed to comply. Similarly, Freedman (2011) refers to regulators allocating 
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audit and enforcement resources based on risk encountered during enforcement. 
The interviewees furthermore agreed that such action was essential to do justice to 
the taxpayers who were compliant and also to alert taxpayers that tax non-
compliance was morally wrong. This hard approach is also consistent with 
responsive regulation theory whereby the command-and-control approach is 
appropriate for high risk taxpayers who refuse to comply with the regulation 
(Braithwaite, 2003; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Andreoni et al (1998); Feld and 
Frey, 2005). 
The interviews demonstrated that all participants agreed the most effective way to 
improve tax compliance was through taxpayer education. Research also suggests 
that knowledge of taxation obligations may increase taxpayers’ ability to 
comprehend the system and to enable them to voluntarily carry out their duties as 
taxpayers (Alm et al., 2010; Richardson, 2006; Murphy, 2004). Prosecution 
should only be implemented as the last resort after all other efforts to educate, 
remind, assist and encourage are exhausted. The interviewees and the literature 
are consistent that prosecution should not be seen as a punishment but more as a 
corrective measure to educate the public about the impact of non-compliance. 
This action sends a signal to the public that they may not be able to escape from 
the law if they evade from it.  
As the literature suggests (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Feld and Frey, 2005; Kirchler 
et al., 2008; Devos, 2009), punishment may also portray transparency and fairness 
of procedural conduct by the authorities, and hence may build up public trust 
towards the system and the government.   
This chapter highlighted various education programmes undertaken by IRBM. 
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The dissemination of information and current news on the IRBM website and 
through the national radio is intended to distribute information more widely to the 
public. Those who seldom refer to the website may still obtain information 
through the radio. Nevertheless, IRBM may need to devise other strategies to 
reach a further group of taxpayers who neither use the website nor listen to radio 
broadcasts.  
Further, approaching young students to expose them to tax knowledge is a smart 
step taken by IRBM in an attempt to educate these future taxpayers of their 
responsibility as law-abiding citizens. This programme could be implemented 
continuously so that the students grow up in the knowledge that complying with 
tax law is important, thus encouraging them to become compliant voluntarily.  
As suggested by the Compliance Pyramid Model, desk audit to review suspicious 
reporting is another soft approach conducted by IRBM. This strategy is introduced 
to respond to taxpayer behaviour at the third level of the pyramid. However, for 
those who deliberately and continuously ignore the law, hard approaches such as 
field audit, penalties, investigations and court actions would then be taken.  
This section presents various enforcement mechanism enacted by IRBM to 
enhance knowledge to taxpayers with regards to their tax obligations. The next 
section discusses relationship between compliance behaviour of taxpayers, risk 
management and responsive regulation. 
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8.7  Relationship between taxpayer compliance behaviour, 
compliance risk management and responsive regulation 
At present, IRBM provides various approaches to disseminating knowledge to 
taxpayers. As stated earlier, there are educational activities to cater for the needs 
of different groups of public and taxpayers. Childhood education is for the benefit 
of future taxpayers; programmes through the mass media are aimed at the general 
public; seminars and visits to premises are promoted to employed taxpayers; and 
the BSS is directed at business-income taxpayers. Moreover, taxpayers who have 
a particular problem relating to tax matters may contact an IRBM call-centre to 
obtain a relevant explanation for their query. The call-centre agents provide 
assistance and advice on specific issues.  
The accounts of higher risk taxpayers found to be committing errors when 
completing their return form, either intentionally or unintentionally, will be 
audited by IRBM and they will be subjected to penalties. Further, for those who 
are found to be evading the law, their case will be placed under investigation and, 
if proven guilty, they may be prosecuted by the court. This approach is consistent 
with the Compliance Pyramid Model which displays the different levels of 
activity provided for different levels of taxpayer. 
It appears that, through its education programme, IRBM has conformed to the 
ethos of responsive regulation in managing compliance risk by classifying 
different types of taxpayers and providing varied types of education for them. By 
identifying taxpayers’ education requirements and the target group, IRBM would 
be able to design an education plan to communicate sufficient information to 
relevant parties. In the current economic situation, in which the financial resources 
of the organisation are somewhat limited, “a well-organised programme would 
250 
 
reduce the administrative cost to tax administrations as well as minimising 
compliance cost to taxpayers” (OECD, 1988).  
This study indicates that there is a relationship between responsive regulation, risk 
management and tax compliance which implies that a responsive approach such 
as education may have an impact in managing compliance risk in Malaysia. The 
relationship is further illustrated in the conceptual framework designed in this 
study and discussed in the following section. 
8.8 Conceptual Framework  
This section discusses a conceptual framework that overarches the two models 
adopted in this study, combining a compliance risk-based responsive regulation 
model and a risk management model.  
The conceptual framework known as the ‘Responsive Compliance Risk 
Management Framework’ has been designed and developed by the author, for this 
study, in order to illustrate the relationship between risk management and 
responsive regulation. This concept, which could be applied by regulators to 
enforce compliance through risk-based compliance management, is consistent 
with Russell (2010a, p.3) who noted that high risks could be identified through “a 
range of measures” – as depicted by the risk management framework, “to respond 
to significant risks” caused by non-compliance behaviour – in relation to the 
compliance pyramid model. This section explains how the framework is designed 
and the processes it involves, and justifies the ‘lamp-shade’ shape of the 
framework which replaces the familiar pyramid model. 
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identification, risk analysis, risk prioritisation, risk treatment and risk evaluation. 
However, the process does not stop at evaluation alone, but continues as an 
iterative loop to improve the process and to deal with new risks (EC, 2010). The 
five steps are undertaken as strategies to meet the objectives of tax administration 
within the context of the organisation.   
8.8.1 Risk-based Management Strategies 
During the risk identification process, the EC (2010) and the OECD (2009) 
suggest that potential risks could be identified, such as risk in the filing of tax 
returns, risk when declaring income and risk of non-payment of tax due. 
Meanwhile, risks also can be identified according to high, medium or detailed 
level, which may assist in setting priorities when managing risks.  Moreover, 
several sources, such as society support, new legislation, information from third 
parties, random audits, pioneer investigations and tax officials’ personal 
encounters with risks, would be useful to assist with risk identification (EC, 
2010). Risks which have been identified are then analysed to explore the reason 
for non-compliant behaviour.  
The EC (2010) suggests that tax administration could use a range of computer 
assisted tools, such as computer systems, data mining and data warehousing 
techniques to analyse risks efficiently. Risks that have been analysed are 
prioritised so that effective treatment can be offered. In the risk prioritisation 
phase, the Responsive Compliance Model illustrated in Figure 13 is used to 
determine appropriate strategies to treat specific risks, which in this case are 
taxpayers’ behaviour and responses towards tax compliance. In this way, effective 
treatment may be given to risks that have been prioritised.  Furthermore, this stage 
will produce a plan laying out risks to be treated and treatment options. This is the 
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first process in which risk-based management strategies are linked with the 
compliance model.   
In the next phase, risks that have been assessed are treated. This process also 
refers to the Responsive Compliance Model, which highlights appropriate 
responses by tax officials, depending on the level of compliance. As tax 
administration, especially in developing countries, appears to have limited 
resources (EC, 2010; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), the EC suggests that some of 
the risks could be transferred to other parties, such as financial institutions and 
other public agencies who may have more resources and may be more able to 
manage the risks efficiently. Risks could also be reduced through limiting 
opportunities for error by improving legislation or providing better services.  
Additionally, to reduce unintentional and intentional errors, tax administration is 
advised to provide taxpayer education through various methods, namely mass 
media, the internet, the telephone, help desks, electronic services and physical 
guidance. Finally, risks can be treated through risk covering to manage intentional 
non-compliance by adopting a policy of strict enforcement towards tax offenders 
(EC, 2010). Enforcement strategies such as field audits, inspections, penalties and 
imprisonment could be used as strict enforcement methods for those evading the 
law. Again, the risk-based compliance model displays appropriate strategies to be 
adopted by regulators in order to treat intentional non-compliance.  
The final process in the conceptual framework involves the evaluation of risk to 
ensure the objectives are achieved. The EC suggests that risk evaluation should be 
implemented at each stage of the process. However, the EC also argues that it may 
not be possible to evaluate all compliance activities due to high cost of resources. 
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Furthermore, there may be differences between compliance activities in terms of 
the complexity of the environment and the availability of data. Thus, the EC 
suggests that the evaluation of compliance activities could be done internally or 
externally.   
8.8.2 Responsive Compliance Model 
As discussed in Section 3.6.6, the risk-based compliance model illustrates various 
strategies that could be adopted by tax officials, based on taxpayers’ responses to 
compliance. As noted by Schneider (2006, p.8), “countries (the developed nation) 
with a better rule of the law, which is financed by tax revenues, also have smaller 
shadow economies”. However, in developing countries, the model is not quite 
suitable for adoption. Figure 13 shows that the shape of the compliance model 
differs from the pyramidal shape introduced by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) or 
the ATO’s and the EC’s compliance pyramid. Figure 13 shows that the shape at 
the top of the model is wider, which suggests the number of cases of deliberate 
fraud may be larger than those at other levels of compliance.  
Schneider (2006) argues that in developing countries the size of shadow 
economies or cash economies is larger and perhaps exceeds the number of 
taxpayers who are compliant. Therefore, the author believes that the compliance 
model could be in the shape of a ‘lamp-shade’ or an ‘hour-glass’, depending on 
number of shadow economy cases in certain countries. For example, Schneider’s 
(2006, p.23) shadow economy table for the year 2002/2003 for the Asian region 
shows that the rate of the shadow economy in Malaysia is 32.2% of GDP, which 
is lower than that of the  Philippines (45.6%) and Thailand (54.1%). Thus, the top 
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shape of the model for Malaysia would be smaller than that of the Philippines and 
Thailand, but bigger than Singapore (13.7%).  
The ‘lamp-shade’ model presented above suggests regulatory responses adopted 
by the IRBM in managing non-compliance risk. The model illustrates various 
educational activities undertaken by the IRBM that reflect taxpayers’ different 
attitudes towards compliance. For the majority of taxpayers who comply 
voluntarily, on-going education through publicity and assistance is provided by 
the Customer Service Department (CSD), branch officials and call-centres. 
However, continued attention is necessary for this group so that they remain 
compliant on a voluntary basis; otherwise the problem may escalate and that they 
may become reluctantly compliant.  
Reluctantly compliant taxpayers are those who wish to comply but, due to various 
reasons such as a lack of knowledge, lack of motivation, uncertainty and mistrust 
of the tax system, they may become reluctant to comply. It is possible that they 
also comply reluctantly due to a fear of being punished by the IRBM or pressured 
by peers and the society in which they live. Hence, this group of taxpayers needs 
encouragement and support from the IRBM so that they become voluntary 
taxpayers.  
The Zakat payers discussed in Section 6.3 as well as the Chinese self-employed 
taxpayers highlighted in Section 6.4 could fall in this category: they may want to 
comply but, due to their perceptions of the government or language constraints, 
they are unable to comply. Therefore, encouragement and support through the 
IRBM education programmes such as the BSS sessions, visits to taxpayers’ 
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premises and regular talks on national radio and television appear to be effective 
responses to enhance compliance among this group of taxpayers.  
Although no empirical study has been done by the IRBM to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the education programmes, increases in the amount of revenue 
collected, the number of return forms submitted and the number of new taxpayers 
registered from the introduction of SAS in 2004 until 2012 (Appendix 7) indicate 
that efforts by the IRBM have managed to enhance compliance among taxpayers 
in Malaysia. Complaints by taxpayers about IRBM services, either received 
directly from taxpayers, through the Public Complaints Bureau or through the 
mass media, have been addressed to improve the quality of service offered to the 
public. 
The next level represents responses towards the enforced compliance group of 
taxpayers. This group of taxpayers comprises those who have submitted returns 
but have failed to report the details correctly, or where the IRBM auditors were 
suspicious of claims, reliefs and expenses reported in the returns. Thus, the 
traditional approaches towards enforcement, such as desk audit and field audit are 
necessary to identify and assess the type and level of non-compliance so that 
appropriate treatment, such as advice, requests for additional documents and the 
imposition of penalties, can be enacted by officials from the Department of Tax 
Compliance and branch auditors.  
At the top level, taxpayers who deliberately attempt to evade their tax 
responsibilities would face stricter enforcement mechanisms from the 
investigation teams. The IRBM may be able to identify them from activities such 
as street-surveys, whereby IRBM officials visit business premises and street 
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vendors to obtain information about their business operation, the income 
generated and whether they have registered with the IRBM.  
From the conceptual framework, it appears that there could be a relationship 
between taxpayer compliance behaviour, compliance risk management and 
responsive regulation, whereby risk management and responsive regulation are 
the two main remedies for non-compliance behaviour as well as the fostering of 
voluntary compliance. The framework covers key aspects of risk management by 
highlighting the steps to be taken to manage risk and, at the same time, applying 
enforcement strategies responsively in the process. It would be interesting to see 
the framework tested in a real scenario of tax administration.  
8.9 Summary 
Data from the interviews and documents reveals that, in managing compliance 
risk, IRBM has provided various educational and training activities to taxpayers in 
order to promote tax knowledge to the public. The findings are consistent with the 
theory of responsive regulation where a soft approach, i.e. educational activity 
such as that conducted by IRBM, appears to be an appropriate regulatory strategy 
to communicate information to taxpayers and to increase their knowledge, thus to 
manage compliance risk. The interviewees further agreed that taxpayers’ lack of 
tax knowledge might influence their behaviour in tax non-compliance. Moreover, 
IRBM has shown an exemplary initiative in educating students at school to create 
awareness of taxation for future taxpayers.  
The research findings also reveal that, although the IRBM HQ and its branches 
have adopted different roles in managing compliance, officials at both levels have 
carried out their roles effectively, through various educational activities, to ensure 
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that education is extended to desired groups of taxpayers. Even though most 
participants agreed that the soft approach through education was the most 
effective method to encourage compliance, the study has discovered that some 
IRBM officials remained satisfied with the traditional approach in enforcing 
compliance and resisted a change to the responsive regulatory approach. They 
preferred to use punishment to enforce compliance rather than adopt a soft 
approach. There was a mixed response on penalty rates in the Malaysian tax 
system in that some participants believed that the rate was high while others 
considered it to be relatively low.  
From the interviews, the study finds that IRBM appears to be confronted by some 
constraints in enforcing the law due to interference from politicians. Malaysia is 
not the only country that faces this predicament - previous research indicates that 
third party interference is also experienced by other regulatory agencies, 
especially in transitive and developing countries. Further, this study suggests that 
there is a strong relationship between the major themes it explores, namely, 
taxpayer behaviour, compliance risk management and responsive regulation. The 
relationship is further illustrated through the conceptual framework developed in 
this study, with the lamp-shade shape model emphasising the size of shadow 
economy in developing countries. The following chapter provides conclusions for 
the findings of the investigation. Limitations of the study, together with 
recommendations for future research, are also addressed in this final chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter One, this study aims to conduct an empirical 
investigation into the internal and external risks faced by the IRBM and to obtain 
insights into its current practice in managing risk in its administration. The study 
also explores the application of responsive regulation in securing voluntary 
compliance by the IRBM. Findings from the study reveal that the IRBM appears 
to comply with responsive regulation theory through the implementation of 
various educational programmes to educate, assist and encourage taxpayers to 
comply with SAS requirements.  
The study contributes to the current knowledge of compliance risk management 
practice in tax administration. In spite of the research being in a Malaysian 
context, there are implications of relevance to other tax administrations. The 
findings provide a platform for the IRBM and other tax administrations in 
developing countries to evaluate their existing risk management practices and to 
understand how the concept of risk-based responsive regulation can be applied to 
improve voluntary compliance in their administrations. The study is still relevant 
for the future as tax administrations would be looking at responsive regulation and 
using ideas from the compliance pyramid to improve their service. As this study 
also focuses on tax non-compliance risks and taxpayer behaviour, tax 
administrations in other countries might be interested to learn how the Malaysian 
tax administration manages its non-compliance risks and the activities involved in 
taxpayer education programmes. 
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This chapter begins with Section 9.2, which summarises the key findings and 
implications of this research. This is followed by Section 9.3 which highlights the 
contributions provided by this study. Next, the limitations of the study are 
presented in Section 9.4, whilst recommendations for future research are 
described in Section 9.5. Section 9.6 addresses the policy implications to suggest 
improvements in the risk management strategies of the IRBM to minimise non-
compliance. Finally, Section 9.7 concludes the thesis. 
9.2 Discussion of Findings 
Tax administrations encounter various forms of risk that threaten their 
organisational objectives. Understanding the importance of systematic measures 
to manage the risks, the OECD (2009) advises revenue bodies to develop an 
efficient system to manage risks effectively. However, as drawn from the 
literature, most revenue bodies in developing countries appear to have limited 
capabilities, resources, knowledge and experience to develop and deploy 
sufficient frameworks to support risk management strategies. In this thesis, Ayres 
and Braithwaite’s (1992) concept of responsive regulation is considered as a 
strategy to manage not only compliance risk but also internal risks faced by the 
IRBM.  
Applying the concept of responsive regulation to the risk management process 
involves a mixture of soft and hard approaches to treat the actors of non-
compliance and to encourage them to comply voluntarily. At the same time, this 
concept promotes on-going assistance and support to those who comply regularly. 
A responsive regulation strategy appears to have been successfully implemented 
by the ATO (Job and Honaker, 2003). Learning from the ATO, other revenue 
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bodies have emulated the concepts according to their organisational requirements. 
However, a participant of this study commented that whatever is good for  
western countries may not be so well suited to the developing countries on 
account of a number of  limitations. As the scope of responsive strategies may be 
very wide, tax administrations with few financial or human resources may select 
activities of the greatest strategic importance to their overall success criteria.  
Tax administrations, especially in the developing countries, could switch from 
command and control to responsive regulation because of the advantages gained 
by this approach. By adopting a risk-based responsive concept, tax 
administrations also could change from the traditional approach, which involves 
aggressive treatment of taxpayers and the threat of penalties, to a softer approach. 
Taxpayer education could be adopted as a strategy to improve the understanding 
of tax obligations, whilst assistance and support are provided to enhance voluntary 
compliance.  
However, responsive regulation may not be applied easily and in a straightforward 
manner in developing countries. This is due to factors which may influence tax 
agencies to take certain actions against taxpayers. Unlike developed nations, 
politicians or high profile individuals in developing countries may intervene in the 
decision making of government agencies. Also, a responsive approach, which 
assumes that regulators and regulatees have a good relationship, may not be a 
suitable course of action in some developing countries where people’s behaviour 
may be influenced by culture, language, social beliefs and perceptions of the 
government.  
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Nevertheless, in the case of some risk management strategies, the step-by-step, 
bottom-up approach of responsive regulation may not be applicable and a firm 
approach may need to be adopted first, especially when handling an emergency or 
crisis situation. 
In relation to the topic of the research – compliance risk management strategies by 
the IRBM, feedbacks from participants and data from secondary documents show 
that different strategies are initiated by the IRBM to manage compliance risks. 
Discussions in Chapters Seven and Eight have highlighted both carrot and stick 
approaches practiced by the IRBM according to different categories of response 
by taxpayers. These measures are in line with the concept of risk-based responsive 
regulation (Figure 13), whereby the IRBM regulates according to types of 
compliance risks and compliance responses. Section 3.2 describes compliance 
risks as non-registration, non-reporting, incorrect reporting and non-payment or 
late payment of tax liabilities. The following sections discuss the findings from 
the study of the IRBM’s regulatory strategies to manage these risks.  
9.2.1 Strategies to manage non-registrant taxpayers 
Some taxpayers fail to register in the tax system due to ignorance of the 
requirement of law and some intentionally choose not to register for the purpose 
of evading their tax obligations. In its effort to manage and treat this type of risk, 
the IRBM has conducted various educational programmes for the general public 
as well as a specific group of potential taxpayers. Collaboration with the Ministry 
of Education and schools has enabled the IRBM to offer the opportunity to gain 
an early initial understanding of the tax system in Malaysia and the public 
responsibility to contribute to the nation’s development. Thus, early education 
programmes appear to be part of an on-going proactive effort by the IRBM to 
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create awareness among students and to inform future taxpayers of their 
responsibility to become compliant taxpayers. With this effort, today’s children 
may register voluntarily as taxpayers when the time comes for them to fulfil their 
duty as responsible citizens and self-regulated taxpayers.  
For employed citizens, the IRBM works together with employers to ensure that 
newly recruited employees who have taxable income are registered and MTD is 
deducted from their monthly remuneration. IRBM officials perform regular visits 
to employers’ premises to educate employers of their responsibilities in 
registering their employees, recording up-to-date information about their 
employees and submitting electronic reports every March. A TRO is appointed by 
employers as a contact person of the company to be trained by the IRBM so that 
information can be delivered efficiently to employers and employees.  
Meanwhile, to manage the risk of non-registration by business-income taxpayers, 
a street survey is conducted by the IRBM with visits to taxpayers’ businesses and 
checks on their business records. To establish that this activity is not an 
enforcement activity but an educational one, the activity is no longer called Street 
Survey but has been rebranded as ‘Lawatan Mesra Hasil’ (IRBM Friendly Visit). 
During the visit, IRBM officials verify taxpayers’ compliance as a registered 
taxpayer in the tax system. If they are found to be non-registered, they will be 
advised to register and their details are delivered to desk audits for further review. 
However, the study finds some shortfalls in the visits. All tax auditors commented 
that the activity could be improved to obtain more information about taxpayer 
compliance habits. As this is the only opportunity for the revenue officials to meet 
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taxpayers, they could optimise the meeting by providing education and advice 
about taxpayers’ responsibility to ensure that business records are kept in order.  
The study has found that taxpayers refuse to leave their business to attend IRBM 
workshops and, as the officials are already present at the business premises, they 
could allocate appropriate time to providing basic lessons about preparing a tax 
return, keeping basic business accounts, methods of paying tax liabilities and 
other tax related information.  
It would appear that further improvement by the IRBM is needed to ensure that 
the visits produce fruitful outcomes in terms of widening the tax base, educating 
taxpayers and creating awareness that the IRBM will occasionally be present to 
ensure compliance by taxpayers. If taxpayers refuse to seek the IRBM’s advice 
the organisation could then take the initiative to meet taxpayers. From the visit, 
underground economies may be detected effectively. However, this would be time 
consuming, requiring a large number of personnel and high allocation of financial 
resources. Therefore, the IRBM may need to set up effective measures to ensure 
the activity would be implemented regularly at reasonable cost to ‘catch’ non-
registered taxpayers, especially those involved in underground businesses.  
This study also raises concerns about the minimal effort made by the IRBM to 
pursue shadow economy activities, which obviously lead to a reduction in revenue 
collection. Even though the IRBM is aware of the threat brought by the shadow 
economy, this non-compliance activity could not be carried out due to insufficient 
numbers of staff. An IRBM recent initiative in setting up an e-commerce unit is 
an applauded effort to identify and explore businesses operated through online 
sales or auctions such as eBay, Facebook, blogs and websites. This process of risk 
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identification is an effective effort to identify non-registered businesses as well as 
non-registered taxpayers.    
The IRBM has also provided an electronic service, e-Daftar (e-Register) to enable 
taxpayers to register online. The website also furnishes various pieces of 
information about taxpayers’ tax obligations and highlights the e-Services 
available to help with tax matters. The service, which is available through the 
IRBM official website, allows taxpayers to register online. Moreover, with the 
establishment of two call-centres, in Kuala Lumpur (West Malaysia) and Kuching 
(East Malaysia), taxpayers may call the IRBM to obtain the information they may 
require. To those who are more comfortable writing to the IRBM, dedicated email 
addresses are provided to facilitate the sending of emails by taxpayers to specific 
IRBM officials.  
The Corporate Service Department is also available at HQ level to assist taxpayers 
in their tax matters, whilst at every branch of the IRBM there is a Customer Care 
Unit to help resolve taxpayers’ tax issues.  
In terms of general education programmes, the IRBM organises annual tax 
seminars to provide up-to-date information related to changes in taxation law. The 
seminars, which are conducted at various locations nationwide, are attended by 
tax practitioners, company owners, employers, professional bodies and the public. 
The IRBM continues to disseminate tax awareness and knowledge to the public 
with publicity through the media, including TV and radio programmes, major 
national newspapers and publications. These education campaigns are part of the 
strategy to manage non-registration compliance risk, whereby the public is 
informed of their role in working together with the government to build the nation 
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so that they realise that revenue is important to provide public services and 
welfare.  
In addition to e-Daftar, as described in Section 7.5, the IRBM has developed 
various e-Services to improve service delivery to the public. Electronic services 
appear to be cost effective measures to the public as well as the IRBM in terms of 
information gathering, a paperless environment and faster information delivery. 
Furthermore, the services expedited data processing, shortened manual processes 
and improved the IRBM responses to the public. As information is now readily 
available the public may have fewer excuses to claim ignorance of tax law in 
Malaysia. In March 2012, the IRBM introduced ‘m-filing’, which offers taxpayers 
an additional method to submit tax return forms, through mobile telephones. The 
IRBM is aware that the use of technology helps in reducing the risk of non-
registration and provides faster and more efficient services to taxpayers.   
9.2.2 Strategies to manage non-filing compliance risk  
For taxpayers who have registered but fail to file their returns, the IRBM system 
is able to identify such cases and a penalty for non-filing under Section 112(1) 
Malaysian ITA 1967 is applicable; if convicted, the person is liable to a fine not 
less than RM200 (£40) and not more than RM2, 000 (£400) or imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding six months or both. The penalty imposed for this offence is to 
prevent the occurrence of future non-filing risk whilst demonstrating fairness and 
justice to compliant taxpayers.  
Meanwhile, during the filing season every year, which is from March to June, 
taxpayers are constantly reminded through radio, TV and major newspaper of the 
submission date. The IRBM also sets up many e-Filing counters at all IRBM 
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branches to assist taxpayers in the submission of returns electronically. Taxpayers 
are given the option to file electronically or manually according to convenience, 
and IRBM officials at the counters will assist them with completing the forms to 
ensure that reporting is done correctly. In 2012, the CEO of IRBM extended the 
submission date of tax return forms for individuals as a ‘carrot’ for those who 
used e-Filing to file their returns.  
With the efforts made by the IRBM in providing the filing system, additional 
service counters, an extended submission deadline and extended hours for 
customer services, taxpayers do not have excuses for failing to file, unless it is 
their intention to evade their tax obligations. 
9.2.3 Strategies to manage compliance risk due to failure to report 
accurately 
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, for cases of failure to report, the IRBM carries out 
desk audits and field audits to examine taxpayers report their tax obligation 
accurately. During a desk audit, tax auditors may request that taxpayers provide 
additional documentation to support their claims or reports. Taxpayers may also 
be invited to the IRBM office to attend interviews if the auditors require 
additional information or seek to verify certain claims. When a field audit is 
conducted, taxpayers are notified by the IRBM prior the audit visit to the 
taxpayers’ premises. During the visits, auditors will request some financial 
documents and business reports to be verified against taxpayers’ reports in their 
return form. If they are found to be committing tax fraud, then a penalty is 
imposed on the taxpayers and additional assessment is raised. Meanwhile, for 
high-profile defaulters, a tax investigation is carried out by the IRBM tax 
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investigators whereby intentional tax evaders have high penalties imposed or are 
prosecuted in court.  
In Section 8.6, participants agreed that the enforcement measures conducted by 
the IRBM are not to be considered as punishment but to educate taxpayers of their 
responsibilities under the law to report their tax liabilities accurately. The study 
finds that most participants agreed that a penalty should be imposed on tax 
defaulters to prevent future compliance risk. From the enforcement approach, 
compliant taxpayers may believe in the tax system and trust in IRBM officials to 
regulate their duties in a fair and just manner. The findings are consistent with 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) compliance pyramid, which illustrates that the 
traditional enforcement approach is enacted at the peak of the pyramid as a 
sanction to deter taxpayers from non-compliance. Therefore, tax regulators may 
respond tit-for-tat towards taxpayer compliance behaviour to ensure compliance is 
regulated effectively.  
9.2.4 Strategies to manage non/late payment compliance risks 
Non-payment compliance risk is committed when taxpayers fail to pay tax due to 
the IRBM or make the payment later than the stated date. The IRBM provides 
several payment mechanisms to assist taxpayers in paying their tax due. For 
employees, tax payment is made through MTD by employers, whilst for business-
income taxpayers an instalment schedule is issued so that payments can be made 
by instalment. In addition, various payment methods have also been introduced by 
the IRBM to facilitate payment of tax.  
Taxpayers can choose any method of payment convenient to them, such as at 
IRBM counters, through appointed bank counters, by mailing cheques or postal 
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orders to the IRBM and through internet banking. Call-out Centre staff are 
assigned to call taxpayers to remind them to settle outstanding taxes, to inform of 
enforcement measures to be taken if they fail to comply and to assist those in 
financial difficulty to reschedule their instalment plan. These are soft approaches 
initiated by the IRBM to encourage taxpayers to comply voluntarily with their tax 
payment obligations. With all the facilities provided, when taxpayers fail to pay 
various actions are then taken to manage these non-payment compliance risks. 
When taxpayers fail to pay or are late in making payments, they are subjected to a 
5% and 10% penalty under Section 103 ITA. Furthermore, a civil suit action is 
taken against taxpayers where the judgement may involve writs of confiscation or 
sale, debtor summonses or bankruptcy orders.  
Section 104 (S104) of the Malaysian tax law disallows taxpayers who fail to settle 
their tax liabilities from leaving the country until they settle the amount due. This 
uncompromising approach may be perceived by the public as unduly aggressive 
action by the IRBM. However, the enforcement measures are taken only after 
assistance, advice and warnings have been given to taxpayers. The author has 
experience of handling taxpayers with S104 cases where their outstanding tax 
debt was worth millions of Ringgit. Only when they were prevented from leaving 
the country, then they would visit the IRBM office to appeal for revocation, where 
finally they have to settle the debt before being allowed to travel abroad. This 
indicates that some taxpayers fail to comply not because they are ignorant or in 
financial difficulty, but as commented by a number of participants, they wanted to 
see if they could escape the law without being detected by the IRBM. Therefore, 
the author and other participants believe that sanction from leaving the country is 
an effective approach because taxpayers who are stopped at the airport by 
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immigration officials would immediately make the payment so that the IRBM 
would revoke their case and they are allowed to leave the country.  
While the S104 enforcement mechanism maybe suitable for some other countries 
to apply, some western countries may believe that the action is against human 
rights policy. This is the comment received by the author from some 
acquaintances in the UK when they were informed of the S104 law in Malaysia. 
The measures taken to manage the non-payment risks should be seen as education 
or warning to others of the repercussion of failure to comply with the law.  
Taxpayers, who were prevented from leaving the country or those who were 
penalised, would probably have informed close friends and relatives of the 
incidents (Franzoni, 1998; Sandmo, 2004; Torgler, 2003). This information would 
be a ‘free advertisement’ for the IRBM to make society aware of the repercussions 
of evading the law. As stated in the literature (Feld and Frey, 2005; Wenzel, 2002; 
Yong, 2011), an individual’s tax compliance is also influenced by social norms 
and cultural behaviour. When a member of society is sanctioned by the law, it is 
possible that others within the community may be affected by the action. As a 
result, they would be influenced to comply in order to avoid being penalised for 
non-compliance.  
9.2.5 Strategies to manage internal risks in the IRBM 
While earlier discussion concerns findings relating to external compliance risks 
and strategies undertaken by the IRBM to manage these risks, the study also 
highlights a number of key internal risks which have impact upon the IRBM’s 
organisational capabilities to achieve the desired objective. Internal risks faced by 
the IRBM, including financial constraints, a shortage of human resources, lack of 
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staff professionalism and technical knowledge and the lack of an efficient 
computer system, are consistent with the literature produced on the internal risks 
faced by other tax administration, particularly in developing countries.  
The IRBM also encounters resistance by a number of staff to change from a 
traditional approach to a responsive approach. As a regulatory body, IRBM staffs 
are accustomed to a command-and-control attitude when dealing with taxpayers 
and they may behave in an unfriendly, arrogant or threatening manner. This 
behaviour is unacceptable as it could result in the reputation of the IRBM being 
placed at risk. Similarly, the ATO was faced with this issue when the responsive 
regulation concept was first introduced in the office. In an effort to adopt the 
concept of responsive regulation in the administration, the Board encourages staff 
to treat taxpayers as ‘customers’ to deliver services responsively and in a friendly 
manner. Through continuous efforts to instil positive attitudes in staff and 
emphasise the importance of portraying a good image of the organisation to the 
public, resistance from staff could be reduced. From this study, risk-based 
responsive regulation (Black and Baldwin, 2010) which promotes the 
development of tools to manage risks appears to be applied by the IRBM.  
In its effort to manage internal risks in its organisation, the IRBM has 
demonstrated various tools, such as the IIP and ISP, to minimise risks and to 
control mismanagement of power in the IRBM. The IIP functions as a means of 
internal control to maintain personnel of high-integrity in the household of IRBM, 
working together towards the future direction of the organisation driven by the 
ISP. The IIP strengthens awareness programmes to combat corruption, 
malpractice and abuse of power within the IRBM, whilst the ISP provides 
272 
 
strategic planning to ascertain clear direction to accomplish organisational 
objectives within the time frame of the next five years. The motivation 
documented in both booklets is not only written as theory, but has proven  
effectiveness and ‘workability’, since the IRBM has successfully collected 
RM109.67 billion for the fiscal year 2011, which is RM23 billion more than the 
target set by the Ministry of Finance. The collection has broken through the two-
digit figure of past years’ tax collection into the new zone of three-digit revenue 
from direct taxes. This achievement was made possible through the IRBM’s 
focussed strategies on compliance, collection and publicity activities running 
simultaneously as inspired by the ISP and IIP.  
Findings also suggest that responsive regulation is applied by the IRBM to 
enforce compliance with organisation rules. In this context, the senior 
management represent the regulators while the personnel are the regulatees. By 
applying the theory of responsive regulation and the enforcement pyramid, senior 
managers may begin to encourage compliance from the bottom of the pyramid. 
Staffs who always comply with organisational expectations are rewarded with 
written appreciation, higher annual income increments and better chances for 
promotion. For those who fail to comply with the organisation rules, as suggested 
by responsive regulation, strict measures are applied through disciplinary actions, 
such as no annual income increment, no promotion or termination of services with 
the IRBM.   
9.2.6 Perception of Malaysian tax practitioners 
The study observes that tax practitioners encounter challenges from both IRBM 
officials as well as taxpayers. Unprofessional treatment by a number of IRBM 
officials, lack of knowledge in taxation technical aspects and lack of knowledge 
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of the industry, have led to lack of trust in the Board’s efficiency to deliver  
services to their customers, the tax practitioners. A lack of efficient record 
keeping by taxpayers, demands by clients to reduce tax liabilities and threats by 
clients to withdraw business contracts appear to be challenges to tax practitioners 
in managing their clients. The study also finds that a number of unethical tax 
practitioners cooperate with their clients to understate income and overstate 
claims in their reporting.  
Tax practitioners play important roles as intermediaries between revenue bodies 
and taxpayers to ascertain that compliance is in accordance with tax laws and 
regulations. Thus, unethical tax practitioners appear to be another external risk to 
be managed by the IRBM. Cooperation between these two parties is essential to 
ensure that the integrity of the tax system in Malaysia is upheld. The study 
suggests that both bodies continue to meet regularly to discuss any predicaments 
faced by them. Current jointly organised seminars between the Board and the tax 
practitioner association appear to be developing the relationship between them to 
meet the common objective of fostering voluntary compliance.   
9.2.7 Perception of Malaysian taxpayer compliance behaviour 
With respect to taxpayer behaviour, Section 3.3 highlights the various factors, 
such as trusting the tax system, compliance cost, tax knowledge, personal and 
social norms, tax morale and fear of punishment, which may influence taxpayers’ 
decision making with regard to compliance. In relation to the compliance 
behaviour of the Malaysian taxpayer, the study found that Chinese self-employed 
taxpayers, particularly street vendors, grocery or hardware stores owners, petty 
traders and food suppliers, appear to be the group of taxpayers with a high 
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percentage of non-compliance. The literature on traders in Malaysia also finds 
evidence consistent with this claim. The IRBM may need to disseminate tax 
knowledge in Chinese and other major languages through publications or the 
media so that the information can reach this group of taxpayers. Even though the 
majority of tax agents are Chinese, this does not help much because most self-
employed or small traders refuse to engage tax agents to handle their tax matters 
due to the additional operational cost to their business.  
The findings indicate that non-compliance within this group of taxpayer is the 
result of lack of knowledge, the language barrier, attitudes towards complying 
with the law and unwillingness to hire tax practitioners to manage their accounts 
due to the high cost. Social norms, culture and trusting the government perhaps 
would be other factors which influence their decision to comply. Therefore, 
further studies may be required to understand the failure of other ethnicities in 
Malaysia to comply. The findings from this study will help inform the IRBM and 
also tax practitioners of the measures to be taken to assist, regulate and encourage 
compliance amongst this group.  
Findings from the study also indicate that self-regulation in the Malaysian tax 
scenario may not be able to materialise in the near future as taxpayers are 
unwilling to embrace the concept. This is because most of them comply out of 
fear of punishment and mistrust the government with regard to spending the 
country’s revenue appropriately. The Malaysian ITA allows Muslim taxpayers to 
obtain a tax rebate after payment for Zakat. The study finds that there are two 
factors influencing Muslim taxpayers in Malaysia to pay Zakat: religious 
obligation and perceptions of government handling (or mishandling) of revenue. 
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Even though Islamic law requires Muslims to pay only 2.5% of their income for 
Zakat, the findings indicate that most Zakat payers contributed the amount 
equivalent to the tax charged. As a result, taxpayers are eligible to claim full 
rebate; hence less revenue goes into the government’s coffers.  
Some participants commented that taxpayers have chosen not to pay income tax 
as they refuse to contribute revenue to the government due to perception that the 
government is misusing the funds for political and personal agendas. The study 
observes that many participants suggested that the Malaysian public needs to be 
instilled with the awareness that tax revenue is essential to develop the nation and 
thereby of benefit to the people. Therefore, the public would realize their 
responsibility to pay tax while paying Zakat, regardless of their political views or 
their sentiments towards the government. While Zakat is a religious obligation, 
income tax is a national obligation; hence, both are important for improving the 
quality of living of the people and should not be perceived as burden to Muslims 
as payment of double tax. However, as the subject of Zakat is not within the scope 
of this research, a study may also be conducted of Malaysian Muslim taxpayer 
compliance behaviour towards Zakat and income tax.  
In understanding the culture of Malaysia, any discussion relating to ethnicity and 
religiosity would be regarded as sensitive matters. However, findings from the 
study are to be regarded from an academic point of view to provide empirical 
knowledge of how revenue bodies could secure compliance through an 
understanding of taxpayer compliance behaviour. 
The results of the study, as presented above, discuss the IRBM’s strategies in 
managing internal and external risks. Although IRBM has not fully established the 
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risk management strategies in its compliance risk programmes, the Board appears 
to apply the guidelines and concepts of risk management set by the OECD and the 
EC. Based on feedback by the interviewees about taxpayers’ lack of knowledge of 
their tax obligations, an extensive educational campaign is needed to inform the 
public about the role of tax in developing the nation and how the revenue is spent 
by the government.  
In addition to education, any government projects or programmes of benefit to the 
public are to be highlighted through mass media so that the people realize that 
they also play a part in contributing to the projects. Consequently, this would raise 
their tax morale and encourage them take pride in being a good citizen, promoting 
their willingness to pay tax in future. Nevertheless, there would be taxpayers who 
may disagree with the projects and believe that the government is wasting their 
money (Kornhauser, 2007). As a result, this may decrease their tax morale and 
eventually decrease their willingness to comply.  
Risk management strategies and responsive regulation theories portray a ‘perfect 
picture’ in regulating responsively to secure voluntary compliance. In fact, these 
concepts have proved to be effective and have been implemented by a number of 
tax administrations, namely the ATO, NZIR, HMRC and some EC member 
countries. However, for tax administration in developing nations, limitations of a 
financial nature and those relating to the workforce may reduce the success rate of 
the strategies to manage compliance risks, as well as other internal and external 
risks, efficiently.  
Through his regular speeches in the IRBM portal and during monthly staff 
assemblies, the present CEO of the IRBM motivated staff to work hard to improve 
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tax administration, increase tax collection and instil public confidence in the 
IRBM by delivering excellent services to the customers and stakeholders. He also 
reminded staff that a lack of human and financial resources is not to be seen as 
limitation but as a challenge to be overcome by the staff by shaping up and 
putting all their energies into providing the best service to taxpayers.  Hence, 
through effective strategies in managing risks, revenue bodies may be able to 
deliver services efficiently and most importantly to minimise compliance risk and 
maximise revenue collection. 
9.3 Research Contribution 
This study provides a number of significant contributions to knowledge 
empirically, methodologically and conceptually. At an empirical level, this study 
involves: 
 An investigation from the perspective of tax administration rather than 
most studies, which investigate from the taxpayer’s point of view. From 
this study, the IRBM officials’ responses were obtained to find out their 
views of IRBM risk management practices and Malaysian taxpayers’ 
behaviour.  
 This study adds to the tax administration literature by examining 
Malaysian tax officials' perceptions of how the IRBM manages internal 
and external risk and also their perceptions of Malaysian taxpayers’ 
behaviour. Participants agreed that most of the enforcement strategies 
adopted by the IRBM are consistent with the concept of responsive 
regulation. However, they believed that the IRBM could enhance its 
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approach towards the management of non-compliance by emphasising a 
softer approach. 
 The study finds that the tax administrations of developing countries are 
faced with similar internal risks, such as financial limitations, a lack of 
automated processes and corruption. In terms of external challenges, tax 
administrations are faced with underground economies and non-
compliance behaviour from taxpayers. From the interviews, it was 
discovered that non-compliance behaviour is influenced by a lack of 
knowledge about tax obligations, attitudes towards complying with the 
law, language barriers and also attitudes towards the current government. 
 This study also adds to the literature on risk management in tax 
administration by highlighting the IRBM’s strategies to foster voluntary 
compliance, in particular the use of education programmes as a soft 
approach by providing relevant information to the public. It informs of the 
early education strategies introduced to primary and secondary schools to 
create awareness about the taxation system in Malaysia.  
 The study also finds that the IRBM had implemented a number of 
strategies, such as enhancing its education programmes and improving 
services to taxpayers by providing many e-Services such as e-Filing, e-
Payment, e-Stamping, e-register, text messaging facilities and other e-
Services. It appears that the education programmes conducted by the 
IRBM are comparable to those of tax administrations in the developed 
countries. The study also highlights the soft approaches as well as the hard 
approaches adopted by the IRBM, as presented in Section 9.2.  
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Methodologically, this study is unique in terms of: 
 Looking at the Malaysian tax authority using face-to-face interviews.  
 The IRBM was chosen as a case study because, as an insider, the author 
had easy access to information and documents which may not be 
accessible to outside researchers.  
 A qualitative approach through face-to-face interviews and document 
analysis, as described in Chapter Four, provides a new and rich 
perspective on risk management practices in Malaysia.  
 The studies of internal documents, the Integrity Plan and the Strategic 
Plan, have contributed supporting information to the study. 
In addition, conceptual contributions from the study involve: 
 This study extends the literature on responsive regulation by showing how 
it can be applied in the context of a developing country.  
 Information gathered from literatures, interviews and secondary data were 
used to develop a conceptual framework, illustrated in Figure 13. A lamp-
shade shaped model, rather than a pyramid shaped model, explains the 
relationship between taxpayer behaviour, risk management and responsive 
regulation. It also informs of the IRBM’s responsive strategies in 
managing taxpayers’ compliance behaviour.  
As stated in Section 1.4.1 and further addressed in Chapter 5, developing 
countries appear to have internal risks, such as shortages of human resources, 
financial resources and technological expertise. Therefore, it would be a challenge 
for the implementation of the risk-based compliance management to be fully 
successful. By learning from other tax agencies’ experience in implementing 
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responsive regulation in their administrations, some important knowledge would 
be gained to then be adapted to suit their own administration. Nevertheless, it may 
not be necessary for developing countries to copy-and-paste all that has been 
implemented by their developed counterparts. As “one size does not fit all” 
(Russell, 2010, p.1), those from developing economies may need to adopt the 
concept of risk-based compliance management according to the culture, people, 
economy, infrastructure and other challenges relevant to their country.  
Tax administrations in developing countries, such as Brazil, South Africa, Turkey 
and other upper-medium-income countries, as well as other tax administrations, 
may be interested to learn of the compliance risk management strategies 
suggested in this study, and might carry out similar activities based on the 
suitability for their administration. In addition, other enforcement agencies, such 
as the Customs Department, Police Department, Companies’ Registrar and other 
regulatory agencies may also benefit from the study in terms of responsive 
strategies to manage compliance with their customers.   
This section presents the empirical, methodological and conceptual contributions 
of this study so that the knowledge can be shared with other regulatory body 
especially the tax administration. However, the author acknowledges that there are 
a number of limitations encountered while conducting the research. 
9.4 Limitations of the research 
As noted by Scandura and Williams (2000) cited in Yong (2011, p.167), “it is 
impossible to create a perfect study that can be considered the final answer to a 
research problem”. There are a number of limitations to this study which are 
acknowledged in this section. 
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As stated in Section 4.4.3, seven branches of the IRBM were visited for the 
interviews with officials. Even though the study finds that all branches provided 
similar perceptions of risk management practice in the IRBM, richer data could be 
obtained if further study is conducted as below. 
 More branches were selected for the interviews, especially those branches 
with special characteristics. For example, the east coast region is known to 
have a population with a high-level of religious values; hence religiosity 
might be a factor to influence the compliance behaviour of taxpayers in the 
region. Also, in branches in East Malaysia, where the majority of the 
population is comprised of indigenous ethnic groups and where the culture 
and language are different from those in Peninsular Malaysia, a study of 
compliance behaviour may add to the literature about the determining 
factors that motivate compliance. 
 The interviewees comprised senior and middle-level managers. To obtain 
richer data, IRBM personnel from various ranks could be interviewed to 
provide responses from different perspectives.  
The study noted a small sample size of tax practitioners interviewed whereby only 
six tax practitioners were interviewed. Section 4.4.3 explains the reluctance of tax 
practitioners to be interviewed. Nevertheless, a larger number of tax practitioners 
being interviewed might provide richer and more in-depth insights into tax 
practitioners’ perceptions of the IRBM’s performance in terms of risk 
management. Tax practitioners also could be selected from different categories, 
such as those from the Big-4 companies, small companies and self-employed 
practitioners. 
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The study involves interviews with tax officials to discuss the IRBM’s 
performance, with the result that a one-sided perspective is obtained. For that 
reason, tax practitioners were involved in the interviews to gain a different 
perspective for data collection. However, seeking the perceptions of taxpayers 
towards the IRBM’s performance would establish a more dynamic triangulation 
for data collection. In order to obtain data from taxpayers, a mixed method 
approach could be adopted whereby the perceptions of taxpayers were obtained 
from surveys, a quantitative approach. Through surveys, a large number of 
taxpayers could be included to add value to the data collection. 
Another limitation of the study is the qualitative approach adopted in this 
research. Due to time constraints, data collection methods undertaken by this 
study involved interviews of IRBM personnel and tax practitioners in Malaysia as 
well as data obtained from internal IRBM documents. Richer data could have 
been obtained through observation, with the researcher present at customer service 
counters to observe how IRBM staffs provide services to customers. The author 
could also have joined the audit teams and the investigation teams during visits 
and raids to taxpayers’ offices or homes. From these visits/raids, reactions from 
taxpayers and responses to the situation by IRBM customer service 
staff/auditors/investigators could have been observed clearly; hence richer data 
could have been obtained from this method.  
The qualitative approach, through semi-structured interviews, does have 
limitations. Some of the weaknesses of this data collection method are as follows: 
 Selected participants were reluctant to be interviewed face-to-face for fear 
of disclosing sensitive or confidential information. 
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 A few participants were cautious in their responses, again for the reason 
stated above. This is proven in Appendix 3 where 15 interviewees had 
requested that the interviews were conducted without being taped. 
 Interviews are time-consuming as well as labour and resource intensive. 
Long hours were taken to transcribe the interviews verbatim. In addition, 
travelling to meet interviewees involved considerable expense.  
 Interviewing non-English speakers was another challenge because the 
interviews had to be translated into English before the transcription could be 
done. 
The next limitation noted by the author is that being an insider has its own 
implications too. The limitations are as follows: 
 As explained in Section 4.5, even though various steps were taken to ensure 
analysis of the data was conducted professionally, the experience and 
knowledge gained while working in the organisation may influence the 
researcher’s thoughts and feelings in writing the thesis; this may result in 
potential bias in data analysis.  
 In discussing the findings of a study, researchers should be honest and 
unbiased in reporting the findings on the basis of the data collected and 
analysed. However, for an insider, it was somewhat difficult to be critical of 
one own employer, even though the objective is to produce academic 
findings, rather than express a personal opinion.  
 Another limitation of being an insider was the predicament in deciding 
whether certain issues highlighted by participants could be reported in the 
thesis. In the Malaysian context, some issues may appear to be sensitive, 
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particularly if comments about religion and ethnicity are concerned. 
However, as an academic researcher, the author has sought to be 
professional and transparent in discussing the findings of the study and to 
report them from an academic perspective. 
 Some participants appeared to provide brief answers. This may have been 
because they thought that, as an insider, the author would have been aware 
of the issues relating to the study. Therefore, the author had to request 
clarification and explanation of their feedback so that the data collected 
could come from the interviewees, not from the author’s own assumptions; 
thus validity of the data collected and analysed is guaranteed.  
The limitations of the study as discussed above can be overcome by undertaking a 
number of actions suggested for future research in the following section. 
9.5 Suggestions for future research 
The area of compliance risk management and responsive regulation theory, 
particularly in a Self-Assessment System, offers opportunities for additional 
research to extend the findings. This section provides several suggestions as 
follow: Firstly, the present study presents IRBM officials’ and Malaysian tax 
practitioners’ perceptions of current practice in managing risks. Further research 
may be undertaken to explore the perceptions of taxpayers towards the IRBM 
regulatory responses. Future study may find that the IRBM’s educational 
activities are sufficient to educate taxpayers and hence able to increase voluntary 
compliance.  
Secondly, as noted in Section 1.6, individual and sole-proprietor taxpayers have 
been chosen for their lack of knowledge of taxation and resistance to acquire more 
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knowledge about taxation, especially business income taxpayers with financial, 
time and language constraints. Future study may look into managing non-
compliance risk by large businesses. Even though the corporate tax structure is 
more complicated than the individual tax structure, the use of tax consultants to 
manage their tax affairs has resulted in corporate taxpayers being more compliant 
and systematic in managing their tax liabilities. Hence, future study might draw 
our attention to large taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, considering whether the 
risk management strategies carried-out on this group of taxpayers are similar to 
those for sole-proprietors or whether a different approach would be desired. 
Thirdly, this research’s conceptual framework demonstrates steps to manage 
compliance risks whilst applying enforcement strategies responsively in the 
process. It is suggested that future research could test the framework to the 
IRBM’s actual practice. This would provide insights into the practical application 
of risk-based concepts into the risk management processes suggested by the EC 
and the OECD to determine whether the conceptual framework could be put into 
operation not only by the IRBM but also other tax administrations. 
Fourthly and finally, going global, empirical investigation of tax administration in 
developing countries within the same region, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Philippines, could be carried out for future research. This would establish whether 
the findings from this study are applicable in terms of risk management strategies 
and responsive regulation adoption in their administrations. Future studies from 
these countries may also ascertain if taxpayers from each country share similar 
non-compliance behaviour and attitudes; it would be interesting to explore the 
motivations behind the decision to evade the tax law. 
286 
 
9.6 Policy and practical recommendations 
Findings from the study support views from the previous literature that voluntary 
compliance is influenced by efficient risk management strategies which adopt 
responsive enforcement approaches when responding to taxpayers’ compliance 
behaviour. These findings could help the IRBM and other tax regulators to 
identify compliance risks and to carry out effective risk management strategies to 
improve compliance and ultimately increase revenue collection. The study 
proposes some risk-based measures that could be implemented by the IRBM, such 
as enhancing education programmes, improving procedures, establishing smart-
partnerships with other agencies and adopting a shaming approach.   
9.6.1 Enhancing education programmes 
The literature suggests that trusting the government and the tax system may 
increase tax compliance. In this regard, the IRBM needs to demonstrate its 
competence to gain trust from the public regarding the efficiency of officials’ 
when dealing with taxpayers. Thus, training and retraining of tax personnel are 
necessary to enhance their knowledge and skills regarding procedures and 
services to the taxpayers. The literature and data from interviews have highlighted 
the importance of IRBM officials upgrading and updating their technical 
knowledge and their treatment of taxpayers. The conceptual model designed in 
this study suggests responsive approaches to be adopted by IRBM personnel 
based on compliance risks posed by taxpayers. Tax personnel who treat taxpayers 
respectfully and discuss technical matters fluently may earn the respect and trust 
of taxpayers, a reciprocity effect which may contribute to improving compliance. 
Meanwhile, training should focus not only on providing technical knowledge of 
tax laws to the officials but also on applying the concept of responsive regulation 
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when dealing with taxpayers by maintaining interpersonal values such as 
professionalism, fairness, respect, friendliness and politeness. However, as 
suggested by the responsive regulation concept, officials could respond tit-for-tat 
and be firm in their conduct when dealing with recalcitrant taxpayers. The on-
going and continued training may increase the competency of IRBM personnel 
and subsequently may gain the trust and respect of the public. Generally, people 
have a tendency to respond to other people in the way in which they were treated 
(Feld and Frey, 2005; McKerchar, 2003). Responsive treatment of taxpayers 
would establish reciprocity in taxpayers’ positive response towards the IRBM.   
As discussed in Chapter Eight, IRBM has taken the initiative to conduct various 
educational programmes to promote tax knowledge to the public. As education 
activities should be on-going and season-less activities, the IRBM could continue 
with the education programmes so that a wider range of taxpayers and locations 
could be included. As some participants commented, due to the insufficient 
number of staff, there are many remote locations which the IRBM is incapable of 
exploring to reach people. Media publicity, either through newspapers, radio, TV 
or websites, is the best channel of communication to distribute information about 
taxation to the public. Dissemination of knowledge through the mass media 
enables information to cover a wide range and to reach the most people.  
In addition to media publicity, IRBM personnel could continue the education 
programmes by visiting taxpayers’ premises to deliver tax education in person and 
to encourage face-to-face communication with the public. Taxpayers should also 
be informed of the policy and procedures implemented by the IRBM so that they 
are well-informed of any action it conducts and know what to expect from the 
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process. This information could also be delivered through other avenues, such as 
workshops and seminars as on-going educational activities to foster tax 
compliance. As business-income taxpayers are perceived as high-risk categories 
for non-compliance, tax education as facilitated by the BSU workshops is to be 
continued. Low attendance at the workshops indicates a lack of motivation on the 
part of taxpayers. To attract them to participate voluntarily in the education 
activity, ‘carrots’ could be used as incentives to motivate them. 
9.6.2 Establishing collaboration with other agencies 
With limited financial resources and workforce, it is rather difficult for the IRBM 
to ensure that detection of non-compliance can be implemented all over the 
nation. As suggested by the EC (2010) and discussed in Section 5.2, the IRBM 
may consider joining forces with other third parties to reach the public. By 
identifying organisations and associations which represent members who earn 
taxable income, the IRBM could obtain information about the members of the 
association for detection and education. In addition, networking with other 
agencies may assist in disseminating tax information to members of the 
association. Thus, the IRBM could work closely with associations representing 
traders, such as the Malay Chambers of Commerce, the Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and other similar associations as most of the potential taxpayers, in 
fact high income earners, are within these groups.  
Furthermore, to approach farmers and rubber tappers, the IRBM could collaborate 
with relevant associations, such as the Federal Land Development Authority 
(FELDA) and the Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development Authority 
(RISDA) which are responsible for the oil palm smallholders and rubber industry 
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smallholders respectively. With the increase in oil palm and rubber prices, the 
income earned by most oil palmers and rubber tappers was more than that earned 
by civil servants. Besides catching these people in the tax net, the imposition of 
tax on these groups of people may perhaps increase the tax morale of civil 
servants and other taxpayers; this treatment by the IRBM appears to be one of 
procedural justice and IRBM personnel would appear to treat all taxpayers fairly 
(Feld and Frey, 2005).  
Nevertheless, the IRBM may consider setting-up a small unit to initiate an 
exploration of cash economy activities in Malaysia. To overcome the issue of 
insufficient manpower, the IRBM may jointly organise  exploration activities with 
other relevant public agencies, such as the Customs Department which 
investigates  smuggling activities, the Immigration Department which investigates 
activities where foreign individuals are involved and the Small-Business Registrar 
Division which ensures that businesses are registered. Collaboration between the 
Central Bank of Malaysia, the Malaysian Royal Customs Department and the 
IRBM in 2011 to eradicate money laundering and illegal operations has proved 
that such cooperation is necessary to prevent tax evasion. As depicted by the 
conceptual model (Figure 13), the shape of the lamp-shade may grow wider at the 
top if the IRBM fails to act on shadow economy non-compliance, which in future 
may grow bigger and become more difficult to manage.  
As a government agency, the IRBM could initiate government-to-government 
interaction by sharing information about taxpayers. IRBM could request that the 
government introduces a policy whereby other public sectors, such as the Road 
Transport Department, the Land Offices, the Housing Department and other 
relevant agencies, channel information to the IRBM online when members of the 
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public are involved in selling and purchasing luxury vehicles or dealing in sales 
and purchases of land and properties.  
Furthermore, tax practitioners are the people who work closely together with 
taxpayers and are responsible for advising their clients on their tax obligation. By 
having good relationships between IRBM and tax practitioners, the IRBM could 
take the opportunity to influence tax practitioners to encourage their clients to 
report accurately and pay promptly.  
Recognising the importance of having third-parties to support the IRBM in its 
mission to improve tax administration in this country,  the Board could take the 
initiative to identify suitable partners to form these smart-partnerships and 
establish strategic alliances in improving the tax system in Malaysia.  
9.6.3 Improving procedures 
The IRBM could review and revise some of its procedures regularly to improve 
its service delivery. Taxpayers satisfaction with the services rendered may 
influence their tax morale and may contribute to an increase in compliance. Some 
of the work processes, such as the refund of overpayments, could be executed 
faster so that taxpayers would not only be happy to get their money back, but 
would also trust and respect the IRBM for its efficient service. Subsequently, 
these taxpayers would always be willing to pay their tax obligation in future and 
would submit their return promptly because they trust that the system will return 
their money faster if there is any credit available.  
With the introduction of e-Filing in 2006, the time taken to process refunds has 
improved tremendously. Prior to e-Filing, the average time taken to process 
refunds was about three months, but with e-Filing, the time taken has been 
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reduced to one month. The IRBM could reduce the time taken to make refunds if 
more research on the refund process is done. Another suggestion by participants 
was the simplification of return forms to ease the form filling process for 
taxpayers. To promote voluntary compliance, the IRBM could constantly review 
and simplify the tax rules and procedures to help taxpayers comply with the 
regulation easily and effortlessly.  
9.6.4 Adopting a shaming approach 
It is interesting to note that shaming techniques (Kornhauser, 2007; Devos, 2009; 
Braithwaite, 2011) implemented by a few tax agencies, especially in the United 
States, have proved an effective means to ‘punish’ delinquent taxpayers for failing 
to comply with the law. Even though this approach may appear harsh because the 
publicity may tarnish the good image of the taxpayer, other taxpayers may begin 
to trust the tax system and respect the tax authority for being fair in their 
treatment. Moreover, this technique will be more effective if the person ‘shamed’ 
by the publicity is a public figure, such as a politician, celebrity, or sportsperson. 
Even though this action may appear to discriminate against the taxpayer, it may 
also instil awareness in the public that the law is fair and gives equal treatment to 
all, regardless of social status.  
To the developed countries, the shaming mechanism may be a common action to 
be practiced by the authorities. However, this method may not be suitable for 
implementation by tax administrations in developing countries. This is due to a 
different culture and public perceptions towards defaming people in the public 
(Yong, 2011). Shaming politicians may be a major concern in some societies and 
bad publicity for a celebrity may upset her/his fans, which may lead to the public 
condemning the tax authorities for their ‘inhumane’ treatment, and eventually 
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may reduce tax compliance. In the Malaysian context, for the IRBM to pursue  the 
shaming approach, further study needs to be conducted, especially on Section 138 
of the ITA, which concerns publicising  a person’s details that are considered to 
be classified. 
9.7 Conclusion 
The present study has attempted to add to the existing literature through 
discussion of the Malaysian tax administration’s management of risk after 
implementation of SAS. This study particularly explores the internal and external 
risks faced by the IRBM and provides important insights and knowledge on how 
risks are managed by the Board. The study of the IRBM current risk management 
practice provides a platform for other tax administrations, particularly in 
developing countries, to obtain insights into how the Malaysian tax administration 
applies a responsive approach, such as taxpayer education programmes, to 
encourage voluntary compliance in SAS in Malaysia.  
Findings from the study also establish that the IRBM, as a responsive regulator, 
uses appropriate responsive risk management strategies to cross the compliance 
boundary and move taxpayers into the compliance zone. Further, the study has 
shed light on the responsive relationship between key actors in the Malaysian tax 
administration: the IRBM, tax practitioners and taxpayers, which shape the 
fairness, efficiency and integrity of the tax system in Malaysia.  
Finally, the ‘lamp-shade’ model developed in this study portrays appropriate 
responses by regulators in managing compliance risks by regulatees. The 
conceptual framework shows the links between the three major strands of the 
study:  tax compliance, risk management and responsive regulation. The study 
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indicates a significant relationship between the themes which are essential to 
ensure a higher tax compliance rate under the SAS. Contributions of this study 
may add knowledge to other regulators in formulating enforcement strategies to 
encourage voluntary compliance in their organisation.   
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Appendix 1: Organisation Chart of the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
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Appendix 2: Offences, Fines and Penalties  
 
Type Of Offences  
Provisions 
Under ITA 1967  
Amount of Fine (RM)  
Failure (without reasonable excuse) to furnish an 
Income Tax Return Form. 
112(1) 
200 to 2,000 / imprisonment / 
both  
Failure (without reasonable excuse) to give notice 
of chargeability to tax. 
112(1) 
200 to 2,000 / imprisonment / 
both  
Make an incorrect tax return by omitting or 
understating any income. 113(1)(a)  
1,000 to 10,000 and 200% of tax 
undercharged  
Give any incorrect information in matters 
affecting the tax liability of a taxpayer or any 
other person. 
113(1)(b)  
1,000 to 10,000 and 200% of tax 
undercharged  
Wilfully and with intent to evade or assist any 
other person to evade tax. 
114(1) 
1,000 to 20,000 / imprisonment / 
both and 300% of tax 
undercharged  
Assist or advise (without reasonable care) others 
to under declare their income. 
114(1A) 
2,000 to 20,000 /imprisonment / 
both  
Attempt to leave the country without payment of 
tax. 
115(1) 200 to 2,000 /imprisonment / both  
Obstruct any authorized officer of IRBM in 
carrying out his duties. 
116 
1,000 to 10,000 / imprisonment / 
both  
Fails (without reasonable excuse) to comply with 
an order to keep proper records and 
documentation. 
119A 
300 to 10,000 / imprisonment / 
both  
Fails (without reasonable excuse) to comply with 
a notice asking for certain information as required 
by IRBM. 
120(1) 200 to 2,000 /imprisonment / both  
Fails (without reasonable excuse) to give notice 
on changes of address within 3 months. 
120(1) 200 to 2,000 /imprisonment / both  
Payment of Income Tax 
Type of 
Offences  
Source of 
Income  
Provisions 
Under ITA 
1967 
Penalties 
Pay taxes after 
30th April. 
 
 
Non-
Business  
103(3)  a. 10% increment from the tax payable, and 
 
b. Additional 5% increment on the balance of (a) if 
payment is not made after 60 days from the final date 
Pay taxes after 
30th June.  
Business 103(4)  
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Payment of Estimated Income Tax (For Business Income)  
Type of Offences  
Provisions Under 
ITA 1967 
Penalties 
Pay instalments after 30 days of the 
date set. 
 
 
107B(3) 10% on instalment due  
Actual tax 30% higher than the 
revised estimate of tax. 
107B(4) 
10% of the difference in actual tax balances 
and estimated tax made 
Source: Income Tax: Offences, Fines & Penalty.  (URL: 
http://incometax.my/law/Offences_Fines_and_Penalties.htm)  
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Appendix 3: List of Interviewees  
 
 
Data Capture:  Interview recorded on tape – T 
Interview without the tape on – NT 
  No interview but written responses were submitted – W 
 
  
 Interviewees Code name Data Capture 
1 State Director RL1 T 
2 Senior Executive HQ RL2 T 
3 State Director RL3 T 
4 Branch Director RL4 T 
5 Department Director RL5 T 
6 State Director RL6 T 
7 Branch Director RL7 T 
8 Department Director RL8 T 
9 State Director RL9 T 
10 Branch Director RL10 T 
11 Unit Head RL11 T 
12 Tax Auditor RL12 W 
13 Senior Executive HQ RL13 T 
14 Deputy Branch Director RL14 T 
15 Branch Director RL15 T 
16 Department Director RL16 NT 
17 Deputy Head of Division RL17 NT 
18 Unit Head  RL18 W 
19 Head of Division RL19 NT 
20 Division Executive RL20 NT 
21 Head of Division RL21 NT 
22 Desk auditor RL22 NT 
23 Field auditor RL23 NT 
24 Field auditor RL24 NT 
25 Desk/Field auditor RL25 NT 
26 Field auditor RL26 NT 
27 Executive RL27 NT 
28 Head of Division RL28 NT 
29 Department executive RL29 NT 
30 Division executive RL30 NT 
    
1 Tax Practitioner RT1 W 
2 Tax Practitioner RT2 W 
3 Tax Practitioner RT3 T 
4 Tax Practitioner RT4 T 
5 Tax Practitioner RT5 W 
6 Tax Practitioner RT6 NT 
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Appendix 4: Guide for interview with IRBM officials 
1. Before the interview 
 Choose a suitable place for interview. 
o Interviews will be held at the interviewees office room 
 Explain the purpose of the interview 
 Assure about confidentiality 
 Explain about the format of the interview 
o A one-hour interview 
o A conversational interview 
o Ask permission to use tape recorder 
 Allow interviewee to clarify any doubts about the interview 
 Get the tape ready 
 
2. During the interview 
Interview questions 
A. Preliminary questions 
 How long have you been in service with IRBM? And how long are you in 
this current post? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 As a ….. how would you describe the work you do?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 Could you please tell me a bit about your previous post and experience?  
______________________________________________________________ 
B. Challenges 
 What are the types of taxpayers or activities that caused major concerned for 
you in your daily working activities?  
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Would you explain how you handled the issues?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Is there any procedure or pre-plan action that you refer to?  
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______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you anticipate any work-related challenges which might occur in the near 
future?  
o If yes, please explain what are the challenges?  
______________________________________________________________ 
o Do you make any preparation in anticipation of the challenges? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
C. Taxpayers’ education 
 What is your view on the taxpayers’ education programs organized by 
IRBM? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Do you feel that the activities are enough, or more should be done? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 In your opinion, do you think the objective of the programs is achieved? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 From the year the programs started until now, which is for …. years, do you 
feel there is any changes in the taxpayers perception towards tax education, is 
there any increase in compliance due to the education activities? 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Are you satisfied with the education programs?  
o If yes, details? If no, why not? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In what way do you think that it can be improved? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Is there any education programs/activities implemented by your 
department/branch other than those conducted by the HQ level? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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D. Compliance 
Before we discuss further about compliance, let’s have the same 
understanding of what compliance means.  
 In your daily practice, what do you think compliance means? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 In your branch, what is the rate of non-compliance? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Do you think the rate is high or low or acceptable? Why? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 What type of non-compliance that has the highest %; and why do you think 
the … type is higher compared to other types of non-compliance? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Why do you think taxpayers refuse to comply with the tax regulations? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Do you feel that what is done by IRBM now is enough or more should be 
done? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 What do you think we should do to encourage compliance? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Does IRBM identify different categories of taxpayers in its compliance 
strategies? 
o If yes, what are the categories?  What special strategies are taken for each 
category? 
______________________________________________________________ 
o If no, why are the taxpayers not categorized into different types of 
compliance?  
______________________________________________________________ 
o The ATO, HMRC, NZIR and other tax administrations have identified 
different types of taxpayers so that different strategies can be taken for 
different types of taxpayers. Do you feel it is necessary for IRBM to take 
similar actions? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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 What do you think the taxpayers would require from the IRBM in order to 
comply with the tax regulation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 How do you allocate resources for taxpayer education and taxpayer 
compliance? 
o How do you decide who get prioritised? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
E. Self-Assessment System 
 Some literature note that SAS leads to poorer tax compliance because it opens 
the opportunity for taxpayers to under declare their income and understate 
their tax liability. What is your opinion of this statement? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 IRBM has implemented SAS for individual taxpayers for 5 years now. In your 
opinion, is there any improvement in taxpayers’ compliance compared to the 
Formal Assessment System? 
o If yes, what are the improvements?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
o If no, why is there no improvement?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
o What more are needed to be done? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 With the introduction of self-assessment system and e-Filing, is there any 
changes in your practise? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 One of the elements which contribute to the success of SAS implementation in 
Japan is a very efficient computerized system for data processing and data 
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storage. Do you think IRBM’s computer system is as efficient and helpful in 
the implementation of SAS?  
 If no, what is lacking? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 According to the e-Filing statistics, 31% of taxpayers submitted the form 
online. What do you think should be done more by IRBM to encourage 
69% of taxpayers to submit through e-Filing? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
F. Self-regulation 
 What do you think would make a good relationship with the IRBM? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think by having a good relationship with the taxpayers, non-
compliance can be reduced? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In your view, by having a relationship with the taxpayers, they will be more 
cooperative? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Will enforcement be hard to do if you have good relationship with the 
taxpayers? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Is there any difference in calling the taxpayer a ‘customer’ than a ‘taxpayer’? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What is your opinion of self-regulation in Malaysia tax administration? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think Malaysia taxpayers are ready for self-regulation?  
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o If not, when do you think they will be ready? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What do you anticipate from the self-regulation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What need to be done by IRBM to encourage self-regulation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 How do you view the taxpayers would think of the situation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
G.  Tax administration in developing countries 
 Most of the research on taxpayer compliance and behaviour has been done in 
western countries. In your opinion, do you think Malaysia has different 
problems from the western countries?  
o If yes, what are the differences?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In some developing countries, non-compliance is a serious problem due to 
insufficient tax services and enforcement activities. Do you think Malaysia 
also has these issues? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What do you think make IRBM different from tax administrations in other 
developing countries? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 One of the reason that determine the high level of compliance in some western 
countries and Japan is the active utilization of penalty provisions on 
delinquent taxpayers, compared to some developing countries which applied 
the provision inconsistently. Hence the lower rates on compliance in those 
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countries. Do you think IRBM is similar with other developing countries in 
the penalty imposition context?  
o If yes, why do you think it is difficult to apply the penalty provision in this 
country? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you feel that penalties imposed are tough enough for taxpayers who refuse 
to comply?  
o If no, what are your suggestions? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Many researchers discover that other issues faced by tax administrations in 
developing countries are corruption, inefficient administration, inefficiency in 
allocation of resources, complex tax systems and lack of professionalism, 
among other things. Do you agree with these findings?  
o Do you think IRBM has similar issues? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
o If yes, what do you think should be done to overcome these issues?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
o If not, what make IRBM different? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
H. Compliance model 
 Have you ever come across or aware of any compliance model used by other 
tax administrations? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 If yes, ask which models that they have seen? 
 Do you see the compliance model as relevant to IRBM generally and to 
your work in particular? 
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______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you use its principles in your current practice?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think IRBM should adopt the model? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What can be improved from the model to conform to Malaysia 
environment? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 If not, explain briefly about the compliance model. 
 In your opinion, what will be the advantages by having a model?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think IRBM needs to have a compliance model? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I. Others 
 If you could give your own impressions as to how things are going now, 
compared to the past 5 years, in terms of taxpayers compliance and revenue 
collection? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What likely do you think would happen in the next 5 years?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What do you think could be done differently? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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3. After the interview 
 Check the list to see if there is any question not asked. 
 Ask if they have any questions or would like to add further on the subject 
discussed before. 
 Get their approval to be contacted later either through telephone or e-mail if 
further clarification is required. 
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Appendix 5: Guide for interview with tax practitioners 
Thank you for agreeing to spend your time to answer the questions. Rest assured 
that your identity will be anonymous and the answers given will be used for the 
thesis only and will be treated as strictly confidential. 
Interview questions 
Preliminary questions 
 Please tell me the post that you are holding now and how long have you been 
holding the current post? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 As a ….. how would you describe the work you do?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 Could you please tell me a bit about your previous post and experience?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
A. Tax practitioner 
 
 As a tax practitioner, what are your roles toward your clients? 
 
 
 
 It was said that since the implementation of SAS, tax practitioners are having 
bigger roles to play in tax compliance.  
 Do you agree with this claim?  
 
 
 
 What are the additional roles that you have to play? 
 
 
 
 A survey on Malaysia SAS has reported that 95% respondents said that SAS 
for corporate taxpayers has not been implemented effectively in Malaysia.  
 Do you agree with this report?  
 If yes, why do you think that the implementation is not effective?  
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 What would you like to recommend to the IRBM so that SAS would be 
more effectively managed?  
 
 
 
 Do you feel that SAS for individual taxpayers has the same issues?  
 
 
 The survey also indicated that the relationship between tax authorities and tax 
practitioners has not improved. 
 Why do you think the relationship has not improved?  
 
 Normally, what are the issues arises when dealing with the IRBM? 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 What do you think should be done between both parties to improve the 
relationship? 
 
 
 Studies have shown that one of the factors that influence tax practitioners’ 
behaviour is clients’ pressure on tax practitioner to act unethically to reduce 
their tax liability. 
 What is your opinion of this finding? 
 
 
 
 Practitioners have a duty both to their clients and to the system to insure taxpayers 
are complying with tax laws and filing complete and accurate tax returns. 
 What is your comment on this statement? 
 
 
 
 
 What are tax compliance complexities faced by tax practitioners when 
representing their clients?  
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B. Challenges 
 What are the types of taxpayers or activities that caused major concerned for 
you in your daily working activities?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 Would you explain how you handled the issues?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Is there any procedure or pre-plan action that you refer to?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you anticipate any work-related challenges which might occur in the near 
future?  
o If yes, please explain what are the challenges?  
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________
Do you make any preparation in anticipation of the challenges? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
C. Taxpayers’ education 
 What is your view on the taxpayers’ education programs organized by 
IRBM? 
____________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
 Do you feel that the activities are enough, or more should be done? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In your opinion, do you think the objective of the programs is achieved? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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 From the year the programs started in 2001 until now, which is for 9 years, do 
you feel there is any changes in the taxpayers perception towards tax 
education, is there any increase in compliance due to the education activities? 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Are you satisfied with the education programs?  
o If yes, details? If no, why not? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In what way do you think that it can be improved? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
D. Compliance 
Before we discuss further about compliance, let’s have the same 
understanding of what compliance means.  
 In your daily practice, what do you think compliance means? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Why do you think taxpayers refuse to comply with the tax regulations? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Do you feel that what is done by IRBM now is enough or more should be 
done to encourage compliance? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 As a tax practitioner, what do you think should be done to encourage 
compliance? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 The ATO, HMRC, NZIR and other tax administrations have identified 
different types of taxpayers so that different strategies can be taken for 
different types of taxpayers. Do you feel it is necessary for IRBM to take 
similar actions? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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 What do you think the taxpayers would require from the IRBM in order to 
comply with the tax regulation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
E. Self-Assessment System 
 Some literature note that SAS leads to poorer tax compliance because it opens 
the opportunity for taxpayers to under declare their income and understate 
their tax liability. What is your opinion of this statement? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 IRBM has implemented SAS for individual taxpayers for 5 years now. In your 
opinion, is there any improvement in taxpayers’ compliance compared to the 
Formal Assessment System? 
o If yes, what are the improvements?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
o If no, why is there no improvement?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
o What more are needed to be done? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 With the introduction of self-assessment system and e-Filing, is there any 
changes in your practice? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 One of the elements which contribute to the success of SAS implementation in 
Japan is a very efficient computerized system for data processing and data 
storage. Do you think IRBM’s computer system is as efficient and helpful in 
the implementation of SAS?  
 If no, what is lacking? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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 According to the e-Filing statistics, less than 50% of taxpayers submitted the 
form online. What do you think should be done more by IRBM to encourage 
more taxpayers to submit through e-Filing? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
F. Self-regulation (voluntary compliance) 
 What do you think would make a good relationship between the taxpayers 
and the IRBM? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think by having a good relationship with the taxpayers, non-
compliance can be reduced? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In your view, by having a relationship with the taxpayers, they will be more 
cooperative? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think enforcement would be hard to do if IRBM has a good 
relationship with the taxpayers? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Is there any difference in calling the taxpayer a ‘customer’ than a ‘taxpayer’? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What is your opinion of self-regulation in Malaysia tax administration? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think Malaysia taxpayers are ready for self-regulation?  
o If not, when do you think they will be ready? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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 What do you anticipate from the self-regulation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What need to be done by IRBM to encourage self-regulation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 How do you view the taxpayers would think of the situation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
G.  Tax administration in developing countries 
 Most of the research on taxpayer compliance and behaviour has been done in 
western countries. In your opinion, do you think Malaysia has different 
problems from the western countries?  
o If yes, what are the differences?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In some developing countries, non-compliance is a serious problem due to 
insufficient tax services and enforcement activities. Do you think Malaysia 
also has these issues? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What do you think make IRBM different from tax administrations in other 
developing countries? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 One of the reason that determine the high level of compliance in some western 
countries and Japan is the active utilization of penalty provisions on delinquent 
taxpayers, compared to some developing countries which applied the provision 
inconsistently. Hence the lower rates on compliance in those countries. Do you 
think IRBM is similar with other developing countries in the penalty 
imposition context?  
If yes, why do you think it is difficult to apply the penalty provision in this 
country? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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 Do you feel that penalties imposed are tough enough for taxpayers who refuse 
to comply?  
o If no, what are your suggestions? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 Many researchers discover that other issues faced by tax administrations in 
developing countries are corruption, inefficient administration, inefficiency in 
allocation of resources, complex tax systems and lack of professionalism, 
among other things. Do you agree with these findings?  
o Do you think IRBM has similar issues? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
o If yes, what do you think should be done to overcome these issues?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
o If not, what makes IRBM different? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
H. Compliance model 
 Have you ever come across or aware of any compliance model used by other 
tax administrations? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 If yes, ask which models that they have seen? 
 Do you see the compliance model as relevant to IRBM generally? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think IRBM should adopt the model? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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 What can be improved from the model to conform to Malaysia 
environment? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 In your opinion, what will be the advantages by having a model?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think IRBM needs to have a compliance model? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
I. Others 
 If you could give your own impressions as to how things are going now, 
compared to the past 5 years, in terms of taxpayers compliance and revenue 
collection? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What likely do you think would happen in the next 5 years?  
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 What do you think could be done differently? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 Please add, if you have any additional information to talk about. 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you so much for your time and contribution. 
 
Marhaini Mahmood 
PhD Researcher 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
United Kingdom 
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Appendix 6: List of Themes 
Major Themes 1
st
 Level Sub-Theme 2
nd
 Level Sub-Theme 
Risk Management Challenges 
 
 Financial resources 
 Insufficient 
information 
 Shortage of staff 
Tax Compliance Compliance 
  
 Non-Compliance 
issues 
 Compliance pyramid 
 Encouragement 
Risk Management Operational issues  
Risk Management Organizational Culture 
  
 Integrity 
 Professionalism 
 Skills 
 Staff attitude 
Risk Management Risk 
  
 
 
 New industries 
 Shadow economy 
 Technology 
Risk Management/ 
Responsive Regulation 
Risk-based Regulation 
 
 Risk-based strategies 
 Risk-based 
tools/models 
Risk Management/ 
Responsive Regulation 
System 
  
 e-Filing 
 Information 
Technology 
 Penalty provision 
 Self-assessment 
Risk Management/ Tax 
Compliance 
Tax administration 
  
   
 Developed countries 
 Developing countries 
 Malaysia 
Tax Compliance Tax practitioners 
 
 Duties 
 Ethics 
 Issues with IRBM 
Tax Compliance Taxpayer behaviour 
 
 
Responsive Regulation Taxpayer education 
  
 Education 
programmes 
 Publicity 
 Taxpayers friendly 
 
  
344 
 
Appendix 7: Amount of tax collected, Number of return forms 
received and number of registered: Individual Taxpayers* 
Year 
Total revenue 
collected (RM 
billions) 
Total number of 
return forms 
received 
(millions) 
                         
Total number of 
newly registered  
2004 9.47 2.06 NA 
2005 10.22 2.73 NA 
2006 10.41 2.64 285,008 
2007 11.59 2.64 230,658 
2008 14.35 2.48 296,873 
2009 15.57 2.59 250,228 
2010 17.08  2.66 331,826 
2011 19.38  2.74 446,200 
2012 22.96 2.93 606,872 
*For employment-income and business-income taxpayers 
NA- Not Available 
Source:  i) Internal report (2013) from Tax Operation Department, IRBM. 
 ii) IRBM Annual Report (2005, 2006, 2010). 
